Securitization process in South America 2008-2018: Brazil, Colombia and Chile

Alejandro Chaves - H725TD

Master’s degree in international Relations

Supervisor: Bernadett Lehoczki

2019
Table of Contents

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................ - 3 -
2. Existing Literature.................................................................................................................. - 6 -
3. Historical background ......................................................................................................... - 9 -
   3.1. South American regional character and sovereignty ......................................................... - 9 -
   3.2. United States Defence and Security Policy in South America ........................................ - 11 -
   3.3. South American Defence Architecture ........................................................................ - 18 -
4. Theoretical Framework ....................................................................................................... - 26 -
   4.1. Securitization Theory .................................................................................................. - 26 -
   4.2. Regional Security Complex Theory ............................................................................. - 29 -
5. Case Studies ....................................................................................................................... - 33 -
   5.1. Securitization process by Brazil ................................................................................... - 33 -
   5.2. Securitization process by Chile .................................................................................. - 41 -
   5.3. Securitization process by Colombia ............................................................................. - 49 -
   5.4. Discussion .................................................................................................................. - 59 -
6. Conclusions ......................................................................................................................... - 63 -
7. List of the literature and references .................................................................................... - 66 -
1. Introduction

In the past decade, South America has experienced significant political and social changes characterised mainly by the drastic contrast between left-wing and right-wing governments in the different countries, encouraging more struggles and debates in the international regional arena, than cooperation and partnership among the countries. In 2018 Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Venezuela underwent presidential elections meaning that there is uncertainty in the region about the direction each country will take during the next 4 years, while armed insurgencies, transnational organized crime, uncontrolled migration and border conflicts are some of the security issues ongoing in every country of the region. The objective of this research is to describe and evaluate South America’s individual and regional security challenges in the period 2008-2018 focusing in the securitization of new security issues, the influence of the United States and the role of regional international organizations. This, with the idea of presenting a comprehensive analysis of how South American countries have faced different security issues, and at the same time, how they have defined their regional standing.

This paper aims to analyse three different case studies, specifically Brazil, Chile and Colombia. These countries were chosen because of their distinctive characteristics, different sizes and diverse historical background, but also because of their willingness to cooperate regionally, since, historically these three countries have always been prone to use their diplomatic channels to solve any kind of regional dispute or issue. During the past ten years, Brazil, Colombia and Chile have had stable democratic administrations, either from left or right wing, economic stability and a globalized vision of security, adopting new approaches such as environmental and human security. And, even though there are other countries in the region, these three countries show common characteristics that can be extrapolate to the rest of the countries. Moreover, Rio de Janeiro, Bogotá and Santiago de Chile have been the official host cities of different conventions, summits and regional meetings in a large number of topics during the past century. Thus, their importance is key to promote regional cooperation and initiatives, likewise their unique and diverse characteristics give a deep understanding of the region.

As it might be expected, there is an extensive literature regarding security issues and security relations of South American countries mainly referencing the United States influence in the region, but also the creation and evolution of UNASUR as a regional actor. However, the existing literature
does not adequately address the evident political change and the importance of the securitization process of current threats and challenges in South America, neither individually nor regionally. Thus, this research gives the possibility to address a gap in the literature in which the securitization theory has not been applied to South American countries in recent years so to understand the current situation in the region to set the ground for future developments.

Hence, this paper aims to assess whether during the past ten years, the new security challenges that emerged in South America, were identified and articulated by the different administrations in order to give solutions to those security threats. This research addresses the inquiry through the lenses of the Securitization theory introduced by the Copenhagen school, analysing specifically how Brazil, Chile and Colombia articulated or at least tried to integrate solutions and policies to face given particular security threats. Particularly, understanding its limitations, the Securitization theory is proposed as the framework to properly determine how the different countries were addressing the new security issues they were facing in the period 2008-2018, who exactly was the agent/actor initiating the securitization, which premises are being used, but also to analyse the reaction of different parties and the new policies being implemented. In addition, the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) presents a complementary analysis to frame the regional situation more appropriately.

The main empirical findings show that the process of how Brazil, Chile and Colombia addressed security threats during the period 2008-2018 displayed different processes of securitization worth analysing individually as well as collectively. First, the Chilean securitization of the right of Native population to protest, defined as a terrorist threat (societal and political security), is an ongoing process, even more now that Sebastian Piñera returned to the presidency. However, this act has received backlash not only from international NGOs, but also from internal and external actors, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations. Chile securitized the fundamental democratic right of social protest by bringing up an outdate anti-terrorism law from the dictatorship years, going against international and national recommendations this securitization process has not been stopped or interrupted up until today.

On the other hand, concerning the case of Brazil and Colombia, it can be argued that the securitization process was a good and effective way of individually dealing with a new threat, but at the same time, fulfilling their government’s agenda without much opposition due to the language
of urgency and promptness been used. Despite Brazil and Colombia evident differences, they have both shown interest in protecting at any cost their natural resources (environmental and economic security) during the given analysed period. Likewise, regardless of the differences in their political views, President Lula Da Silva being from the Labour party in Brazil and Colombian President Santos being a right-wing conservative), presented interrelated securitization practices forming a security complex consistent with the RSCT. At the same time, in a regional framework, Brazil projection of soft and hard power in the region added to their willingness to move away from the influence of the Unites States, a positive initiative that can help as an empowering boost in the region.

Finally, it can be argued that if South America wants to claim a leading place on the geopolitical world and solve security issues that transcend its borders -such as drug trafficking or migration- it will have to achieve a bipartisan regional integration in the coming decades, leaving behind the Left-Right debate and engage in the resolution common issues. The results showed that Acácio, Brancoli, & Suarez (2017:277) are right when they claim that securitization could be defined as a security process, but also as a political discourse, or both. Moreover, McDonald’s criticism (2008:564) is also valid when stating that the framework of securitization is narrow because it can be defined solely in terms of the designation of threats. Hence, the description of securitization processes needs to be careful and comprehensive so there are no biases or misjudgements in the analysis.
2. Existing Literature

South American security agenda has been determined by correlated variables. First, the influence of the United States (US) in the region, second, different attempts of regionalism, and also, the individual objectives of each South American country. Therefore, it is important to describe how these variables had been analysed in the literature throughout the years. Specifically, there is a growing body of research focused on the importance of regionalism and the role of UNASUR in security cooperation matters, and other papers regarding Brazil’s influence and capacity during the past decades. However, the existing literature does not adequately address the importance of the securitization process of current threats and challenges in South America, neither individually nor regionally. Thus, this section reviews chronologically some of the most important and current papers regarding security in South America and their different approaches.

First, regarding the strong role of the US in the regional security, the paper “Security Challenges in Latin America” by Diamint (2004), focuses on Colombia, Argentina and Venezuela’s security outlines attempting to demonstrate that despite the existing regional framework for cooperation in Latin America, the United States security strategy had a big influence in how Latin American governments approached their own security issues after 9/11. The author analyses the regional arrangements and the security paradigms of the region under the shadow of the United States by focusing on the role of the civilian control of the military giving examples of the specific cases of Colombia, Argentina and Venezuela, always keeping the analysis in the regional framework. With this, the author concludes that this absence of democratic civil control over the military is reinforcing the undemocratic privileges and extensive functions of the military, as well as, threatening the consolidation of democracy in Latin America. At the same time, the author does not discard the option of a collective policy on regional security, mainly because of the existing committees, agreements and values that the region already share. Diamint’s paper was one of the first researchers that started reflecting a little bit the distinction between Central American and South American security context, this being an important notion to clearly understand the security approaches in the different countries.

A few years after, Herz (2010) in his paper “Concepts of Security in South America”, shows a clear picture of the different frameworks under which South American countries specifically define security matters in the region since the end of the Cold War. Moreover, the author addresses five
elements that can help to understand potential support for intervention in the region: the increased interest in international security in South America; the distribution of power in the international system; the portrayal of South America as a zone of peace; the broadening of the concept of security; and the centrality of the concept of state sovereignty. Thus, concluding that the five components of security in South America present a mixed scenario regarding conditions for interventionist postures, hence interventionist language and measures are confronted, but at the same time, there is an accepted interdependence in the international arena, leaving room for more cooperative behaviour in the future. Around the same period of time, different authors started to focused on the new and ground-breaking initiative of UNASUR.

Likewise, Chipman & Lockhart Smith (2010) in their paper “South America: Framing Regional Security” express that, under the context of the UNASUR summits, regional security discussions focussed on several threats that are more perceived than real, and the strategic postures and motives are more rooted in outdated believes than in present ambition. After analysing the territory and resources disputes, the outside influence, and future regional security agenda for South America under the Defence Council scheme, the authors conclude with 7 different aspects that can improve the regional security framework of the Defence council of UNASUR, highlighting aspects such as: the possibility of sanctions, regular reports and meetings, and also, the importance to cross-border security, energy and natural resources cooperative arrangements. Chipman & Lockhart Smith (2010:100) claim that should the UNASUR’s Defence Council be armed with a robust agenda, a more coordinated participation and more enforceable tools, it could build a more effective security order in the continent.

Finally, in a more recent paper, Vargas-Alzate, Sosa, & Galeano (2015) with “The Evolution of Security in South America: a comparative analysis between Colombia and Brazil” analyse the evolution of security in South America by comparing the advances of Colombia and Brazil in their transition from traditional security models to the application of the concept of human security. Through a historical analysis of both countries and a timeseries analysis of different variables such as: soldiers per inhabitant, military quality, military and social spending, and human development, the authors conclude that Brazil has gone through a gradual demilitarization that corresponds to modernization programs to meet the current demands of the international system. Colombia, on the other hand, presents the opposite trend, oriented towards militarization. Both countries show that
the human security approach is being implemented, the advance has been slow, however, differences between the two cases are smaller than expected.

As it can be seen, the South American security literature has been developing almost at the same pace than the different countries shifting their approaches from the US dependency to an UNASUR compromise in order to address the different challenges. The literature shows all the different regional attempts to reach a common position, and also, the different occasions that states have shown their willingness to increase cooperation against common security problems. However, the existing literature analyse the regional security issues and cooperation in a deductive way, from International organization and regional structures to the individual states. Therefore, it is necessary to have an intuitive analysis that starts from every individual issue of each south American state, and in that way start building up to some regional conclusions. As Vargas-Alzate, Sosa, & Galeano (2015:60) suggested, a more “comparative analysis should also be expanded to other countries in South America in order to clearly comprehend the region’s security situation”. Thus, the objective of the current paper goes along that line.
3. Historical background

3.1. South American regional character and sovereignty

Latin America and the Caribbean, Central America and South America are terms usually used indiscriminately by researchers and analysts when talking about this huge region. Many researchers assume that Latin America and the Caribbean is a homogeneous region with similar characteristics and motivations, and that is not really the case. For instance, it is possible to identify a shared sense of identity, and a common desire to cooperate in the region (Diamint, 2004:44), however, due to their historical background, geopolitics, US influence and regional institutional initiatives, South America has a different regional character compared to the one in Central America and the Caribbean (Medeiros Filho, 2017:674-675). In general, it can be said that Latin American countries have diverse democratic processes, national interests, and domestic constraints (Diamint, 2004:44), different security approaches towards illegal immigration, citizen security pandemics and corruption (Gouvea, 2017:229) and most importantly, distinctive relations with United States throughout history. But all Latin American states have suffered from domestic revolutions, military coups, state repression and have struggled to find different forms of independence from the exercise of US power (Chipman & Lockhart Smith, 2010:78). That being said, this chapter focuses on analysing the particularities of South America, however, it is important to start by having a quick overview of the different aspects of Central and South America and why South America has a stronger and more independent security identity in the region.

To begin with, it can be claimed that, the US have had a realistic approach towards the small countries in Central America, but a more indirect approach towards South American countries (Guasch, 2016). Historically, the US has played a very direct role in financing and advising armies in the smaller countries of Central America, but also training and arming rebel groups. The US have intervened political and military in Central America and the Caribbean several times mainly focusing its efforts in stopping the spread of Marxism and support of democratic rights (Palmer, 2006:10). These concerns were not unfounded, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Cuba were the principal targets of the Soviet Union, and a threat for the US security (Guasch, 2016:25-28).

The CIA’s involvement in the Coup d’état of 1954 in Guatemala, the failed Bay of Pigs Invasion in Cuba in 1961 are examples of the US direct military approach. Later on, in 1994, with the United Nations Security Council support, the US lead a military invasion in Haiti seeking for the
restoration of democracy (Guasch, 2016:34). Moreover, during the first Bush administration, US carried out a unilateral military intervention in Panama to capture its head of state due to his involvement in drug trafficking (Task Force, 2008:8). Following this trend, in more recent years, the United States still has a direct military involvement in Central America, where US military-trained officers have carried out human rights abuses, and have attempted coups in these same countries. In addition, some authors claim that the US have had great influence in spreading criminal gangs on these countries by facilitating the purchase of illegal firearms in US gun shops near the Mexican border and also deporting thousands of criminals from the US prisons to Central American nations where their judicial and prison systems are unable to restraint those criminals (Task Force, 2008:33). Massive migrations from Central America and the Caribbean countries, such as Haiti and Cuba, have such as always being a security concern for the US (Palmer, 2006:24).

On the other hand, US relations with South American countries are quite different. South America also falls under the shadow of the United States, but much less so than Central America. South America has acquired “an increased importance in regional and world affairs and a much greater awareness of its enhanced autonomy from the United States” (Little, 1987:601). The US approach towards South America has been mostly through cooperation, indirect assistance, and international aid. The US has remained neutral, yet committed to solved any disruption. There has never been clear evidence of direct military interference in the region, however, allegedly there has been some covert operations financing or supporting the militaries in Brazil, Chile and Bolivia, among others, in order to overthrown regimes (Palmer, 2006:10). Ultimately, a military invasion has never been on the table, neither in cases like Venezuela with the provocative statements of Hugo Chávez, nor in the controversial attempt of Bolivia in 2006 to nationalize natural resources against the US interests. For all that, the next two sections of this paper will focus on these characteristics to a greater extent.

However, as it can be seen, different perspectives applied to Central America and South America, hence this research address the particular case of South America in terms of security issues and how some South American countries had tried to individually and regionally counterbalance the United States with its greater sense of self-confidence and desire to diminish the historic military dependency. Thought, there is a need to highlight that this is not a recent turn of events, for instance, Child claimed that Latin America had no wish to alienate the United States or to cast the northern
superpower in the role of adversary. But there was a clear picture that Latin America had matured; that the old paternalism was no longer valid and there was a need to have a relationship of greater mutual respect. And if this did not happen, there was a danger that a new polarized and conflictual relationship would emerge; hence, the United States would have to face a much more unified Latin America (Child 1988:400). Indeed, during the past two decades, South America started outweighing the United States influence with the role of Brazil as a geopolitical pivot, and a classic regional power, in addition to a new hemispheric security architecture in the region, the progressive increase of the defence budget, and a high degree of nationalism, developing political convergence, diplomatic dialogue, military and political autonomy, while at the same time reducing, excluding and preventing the influence or interference of the United States (Castillo, 2012; Bolzan de Rezende, Blackwell, & Degaut, 2018).

3.2. United States Defence and Security Policy in South America

The goal of this section is to analyse the particular case of the United States defence and security policy agenda in South America, focusing mainly in the different role that the US Presidents have played over the years controlling and influencing some countries regarding topics of interest to the US. Moreover, it will be discussed that the US paradigm has always played a role of influence, and it has aimed mostly at addressing external threats to the region. Over the last thirty years, the United States’ influence in South America and the role it plays in regional affairs have changed dramatically. Still, the US paradigm in South America can be understood and describe in three main approaches: First, the fight against communism in the post-Cold War era; Second, the “war on drugs” and counter-terrorism approach since the middle of the 1990’s. Finally, a cooperative approach during Obama’s administration.

As we mention above, the first approach of the United State paradigm towards South America began in the late years of the Cold War. Guasch (2016) has already provided a detailed review of the evolution of US strategy in the region after the cold war, therefore, the following review does not attempt to be broad, instead, this analysis considerably summarizes his main findings, and additionally collect some supplementary literature regarding the specifics of South America relation with the US. Accordingly, in the early 90’s, as the Cold War began to wind down, United States was focused on fighting the spread of communism, even though the presence of it was small in South America (CFR, 2008:9). Between 1978 and 1991, fifteen Latin American nations turned
to or returned to electoral democracy, abandoning the authoritarian regimes that had dominated the region for some 25 years (Palmer, 2006:1). Through the Washington consensus, the US aimed to introduce open markets, strengthen democracy, and hinder the flow of illegal drugs, while at the same time containing any communist and left-wing insurgent initiative. These security priorities will remain remarkably consistent over the next two decades. (CFR, 2008:9)

In the 1990’s, the War on Drugs replaced the Cold War as the driving threat framework. The United States committed itself to a $2.2 billion program to foment drug crop eradication or crop substitution in Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, the three main producers of the cocaine produced in the US. This program was labelled The Andean Initiative, and it was the first time that a multilateral approach to the drug production and trafficking problem had been attempted. (Palmer, 2006:18). In 1994, the first Summit of the Americas introduced a Plan of Action were drug production and trafficking reduction was within the democracy strengthening objective (Palmer, 2006:80). Although both Peru and Bolivia were fully cooperating with U.S. efforts, drug manufacturers were gaining power and Colombia was at the edge of a state collapse. President Clinton introduced a major infusion of military assistance named Plan Colombia in 2000, with $1.3 billion in aid extended counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency war (Palmer, 2006:39-40).

Despite all these efforts, the US war on drugs has done little to address the real factors regarding drug production, trafficking, and consumption (CFR, 2008:11). In 2006 alone, US assistance to Colombia amounted to $741.68 million, approximately 80 percent of the military and police allocation for the whole region (Emerson, 2010:43). After many years and billions of dollars invested, US policy has not been effective in strengthening the governments or reducing drug trafficking in South America, and public insecurity in the region has increasing sharply. For instance, during the 1990s, the US Army’s School of the Americas had trained dozens of military officers with notorious records of human rights violations, but also in the 2000s, US aided Colombian Army units were among those whose members were killing thousands of civilians to falsely increase combat “body counts.” (Isacson & Kinosian, 2017). The United States assistant programs were to blame. Thus, the “War on Terror” paradigm intensified the military and security forces in South America posing a danger to democracy while also weakening civilian and democratic institutions (Diamint 2004).
Not even the diplomatic approach was coherent during those years. President Clinton’s brief visits to Venezuela, Argentina, and Brazil in October 1997 brought uncertainty to the region. The trip occurred just weeks after the United States lifted a 20–year ban on the sales of supersonic fighters planning on selling aircrafts to Chile. Venezuela started asking if they could also buy similar airplanes. While Brazil authorities were offended by Argentina’s special designation as an extra-NATO ally. Hence, President Clinton’s short trip displayed the lack of a coherent policy strategy for South America. (Palmer, 2006:42-43). Evidently, South American assessment on the US approach to hemispheric security has not always in line with the real necessities of the region. The failure of neoliberalism in South America, as a result of the ‘Lost Decade’ and the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Palmer, 2006:22), made sure that the anti-US sentiment appear again with the rise of populist leaders as a response to this widespread discomfort towards United states power (Guida, 2018:191).

As a response to the rise in populist or socialist presidencies, there was a declared change in the approach towards South America when George W. Bush was elected President of the US in 2001 (CFR, 2008:8). He pledged to make Latin America foreign policy a priority announcing several major new initiatives that were not developed mainly because since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the US attention was diverted elsewhere (CFR, 2008:9). In the following years, however, their attention turned towards terrorism and insurgent groups in the Middle East and South Asia. This sudden shift in priorities created the impression that President Bush had no coherent foreign policy towards the region, creating a negative opinion among South American leaders, he became the most unpopular US president ever (Le Grande, 2005:1). Hence, the necessity of dealing with ‘non-traditional’ issues, mainly drug trafficking and terrorism, the latter especially after 9/11, became more and more of a priority (Narich, 2003:2)

Regarding counterterrorism, US focused its attention on the tri-border shared by Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, which is home to considerable criminal activity by Middle Eastern terrorist groups and relatively low levels of government control (CFR, 2008:32; Emerson, 2010:45). At some point, Hezbollah terrorist group was also a target, and some provocative statements by Hugo Chávez and his connections with Iran raised concerns of the potential threat. However, no evidence was found regarding Islamic terrorism in Venezuela, but some evidence was established regarding money
laundering (CFR, 2008:33) and involvement in drug smuggling in the tri-border (Gouvea, 2017:232).

In 2002 Venezuela was in the spotlight again, when, one year after signing the Inter-American Democratic Charter of 2001, the US was the only country endorsing a possible military coup against Venezuela’s democratically elected president, Hugo Chávez. Despite the fact that the US gave assistance in the resolution of the Ecuador-Peru border dispute in 1995, and also helped protecting the democracy of Paraguay in 1996 (Palmer, 2006:33), this situation with Venezuela undermined the credibility of the US democracy promotion efforts, and increased the anxiety over growing nationalist governments in countries such as Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador (CFR, 2008:9-11). From that moment on, these three countries have been especially problematic for the United States mainly because they were breaking away from the economic and security policies of the US. Outside powers have allowed South America’s countries to expand their trade and diplomatic relations, and ultimately, decrease the influence of the United States. The economic presence of Russia, India, China and Iran, presented a real challenge to US’ security interests in South America.

At the same time, Brazil economic success help the country realized their territorial power, which allow them to shape their regional agenda more ambitiously aiming for a global recognition as a key player. (Chipman & Lockhart Smith 2010:93). In 2003, the Lula Administration took Brazil’s diplomatic and political relations with the US to a new low (Gouvea, 2017:236) and Brazil relations with foreign powers were perceived by the US as a potential factor that could alter the strategic and military balance in the region. Therefore, in order to bypass this external influence, the US came up with a different strategy implementing in 2004 a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Chile, in 2009 with Peru, and later in 2012 with Colombia allowing the US to develop closer security ties and to promote shared values in the region. (Gouvea, 2017:237).

Overall, the 2000s were years when Washington’s regional influence declined dramatically. Multiple indices reflect the remarkable decline of U.S. regional influence in defence and security matters. For instance, they were unable to win regional support for US military operations against Iraq. Second, failing to coax Chile and Mexico to support U.S. war plans against Iraq in the UN Security Council. Lastly, the failure to induce regional powers to accept the 2002 coup that briefly
deposed Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez, or persuade Paraguay and Peru to join the United States in a military alliance against Venezuela.

At the same time, the influence of outside powers kept growing over the years. Russia’s involvement was driven by having access to new energy resources, through Gazprom, signing agreements with Bolivia to develop its gas reserves, and partnering with Venezuela to extract crude. Following Chipman & Lockhart Smith (2010:90-93) Russia re-engaged with the region after almost 20 years of absence. In 2005 Venezuela spent $6.6bn of funds on Russian weapons, mostly for offensive warfare, procuring tanks, air-defence systems, helicopters and fighter aircrafts. In late 2008, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev visited Peru, Brazil, Venezuela, while high-level delegations from Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, Colombia also visited Moscow (Guasch, 2016:64). Russia has been able to capitalise on the economic interests of Brazil, but also, particularly in the case of Venezuela and Ecuador on their desire to upgrade their military arsenals. Later on, in 2009 the Ecuadorian government decided to close the US military base at Manta, situation that concerned the US because despite the increase in military expenditure, there was a limited presence and their efforts often met opposition (Emerson, 2010:45-46).

During the same period of time, China and India sphere of influence in South America has also became a concern for the US. Regarding defence and security, India signed its first defence export agreement with Ecuador in 2008 for the sale of advanced light helicopters. China, on the other hand, in 2013 started an aggressive commercial agenda to sell defence hardware and software mainly to Brazil and Argentina (Gouvea, 2017:232). From 2002 to 2012, China sold jets to Bolivia, expand on $150 million Venezuela’s air surveillance systems, and also donated military materiel to Bolivia, Guyana, Colombia, and Peru, such as uniforms, trucks, jeeps, field kitchens, engineering supplies, tents, gloves, and hats. Peru received a mobile field hospital and other equipment in 2010 worth $300 million” (Marcella, 2012). Furthermore, Chinese soldiers were attending military courses in Colombia and Brazil during 2010 and 2011, while in 2013, for the first time, Chinese warships conducted combat exercises with Chile, Argentina, and Brazil, finally in 2015, China took a step forward selling 27 Chinese artillery vehicles to Peru, while Argentina planned to purchase Chinese ocean patrol vessels (Guasch, 2016:62). US lacked the tools to cope with the China’s growing presence in the region. Trade relations and infrastructure investments were
The last stage of US influence in South America was characterized by a new administration in the US, the deep economy recession of Brazil, the end of the leftist regimes, and the raising interest of outside powers in the region. US President Barack Obama showed an intention to reshape and revise the US approach in the region. There was a new narrative during his administrations with adaptation and collaboration being in the core of the security paradigm. The main goal was to stop overlooking or postponing a closer security partnership between the US and South America as it had happened in previous administrations (Gouvea, 2017:224).

Another pillar of US military presence around the world is the Foreign Military Training (FMT) program. This program includes taking military and police personnel from Latin America to the U.S. for training in different areas in order to promote better interoperability between different military forces (Sánchez, 2018). The US realized that it is important to keep close relations with allies and partners by training military and police officers, particularly to avoid other global powers, such as China, to step in to fill in the gap. This new approach of the US, in addition to the deterioration of the populist left-wing political regimes, created a good environment with higher levels of security partnership and shared responsibility, avoiding the hegemonic presumption. Some examples of this are, the cooperation between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and

---

1 The Rio Group, established on 1986 is an association of 23 Latin American countries seeking a common foreign policy on a variety of issues. As a main objective, the group seeks prevention of the introduction of weapons of mass destruction in the region (NTI, 2012).
Brazil’s government during the 2016 Olympic games (Gouvea, 2017:224). Furthermore, Obama’s 2016 trip to Buenos Aires consolidated the US’ perspective of a closer cooperation and alliance with the new administration in Argentina (Gouvea, 2017:226). Despite the fact that the “war on drugs” was not a slogan used by the Obama administration, drug trafficking was still a security issue, and the US attempts to increase its military bases in the region have always drawn a lot of criticism among South American leaders (Guasch 2016:46).

The United States currently works along with security forces in every South American country but Venezuela and Bolivia. This money goes towards everything from providing weapons, to building bases and holding joint training exercises and conferences, to working with them on intelligence operations and drug raids. (Isacson & Kinosian, 2017). Since 2000, data from Security Assistant Monitor (2019) shows that the United States has spent roughly $13 billion on security assistance in South America only. Of that total, over 70.5% has gone to International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement where the top recipient over the past 18 years, by a large margin, have been Colombia ($9.9 billion), followed by Peru ($1.5 billion). Yet, with exception of cannabis, no drug produced in the region—coca, heroin, methamphetamine—has shown a sustained decline in production over those years (Isacson & Kinosian, 2017).

To recap, it can be said that the US has three different foreign policy patterns towards South American countries that can be described as, being confrontational with Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador. A moderate position in Brazil, Chile and Argentina, and a friendship with Colombia and Peru (Herz 2010:598). Despite the fact that the concerns and Characteristics of the regions have changed, the US strategies have remained intact throughout the years. Fighting drug trafficking and strengthening democracies still remain the only evident priorities for the US after 25 years. For instance, Evo Morales and Rafael Correa not running for re-election, the arrival of a young president in Colombia with huge challenges to keep the peace agreements and the far-right presidency of Bolsonaro in Brazil, are some of the many moving aspect to take into account by the US. Obama’s administration brought some change to the rhetoric, however, since the 2016 election of President Donald Trump relations with South America seems to be neglected. Thus, it can be argued that South America’s defence priorities and security issues are being revised, and a new comprehensive approach is needed.
3.3. South American Defence Architecture

This section aims to give a comprehensive description of the South American Defence Architecture, by explaining all the agreements on security and military cooperation between the different countries in the region, which in the end they have laid the foundations for regional structures and they are the basis for future defence agreements. In the framework of this work it is a very important part of the research since allows us to analyse whether the current security issues of Brazil, Colombia and Chile have already been discussed in the regional organizations, and how they have been addressed if that is the case. All of this is important because the initiatives, intentions and proposals put forward by specifically these three countries, this been paramount for the regional development of new multilateral organizations as it will be described below. Moreover, in accordance with the objective of the investigation, this section helps to articulate the final answer to whether the states have reacted and articulated individually and/or regionally the new security threats presented in the past ten years.

To begin with, the idea of strengthening regional ties in defence and security in South America has been a progressive effort throughout the years by all the different states, in which Brazil has always played a key role promoting cooperation and association regarding all regional security matters. For instance, the Treaty of Non-Aggression of Saavedra Lamas of 1933 and the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR) of 1947, were the first proposals to move forward in this regard. One of this tried to exclude the USA, as was the original purpose of Saavedra Lamas, while the other sought to include the US as in the case of the TIAR (Comini, 2010:17). Under the Organization American States (OAS) framework, the TIAR and the Pact of Bogotá\(^2\) were the pillars of the hemispheric security system, however, both presented problems; the TIAR lost its legal and political efficiency after the Falklands/Malvinas war, and the Pact of Bogotá was never really applied (Herz, 2003:133).

Another important aspect in the region is the absence of weapons of mass destruction. First of all, following the analysis by Herz (2010:602), the adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions is universal, but regionally speaking, there have been some other initiatives such as the 1967 Tlatelolco Treaty, which established the first nuclear-weapon free zone in the world; and the rapprochement between Argentina and Brazil in

\(^2\) American Treaty on Pacific Settlement
the Eighties and the Nineties, which put an end to their nuclear rivalry (Narich, 2003:4). Moreover, the Cartagena Declaration on Renunciation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was issued in 1991. And finally, another milestone on nuclear weapons and security cooperation in the region occurred in 1991, when The Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) was created, and it rapidly became an important bilateral agreement on security matters in the region. The main goal of the ABACC is to guarantee to Argentina, Brazil and the international community that all existing nuclear materials and facilities in both countries are used exclusively for peaceful purposes (ABACC, 2019). This process was possible through the settlement of differences regarding shared hydroelectric resources, and gradually developed into cooperation in security in the nuclear diplomacy area (Brigagão, 2011:27). This was finally concluded in the Bilateral Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in 2007 (Fuccille, Passini, & Ramanzini, 2015:17).

It can be said that the regional convergence on security aspects in South America began with Brazil and Argentina, particular “the sui generis architecture created by both countries under mutual reliance of nuclear non-proliferation” (Brigagão, 2011:27). With this mutual confidence base and dynamic economic growth, Brazil and Argentina were able to create the first neighbourhood cooperation on defence matters, focusing on a different path, away from the OAS influence. They also signed together with Chile an agreement prohibiting the use of chemical and biological weapons in 1991 (Narich, 2003:4). In addition, South America started an intense political and social change that did not fit in the security framework of the hemisphere. In 1991, the creation of MERCOSUR brought the region closer together on economic and diplomatic matters. As a reaction to this new discomfort of some South American states, the OAS tried to adjust their approach by adding a new apparatus named Hemispheric Security Commission, created with an imperative need for greater cooperation in solving problems involving not only one but all of the states (Brigagão, 2011:29). Nonetheless, the OAS has been always criticized by South American countries, specially Brazil (later on leftist governments in other countries), as a tool of manipulation by the United States (Chipman & Lockhart Smith 2010:79).

Regarding non-traditional issues, as it can be expected, both narcotics and terrorism have always on the OAS agenda. For instance, the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (IADACC) was established in 1986 but did not begin to function until 1988. Also, in November 1998, an Inter-
American Committee in charge of fighting against Terrorism, known by its Spanish acronym (CICTE) was created, as well as the "Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials" (CIFTA) (Castillo, 2012:8). Moreover, after September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, an Inter-American Convention on Terrorism got adopted, in 2002, which contained some very specific and strong provisions. It seeks to prevent the financing of terrorism, strengthen border controls and increase cooperation among law enforcement authorities in different countries (Narich, 2003:12-13).

Despite these efforts, South American strategy was moving in another direction from the OAS. The OAS, with headquartered in Washington and largely financed by the US, was not an institution were South American countries could express their approaches and new role in the world. As a result, in 2003, the Special Security Conference of the OAS recognized that there were different approaches of security matters by South American countries, for instance, “the arguments of the Chilean government were based on the concept of human security; Colombian representatives stressed the threat posed by illegal armed groups, drug traffic and terrorism; and Argentine and Brazilian officials focused on poverty as a threat” (Herz, 2010: 605). The region has been exposed to domestic and external pressures to respond to a wide display of security issues, such as public security, environmental security and non-traditional threats. Hence, South American countries realized having different necessities, and adopted multiple views on security and defence policy (Costa, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2017:9). Nonetheless, South American countries tend to be “prudent” about proposals to improve hemispheric security, mainly because the fact that US considers itself as ‘an ordering power’, want to be ‘in control’ and have an “ingrained preference for unilateral and bilateral responses” to regional problems (Narich, 2003:16).

Going beyond this strong US interaction in the region, the interactions among South American countries can be also explained on the base of a friend-enemy dynamic. The long-lasting peace in South America is an element that contrasts clearly with any other region, for instance, it can be said that South America is a peace zone in the world, free of weapons of mass destruction and one of the smallest military expenditures in the world (Ministry of National Defence of Chile, 2009). The continent has not seen a prolonged interstate military conflict in over 80 years (Fedirka, 2016). Although, despite there are no interstate wars in South America, there have been some border conflicts, vastly smaller in comparison to similar conflicts on other regions of the planet.
The existence of these border issues was crucial for the creation of a security architecture in the region. Specifically, the case of the Colombian attack to a FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) camp on Ecuadorian soil turned out to be a significant boost for the creation and approval of the South American Defence Council (Ministry of National Defence of Chile, 2009). In spite of Colombia’s intense and active military cooperation with the US and its military presence in the country, and in spite of the interest of Venezuela to bring Russia and Iran closer to the region, the establishment of regional blocks such as the Andean Community (CAN) the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the South American Union of Nations (UNASUR) have contributed to a regional security and defence cooperation that might have set the first pillar of a security alliance to tackle individual and regional security challenges.

Later on, in 2008, UNASUR Constitutive Treaty was signed (entering into force until 2011) with the relentless support of Brazilian president Lula da Silva, who promised to build sovereignty trust in matters of defence and security, but principally warned against the destabilising effects of “the presence of foreign military forces” (UNASUR, 2018). UNASUR is of particular relevance as an umbrella organization because it has advanced deeper political cooperation and cooperation in security and defence among its member-states (Briceño-Ruiz & Ribeiro, 2015:49). UNASUR’s creation was driven by Brazil’s considerations regarding the relations with external countries, with the idea to exclude the United States from South America, and to a lesser extent Venezuela’s intention to use UNASUR as a vehicle to expand and consolidate their influence in the region (Weiffen, Wehner, & Detlef, 2013:384). Ultimately, UNASUR has been described as “the most important institutional framework for political dialogue on security matters on the region” (Costa, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2017:1).

The South American Defence Council (SDC) is another important step forward in this regard, and represents the first multilateral organ in the region specifically tasked to deal with matters of defence policy (Kenkel, 2010:587). As it was mention before, the case of the Colombian Armed Forces entering Ecuadorian soil to attack a FARC camp triggered the creation of the SDC on December 16, 2008 by decision of the Heads of State and Defence Ministers of the UNASUR countries (UNASUR, 2018). Colombia initially did not want to take part because of its strong military ties with the United States through Plan Colombia. However, after reassessing the situation, Colombia opted to join the Council on July 20, 2008. Shortly after the signing of
Colombia’s president, Chile’s president, Michelle Bachelet, appointed a working group to investigate and draw up a plan for the new council. Finally, on March 10, 2009, the 12-member countries celebrated, in Chile, the first council meeting (Medeiros Filho, 2017:685).

The creation of the SDC was an attempt, fuelled by Brazil in particular, to establish defence cooperation between South American countries, independent of the hemispheric framework promoted by the United States (Luciano & Ramanzini, 2018:244). The SDC is responsible for implementing regional defence policies regarding military cooperation, training and humanitarian operations. Given the differences of South American countries, it can be said that there is not actual consensus on the meaning of the term "defence” in the region, since, in Colombia for example, the Armed Forces are used to resolve internal security issues, which is legally forbidden in Argentina. In detail, while in countries that experienced military authoritarianism, such as Argentina and Uruguay, the armed forces are restricted to defence tasks under strong civilian control, in the Andean countries, such as Colombia and Peru, the presence of military personnel in internal missions does not seem to be a major cause for concern. (Medeiros Filho, 2017:684). The goals and values of the SDC were the result of the search for minimum common denominators between the parties involved (Comini, 2010:17).

The South American Defence Council is not a conventional military alliance like NATO, and it was not intended to be one, but it implies some degree of regional military coordination (Ministry of National Defence of Chile, 2009:37). Aligned with the regional situation, the main objective of the SDC is to consolidate a South American zone of peace and security. In addition, other objectives comprised, to build a common vision on defence issues. To articulate a regional position on security in multilateral forums. To cooperate regionally in defence matters, and finally, to support actions such as demining, prevention, mitigation and assistance to victims of natural disasters (UNASUR, 2018). Another key issue in the agenda is the non-traditional military threats, represented by organized crime and drug traffic. However, these threats provide a clear picture of how close, but distant, South American policies/responses really are, in relation to the US policies and to other countries in the region (Costa, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2017:10).

There are, of course, positive aspects to mention about the SDC. For instance, information sharing, transparency of defence expenditure, and the need for consultation and cooperation regarding military operations, are some of the key elements discussed in every summit. These regular
meetings on security issues, serve to foster a more common strategic culture among South American states, and develop settled norms to govern conflict resolution. (Chipman & Lockhart Smith, 2010:78) in addition to regional participation in different security projects, such as the participation in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), or the creation of the Argentine-Chilean Combined Peace Force, and also the Chilean-Ecuadorian Military Engineers company, represented a boost on cooperation between countries and their Armed Forces (Comini, 2010:18). Along these lines, Colombia started to be a key exporter of knowledge and military training capabilities due to its competent and experienced military force. Its participation is highlighted in the SDC, mainly because Colombia has strengthened the defence integration and the mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts, articulated in four axes: Defence Policy, Military Cooperation and Humanitarian Actions, Defence Industry and Technology, and Training and Capacity Building (Garay & Ramírez, 2017:452).

From the Brazilian point of view, the creation of the SDC was associated to improving cooperation in the defence sector and establishing a counterpoint to the presence of the US in South America. Brazilian Defence Minister Nelson Jobim, was the one that brought back the concept of regional defence and security at the beginning of 2008 (Comini, 2010:15). Colombia and Chile instead, were focused on different aspects, such as new trade agreements with other regions. However, Brazilian stand was not only rhetorical, Brazil launched a broad process of reactivation and modernization of its industrial production complex for defence, and Lula da Silva’s government found significant support in the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) and in major Brazilian corporations, in order to make several administrative and structural changes in the Brazilian defence strategy, that ultimately, were aligned with the SDC expectations (Costa, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2017:12).

Moreover, during its first 5 years, the SDC had accomplished very important and clear political and institutional progress. Some of its achievements are the creation of the Centre of Defence Strategic Studies (CEED), in Buenos Aires, the South-American Defence School (ESUDE), in Quito, the development of a common methodology for measurement of defence expenditure, and also, it proved itself to be an important exchange centre for military formation and study (Costa, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2017:8). Another important aspect to highlight is the fact that, the geopolitics of South America are appropriate to have an effective regional architecture. First, there are no
external military threats to the region. Second, Brazil has a good status among South American countries, unlike China in Asia or Russia in Europe. Last but not least, there is a comfortable relationship between small and big countries that offers the prospect of a small country in tandem with the continent’s largest power, framing more productive security arrangements that could have wider regional acceptance (Chipman & Lockhart Smith, 2010:96).

A step forward on regional security is the Board of Security and Justice that was created by Resolution 01/2015 of UNASUR, and encircles the Council on the World Drug Problem (CSPMD by its initials in Spanish), the South American Council on Citizen Security, Justice and Coordination of Actions against Transnational Organized Crime (DOT) and a High-Level Working Group for the Management of Natural Disaster Risks (UNASUR, 2018).

However, ever since 2014, UNASUR’s increasing demands have not met the desired political willingness amongst member states. Overall, the main reason why the consolidation of the SDC has not been easy, is the “differing and often competing views on defence and security among South American countries, plus the fact that the subcontinent had no relevant antecedents of sustained political dialogue and regional concert in defence without foreign power’s presence” (Costa, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2017:6-7). The lack of political guidance becomes a critical issue in defining the prospects of the SDC, and due to the ongoing economic and political debacle, Brazil has not been willing to play an active role in strengthening the SDC, and this could be a decisive factor in the shaping of its recent course and prospects. (Costa, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2017:17). Therefore, the SDC seems to lack strategic path because it seems as though there is an ongoing desire to hold successful summits rather than admit differences and start committing. There is a need for “more transparency and discussion of defence and foreign policy would be a proper priority of a more effective regional security institution” (Chipman & Lockhart Smith, 2010:79).

Furthermore, the current situation in the region makes coordination even more difficult, for instance, the “Venezuelan constitutional crisis of 2017 may be the utmost challenge for UNASUR’s relevance as a political and dialogue forum amongst South American states.” (Costa, Fuccille, & Rezende, 2017:8). After 10 years the SDC still does not show a shared vision on the role of defence in the region. Another point, even more challenging, is the fact that the 12 countries on the organization maintain bilateral relations in defence matters with extra regional countries, in areas that correspond to regional interests (Comini, 2010:21).
To recap, there is a complex regional architecture on security and defence in South America, where the OAS, and the UNASUR, exhibit a significant overlap in mandate with respect to their security conceptions and practices (Weiffen, Wehner, & Detlef, 2013:384). Specifically, UNASUR embodies an idea of unity and harmony in the region, and the SDC was a step forward regarding security and defence debates and cooperation, but it was born also as a reaction to ongoing conflicts. Notwithstanding, Mercosur is still the core element of the Argentinean–Brazilian alliance, and the main platform for Brazil’s regional strategy in economic, political, and social terms. Thus, the creation of UNASUR was not an expression of perfect and permanent unanimity, and its existence does not necessarily indicate conformity of the South American countries. (Nolte & Comini, 2016:560-562). Ultimately, it can be said that there are many individual national agendas, the most prominent of which is Brazil's, which seeks to exercise a role of power at the global level, and it has always tried to push this indirectly in the regional level, but there are also factors of ideological division, such as those proposed by Venezuela-Bolivia (socialism of the 21st century) against countries that follow an open political-economic model and maintain greater links with external actors, such as Colombia, Peru and Chile.
4. Theoretical Framework

Discussions on security and security relations are usually explain through disagreements or ambiguity over what is security and how it needs to be studied. First, it can be argued that the traditional realist approach is too simple when considering security is only about military relations that revolve around threats to states, governments and societies. On the other hand, the human security approach might be too broad and people-focused so to give an overall framework of analysis for South American countries. Therefore, an appropriated framework is the theory of securitization, promoted by the Copenhagen school, which lies in the middle of the security literature spectrum, and may help explain the security architecture and decision making in the region.

Moreover, given that the purpose of this paper is to define how Brazil, Colombia and Chile have perceived security threats and how they have reacted to them, the securitisation theory fits perfectly in this framework. Despite its limited scope, if not sometimes outdated concepts, it is a simple, valid and very explanatory approach that will allow us to understand the process of definition of security threats in these countries.

4.1. Securitization Theory

Based on constructivism and neorealism, the Copenhagen School provides a coherent framework to define security and determine how a specific matter becomes securitized. Although significant differences exist between scholars regarding the concept of security, the Copenhagen school has developed a substantial body of concepts to rethink it.

The Copenhagen school emerged at the Conflict and Peace Research Institute (COPRI) of Copenhagen, and is represented by Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde. They reshaped and redefined the security studies on the basic understanding that security is a speech act. Security, according to them, is about survival, “it is when an issue is presented as posing an existential threat to a referent object (traditionally the state, government, territory or society). The Copenhagen school also identifies five general categories of security: military, environmental, economic, societal and political (Emmers, 2019:174). For instance, in the military sector, the reference object [of security] is usually the state. In the political sector, sovereignty can be existentially threatened by anything that questions recognition, legitimacy, or governing authority. Economic, societal and
environmental referent objects are more difficult to defined, and they are going to be strictly defined by the particular conditions of each state. (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998:22)

These notions of securitization and desecuritization, in addition to widening the definition of security beyond military issues, also deepens security studies by including non-state actors developing a different concept in the new security studies while adopting a multi-sectoral approach to security that represents moves away from the traditional security studies (Emmers, 2019:174), and it is crucial in criticizing the traditional and military-focused view, usually associated with realism:

“The special nature of security threats justifies the use of extraordinary measures to handle them [...] traditionally, by saying ‘security’, a state representative declares an emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to block a threatening development.” (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998: 21).

The Copenhagen school explains that any public issue can be characterized from nonpoliticized, through politicized, to securitized. Therefore, “security” is a self-referential practice, “because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – Not necessarily because a real existential threat exists, but because the issue is presented as such a threat” (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998:24). According to this school, an issue materializes as a security problem through the discursive politics of security, the speech act of saying ‘security’ (Balzacq, 2010:59). Hence, based on Mares (2015:421), security issues are defined by political processes operating within the relevant community.

Securitization can be seen as a more extreme version of politization. When a securitizing actor uses a rhetoric of existential threat, and thereby takes an issue out of “normal politics” conditions, then that’s securitization. This implies that the securitizing actor has managed to change the normal political and bureaucratic procedures or rules that in normal conditions the decision makers would be bound by (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998:24-25). Then, security entails that an issue has priority and utmost importance, and the referent object is under threat. The model incorporates several important items (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998; Balzacq, 2010:65):

- A securitizing actor (that which or who makes the move towards a new, or to alter an existing, issue of security in accordance with particular conventions and grammars);
- A referent object (that which is to be secured);
- A threat (that which threatens the referent object);
- An audience (the necessary relation needed to produce the deontic modality of security or those who have to be ‘convinced’ for securitization to be satisfied);
- Felicity conditions (rules and conventions of the speech act and its consequences);
- Facilitations factors (factors that can facilitate or impede the acceptance of the securitization move; social conditions that relate to social positions of the actor and audience as well as the threat);
- Functional actors (actors that are neither the securitizing actor, the threat, nor the referent object, but still have some bearing on the process).

Finally, in order to facilitate the analysis of security issues, Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde (1998:33) explain that actors who securitized do not necessarily say the word ‘security’ when explicitly starting a securitization process. On the other hand, the use of the term security not always constitute a securitizing step. It is always a political choice to securitize or to accept a securitization, however, the issue is only securitized when the audience or society accepts it as such, through public debate, in most of the cases. Therefore, it can be said that a successful securitization process has three components (or steps): an existential threat, an emergency action and the effect of breaking free of a set of rules (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998:26). On the other hand, the Copenhagen school also notes that the concept of desecuritization is the reverse process. It involves the ‘shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere’ (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998:4). If a given type of threat is persistent or recurrent, it is no surprise to find that the response and sense of urgency become institutionalized. Additionally, securitization on the international level means to present an issue as urgent and, hence, so important that it should not be exposed to the normal bargaining of politics but should be handle by top leaders prior to other issues. (Buzan, Weaver, & de Wilde, 1998:27-29).

Another important aspect to consider in the analysis of South American countries is the concept of Non-traditional security issues, defined as those threats not found on the “traditional” security agenda. Examples vary from drug-trafficking, to nuclear proliferation, or to terrorism. Hence, they can be explained as security issues other than military security or national security, such as some global security threats (e.g. ozonosphere destruction), transnational security threats (e.g. various
crimes at high seas) or security threats to minorities (e.g. oppression of vulnerable groups, extinction of rare or endangered species, or marginalization of ethnic minorities in terms of language and culture) (Wang, 2007). In this context then, the definition of non-traditional security encompasses the understanding that the source of security threats does not have to originate from a military organization, nor do they have to be met with military force; they do not have to be intentionally caused, nor caused by a sovereign state; and they do not have to directly threaten the state (Smythe, 2013).

According to Acácio, Brancoli, & Suarez (2017:277), the model of analysis offered by the Copenhagen School carry some weaknesses that raise the following questions: “How to measure the securitization process, if it is a process and political discourse? How to define the thresholds from one stage to another? Can this framework of analysis address systemic-based research questions?”. The claim that security is a speech act may be intuitively strong, but it is theoretically restrictive, narrow and not easy to apply methodologically (Balzacq, 2010:60). Some of their critics argue that while securitization is an important and innovative contribution to the understanding of security and its construction, the model is problematically in three aspects:

*First, the form of act constructing security is defined narrowly, with the focus on the speech of dominant actors, usually political leaders. Second, the context of the act is defined narrowly, with the focus on the moment of intervention only. Finally, and perhaps most fundamentally, the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats to security. (McDonald, 2008:564).*

However, the Copenhagen School builds a comprehensive and useful framework to think about how security performs a key role in the post-Cold War setting of international politics (Acácio, Brancoli, & Suarez, 2017:277). Securitization conceptual framework has been applied to issues such as immigration, health, political dissidence and minority rights, particularly in the context of the post-2001 US-led ‘war on terror’ (McDonald, 2008:563).

**4.2. Regional Security Complex Theory**

Likewise, the concept of securitization comes along with the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT), a theory that has created a new approach to analyse security and defence based on a regional-level variable than can be understood in specific moments. Since its formulation, the
RSCT has been applied several times when talking about South American security community, Brazil being its most important player, however, this paper will only present some conclusions regarding the basic fundaments of the RSCT in relation to the commonalities found regarding the different current and/or recent securitization processes in Brazil, Colombia and Chile. For this reason, it seems appropriate to choose as a theoretical basis an approach that also considers regionality as a priority. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver's Regional Security Complex Theory fulfils this criterion and is therefore applied here as a complement to the theoretical framework for analysis.

Therefore, it is important to affirm that the RSCT seeks to comprehend how securitization processes in the international system work and are established through a regionalist approach (Fuccille & Rezende, 2013). The RSCT analyses development within regions and therefore takes a nuanced look at state security behaviour. A determining factor of any Regional Security Complex is the interrelated securitization practices that exist between the different countries or member states of the given complex, which make difficult either to analyse nor solve their problems separately. “Security complexes offer a systematic approach to a security analysis which requires attention to the macro level of great power impact on the system, the middle level of local state relations, and the micro level of domestic affairs” (Buzan, 1981: 222).

Interactions within a certain region also serve to protect national security policy interests. Thus, the RSCT aims at explaining why states engage in relations of cooperation and reciprocity. The theory derives from the anarchical relations, balance of power and geographical proximity of different states after the Cold War context. The task of identifying a security complex involves making judgements about the relative strengths of security interdependencies among different countries (Buzan, 1981: 192) Hence, the RSCT seeks to understand how the securitization processes occurs in a region. When defining regional security “the principal element that must be added to power relations is the pattern of amity and enmity among states” (Buzan, 1981: 189-190).

In this context, amity is understood as the relationships ranging from genuine friendship to expectations of protection or support. In contrast, enmity means relationships set by suspicion and fear. Patterns of amity/enmity arise from a variety of issues that could not be predicted from a simple consideration of the distribution of power. These range from specific things such as border
disputes, interest in ethnically related populations, and ideological alignments, to longstanding historical links (Buzan, 1981: 190). Four of the criteria necessary based on Buzan & Wæver, 2003:

- A boundary dividing regional neighbours.
- Anarchic structure of two or more autonomous units.
- Polarity defining the distribution of power among units.
- A socially constructed understanding of amity and enmity among the units.

Measuring variables like amity and enmity, is an even less precise business than measuring power or socio-political cohesion, though in all these cases the main features usually stand out quite clearly even in the absence of scientific scales for comparison. (Buzan, 1981: 197) Furthermore, the characteristics of each complex are directly linked to the historical pattern of its components, for instance, the history of enmities between countries and even military, economic or cultural partners (Buzan & Wæver, 2003).

There are two general conditions that explain why a security complex may be hard to find. The first is that in some areas local states are so weak that their power does not project much if at all, beyond their own boundaries. The second condition is called overlay, and it occurs when the direct presence of an outside powers in a region is strong enough to suppress the normal behaviour of security dynamics among local states (Buzan, 1981: 197-198).

An approach based on security complexes focuses attention on sets of states whose security problems are closely interconnected. Security is viewed as only partly divisible, a substantial portion of it residing in essentially indivisible relational patterns among states (Buzan, 1981: 224). The RSCT proposes a framework for the analysis of complexes, in which four levels should be studied: 1) the domestic level: the vulnerabilities generated domestically in the different States of the region (this helps define the type of perceived threats). 2) the interstate level: State-State relations. 3) The interregional level: the relationship of the region with other neighbouring regions. Lastly, 4) The global level: the role of global powers in the region (Buzan & Wæver, 2003).

Emmers (2003) sets an important background on how to approach the securitization issue in a regional association of countries. Primarily, he evaluates the declarations and communiqués of ASEAN to determine if there has been a process of securitization or not regarding the topic of transnational crime in the region. Through a comprehensive examination, Emmers analyses the
political will, military capabilities or political instruments to tackle the security issue, hence, the securitization process does not transcend locally and stays only in the rhetoric of their speeches and intentions on the international regional arena. Consequently, he concludes that the threat is never really minimized, and the referent objects are not protected satisfactory, challenging the notion of securitization as a speech act.

Securitization is better understood when analysing a whole region or group of states with similar issues interacting between them. To this end, the goal is to define how South American countries are perceiving current security threats and reacting to them individually by adopting new sets of policies. Based on the said theoretical approach and the methodology by Emmers (2003), this paper uses the securitization theory to recognize and describe one unique securitization process for each country (Brazil, Colombia and Chile) that specifically took place during the past ten years (2008-2018). In the next section, the results will describe what is the threat being securitize by each country, what is the referent object being protected, and the different referent audiences involved. There will be exemplifications of the speech acts made by the securitizing actors and all the different repercussions surrounding the attempt of securitization.
5. Case Studies

5.1 Securitization process by Brazil

As a quick overview, it can be said that after the fall of the authoritarian military regime of Brazil in 1985, the different administrations focused Brazil’s foreign policy on soft power, as a result its defence policy and strategy seem to be based on consolidating the country’s position as a regional power and gaining influence in South America through soft power capabilities (Bolzan de Rezende, Blackwell, & Degaut, 2018). This approach is mainly explained by the context and geopolitics of the South American region itself, for instance, Brazil’s last border conflicts were settled over one hundred years ago, and the last time when the country engaged in a major international conflict was during the Second World War, where Brazilian troops played a small role (Degaut, 2017: 279). Since then, Brazil has been a strong “supporter of the international principles of sovereignty, self-determination, non-intervention, and territorial integrity […] and] has relied on its soft power resources to forward its foreign policy priorities and to promote international changes” (Degaut, 2017: 272). All these circumstances have reduced the interest of Brazilian politicians in developing military capabilities, but also have led the country to largely neglect its military needs.

Predominantly, Stuenkel (2010:105) argues that “the principal international threat Brazil faces is its own inability to assume regional leadership”, and despite Brazil efforts to assume a more regional role through UNASUR, more specifically with the South American Defence Council (SDC), they have failed to bring its neighbours into line. Soft power has been adequate but not enough, and when it comes to hard power, there is an apparent mismatch between Brazilian global ambitions and its military capabilities (Degaut, 2017:285). Despite Brazil’s preference for soft-power strategies, a slow but noticeable change seems to be under way regarding the use of power to pursue foreign policy objectives, thus, their commitment to acquire a permanent seat in the UN security Council. Brazil is strong and getting stronger, but its neighbours somehow appear to be getting weaker throughout the time, hence, Stuenkel (2010:106) claims that it is within this context that Brazil faces its biggest security challenges.

Brazil is characterized by having a relatively secure environment, due to an absence of enemies in the region and the nonexistence of nuclear weapons, in which transnational crime is sometimes more pressing than any military threats. Trans-border issues such as drug-trafficking, guerrilla groups and arms-smuggling have always been a security concern, but Brazil has seemed not
interested and unable to effectively control the borders in the Amazonas with Venezuela, Colombia and Peru, mainly because these borders literally run through the middle of the forest (Stuenkel 2010:118). At the same time, the Three Frontiers Zone, in the crossroads of Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina in the Southern Cone, became for almost 30 years one of the most active areas in the world for transnational crime and has always been a security concern for Brazilian presidents (Narich, 2003:8).

Securitizing transnational organized crime: Borders and natural resources as source of power for Brazil

The threat of transnational crime and illegal exploitation of natural resources in the borders of Brazil was identified as the securitization process during 2008-2018. Before examining the different motives and triggers, it is necessary to properly identify the securitizing actors, the referent objects and the relevant audience. The main securitizing actor was Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, President of Brazil from January 2003 to December 2010. As the head of the state he was the one that introduced the necessity to protect the natural resources by any means necessary and his concerns were reflected in the National Defence Strategy (END). Later on, Dilma Roussef, Minister of Mines and Energy during Lula’s administration, and later President of Brazil (2011-2016), played an important role on continuing the same security approach based on protecting Brazil’s natural resources. In addition to them, Foreign Affairs Ministers and Ministers of Defence, as well as the various senior officials in the Army and Navy should also be regarded as functional securitizing actors, though of much less importance.

The referent object in this securitization process specifically referred to the protection of natural resources and the capacity to control their Amazonas border and the Triple Frontier from any external threat. Brazil rhetoric was focused on protecting its sovereignty and project power in the region centralizing in the natural resources as the source of strength (environmental and economic security). Finally, the Relevant Audience can be understood as the Ministers of Defence, politicians and the government bureaucracy of Brazil understood as the actors who needed to be persuaded and may indicate inconformity its existential threat. Brazil was engaged in reflections on the usefulness of its army, some people claimed that “militarizing the Amazon, was not a practical solution”, a statement by Unger, a former minister in Lula’s cabinet and Harvard Law Professor,
(Stuenkel, 2010: 121). But others, kept the same approach on the securitization matter, such as Dilma Roussef.

In order to clearly understand the whole securitization process of transnational crime and illegal exploitation in Brazil’s borders, it is important to understand all the different variables. First of all, the fact that during two decades Brazil compromised its ability to secure its own borders, reflecting in an increasing consumption of drugs and availability of smuggled weapons. The threat in the Amazonas came from Venezuela, mainly because of their support to the Colombian guerrilla group FARC, designated terrorist organization by the US and the European Union. Venezuela was unlikely to pose a serious military threat to Brazil at that time, primarily because Venezuela lacked well-trained soldiers with combat experience. Yet, Chavez’ support of the FARC group made security in the borders of the Amazon an issue (Stuenkel, 2010: 116).

In addition to this, illegal miners and logging expeditions regularly enter Brazil’s territory increasing the destruction of the Amazon forest and the illegal exploitation of natural resources. Being a resource-rich country, environment and natural resources protection has always been Brazil’s vulnerability, in particular, since the 1980’s Brazil’s Amazon rainforest has been on the spotlight of environmental NGOs, local governments, and international donors alike, transforming Brazil in one of largest world recipients of foreign aid (Malamud & Alcañiz, 2017:10). The major problem is that it still makes economic sense for people to destroy the woods. (Stuenkel, 2010: 118). Finally, Brazil’s oil platforms offshore had become increasingly important, since 2008, industry estimates of Brazil’s oil reserves increased dramatically to 40 billion barrels, placing Brazil among the ten countries with the largest oil reserves (Stuenkel, 2010: 113). Brazil also possesses vast resources of renewable energy mostly hydro energy, therefore the protection of hydroelectric dams in vulnerable zones in the Triple Frontier are critical for the economic growth and development of the country. In addition, Brazil also refocused its attention on the Triple Frontier, home to drug smuggling and considerable criminal activity by Middle Eastern terrorist groups and relatively low levels of government control.

Another important aspect to highlight is the motivation of President Lula regarding the protection of natural resources. Since he arrived to the administration, he started promoting programs to foster more sustainable farming practices for the communities in the Amazonas region. Lula struggled to control the destruction of the Amazon, and his government was focused delimited its most affected
areas encouraging farmers to stop deforesting the jungle. In fact, the rate of deforestation of the Amazon rainforest was reduced under his mandate 2003-2010 (Rhi-Sausi & Oddone, 2012). Lula Da Silva’s rhetoric played a big role, for instance, at the end of his second term, he assured that his government was the most ‘ecological’ of all those who administered the country before him, and even nowadays, he still defends the policies that were carried out (ECOticias, 2010).

Moreover, evaluating the securitization of the transnational crime and illegal exploitation of natural resources, another important fact is that Brazil’s defence forces were using outdated defence hardware and software, neglected for several decades and compromising their national security. Along the years, military acquisitions had favoured second-hand equipment from countries such as Germany, comparing to Chile’s and Venezuela’s spending that were focused on new and globally competitive defence hardware and software. Brazil’s politically driven defence budget forced its Armed Forces to engage in low prices and outdated defence equipment in order to keep them semi-operational (Gouvea, 2015:139). Brazil had the biggest military expenditure in the region and the highest number of military personnel in the Army, Navy, and Air Force (SIPRI, 2018). However, the adept Colombian Army, and new acquisitions by Chile, Peru, and Venezuela shed light on Brazil’s aging military. (Gouvea, 2015:140). Despite that, Brazil faced no plausible military threat of any significance, but its incapacity to protect their numerous borders was worrying for President Lula. The motivations for this rhetoric of the government was mainly the obligation to better protect natural resources, but also the understanding that Brazil needed Armed Forces that correspond with their size and importance, based on the interpretation that a country like the South American giant would need an effective deterrent capacity.

All these aspects reached a new step of securitization in 2008, when Lula’s leftist government published the first-ever National Defence Strategy (Reid, 2014:260) as a facilitating factor to facilitate the acceptance of this securitization move. The National Defence Strategy (END) was unique in its kind and was based on a systematically guide for the reorganization and reorientation of the Armed Forces, against specific threats, but prioritize the Amazon region (Gouvea, 2015:138-139). The END also included a Brazil’s maritime defence strategy, to proactively defend the oil platforms, port facilities, archipelagos and oceanic islands, in order to respond to any threat against sea lanes of trade, by States, or by non-conventional or criminal forces; (Ministry of Defence of Brazil, 2008:20)
The renewal of the Brazilian defence will be completed with the creation of a Cyber Defence Center, to foster the development of a satellite launch vehicle, and the implementation and coordination of three programs known as the Integrated Border Monitoring System -SISFRON-, the Blue Amazon Management System -SISGAAZ-, and the Brazilian Air Space Control System -SISCEAB- (Ministry of Defence of Brazil, 2008:20). With this, it can be said that Brazil’s Armed Forces went to a comply remake after the END of 2008. For instance, the three separate military ministries were merged into a single defence ministry under civilian control only in 2000 (more than a decade after most Latin American countries did). Only in 2010 did the three services accept a joint chief of staff. (Reid, 2014:259-260). From that day on, the armed forces have been conservative, and they have retained a degree of veto power over some issues.

The END was not only a strategy to protect the Amazon, the Triple Frontier and the offshore reserves, but it was also an indirect mechanism to improved, update and spend in defence technology without raising any tension in the region. However, the Brazilian END (2008:11) specifically states that, “to dissuade, one needs to be prepared to combat”, and “if Brazil is willing to reach its deserved spot in the world, it will have to be prepared to defend itself not only from aggressions, but equally from threats”. For instance, on the possible transfer of seven Colombian bases to U.S. officials in 2009, Brazilian president asked for legal guarantees that the operations will not violate the territories of other countries. He also proposed that the issue of combating drug trafficking on the continent be dealt with in the framework of a specific UNASUR council recently created for the subject. Finally, Lula recalled that “Brazil and Colombia share a vast area of the Amazonian border and called attention to the interests of developed nations for the natural resources of this region” (O Globo, 2009). This is an example of how the words used by President Lula reaffirmed his commitment to the securitization process in play and defined a trend on how all regional and national threats were being dealt on the framework of natural resources and borders, as he had promoted.

Lula’ administration came to an end in 2010, and President Dilma Rousseff decided to keep supporting the further growth and development of Brazil’s defence industry, facing a number of challenges. First, in contrast with the 1980s, in 2011 there was no longer a domestic political consensus as to the importance of supporting a strong military apparatus and a strong domestic defence industry. As it was described earlier, in the past two decades, the military branches were
marginalized by Brazilian policy-makers, allocating enough funds only to keep the Armed Forces operational. However, after the publication of the END, strong measures were taken to plan a growth strategy for the defence forces, and these measures were scrutinized by politicians and the government bureaucracy, which considerably delayed the implementation of these projects (Gouvea, 2015:144). As a result, seven defence programs have seen their chronograms delayed. One of the most affected programs as the SISFRON program. The 10-year US$6 billion program was relying on a US$500 million budget for 2013, but it only received less than US$100 million. These budget uncertainties will delay the program far beyond its 10-year proposed timeline (Gouvea, 2015:140-143).

Despite the inconformity and obstacles presented by politicians and the government bureaucracy, the ambitious Plan of Defence Articulation and Equipment (PAED) began to be designed, under the responsibility of the General José Carlos de Nardi, and the Minister of Defence Celso Amorim, plan which included, among other things, the manufacture of four conventional diesel-electric submarines, and the first nuclear submarine in Brazil. These new ships will be destined to protect the 7491 kilometres of coastline, the Amazon river basin and the so-called "Blue Amazon", the rich oil fields recently discovered in the ‘pre-salt’ of the Brazilian continental shelf, an area with estimated reserves of about 100,000 million barrels of crude oil in deep waters of the South Atlantic. This PAED is spread over the next 20 years, with investment expenditures on armaments and equipment estimated at between $30 billion and $35 billion dollars. All of which was justified by the General De Nardi under the referent object of the natural resources:

"The Amazon and the Blue Amazon are areas of vital strategic importance because of their natural resources, and we are concerned about what could happen to them in the future(…)Brazil is coming out of a situation of neglect of its armed forces and when we complete our plan we will have an adequate [military] capacity for what is the sixth [biggest] economy in the world, perhaps the fifth by then." explained De Nardi (Armendáriz-La Nación, 2012)

Again, Dilma Rousseff’s Administration, following in the Lula Administration’s footsteps, published the National Defence White Book in 2012, which effectively tried to overcome the suspicions about practices of the balance of power implicated in its military build-up. The White Book examines the challenges in key strategic areas such as space, cybernetics, nuclear energy,
However, still mentioning the defence of the Amazon region and offshore oilfields in the South Atlantic as well. For instance, the Defence Policy established in the White Book introduce the National resources as the first objective: guarantee sovereignty, national treasures and territorial integrity. Describing this new approach to traditional themes as “the protection of sovereignty (an issue connected with the global challenge of drugs and related crimes); the protection of biodiversity, biopiracy, cyber defence; tensions derived from the increasing lack of resources, natural disasters, international crime, terrorism” (Ministry of Defence, 2012). Lula helped to launched a big defence purchasing programme, mainly focused on upgrading or replacing dated equipment such as tanks, frigates and transport aircraft. There were two big new purchases to highlight: first, in December 2013, the defence ministry announced that it would buy thirty-six Gripen advanced fighter jets from Sweden’s Saab, at a cost of $4.5 billion. Second, the government had earlier agreed to buy nuclear-powered submarines to a French design (Reid, 2014:260).

The most important factor behind all this development, purchases and new attitude was the strong rhetoric used by Lula’s securitization approach which was able to resonate during the next years. For instance, Celso Amorim, former Minister of Foreign Affairs (1993-1995 and 2003-2011) and Minister of Defense (2011-2015) observed in 2013:

“Brazil’s abundance of energy, food, water, and biodiversity increases its stake in a security environment characterized by rising competition for access to, or control of, natural resources. In order to meet the challenges of this complex reality, Brazil’s peaceful foreign policy must be supported by a robust defense policy” (Amorim, 2013).

Another example can be found several years later, in 2014, when the Brazilian company Embraer presented its new military transport plane KC-390. This plane is the largest aircraft built by Embraer the world’s third largest aeronautical company, after Boeing and Airbus, whose production involves international companies from Argentina, Portugal and the Czech Republic. This was a milestone by a Brazilian company, and the language used by the Minister of Defence Celso Amorim stressed that this was "a big step that Brazil and Embraer are also taking in terms of international cooperation” and “a joint effort was very important for building trust and protection of natural resources” (La Nación, 2014). Even in 2018 with the new presidential elections in play, former president Lula denounced President Temer’s government for "giving away natural resources” from Brazil (La nueva Mañana, 2018). He criticized the bill approved by Congress,
which allows the sale of 70 percent of Petrobras' pre-salt fields to international companies. Same fields he so faithfully protected for several years.

Moreover, in December 2018, the first of four conventional submarines from the was launched into sea. It is estimated that one submarine will be launched at sea each year: 2020, 2021, 2022 and 2029 (Oliveira, 2019). Again, with every opportunity, Brazil’s government has always used the “protection of natural resources” as a rationale on security for more than a decade. The need of the submarine programme was justified to protect the new deep-sea oilfields. But it also involved a further step in Brazil’s nuclear ambitions. The failure to achieve a Security Council seat let a few Brazilians, such as Lula’s vice-president, to argue that the country should develop nuclear weapons if it wanted the world to take it seriously as a great power. Then Brazilian President Michel Temer at the launching ceremony declared:

“Brazil, as a peaceful country, doesn’t build its ships as a threat to anyone or to disturb the tranquillity of national waters, but rather because a country with a coastline of more than 7,000 kilometres needs certain resources to defend its sovereignty and rich marine biodiversity,” (Oliveira, 2019).

Brazil, driven by its new economic weight and by its desire to give greater projection to its international influence, began the process of renewing its armed forces, to ensure the defence of its territory and the protection of its natural resources. Accomplishments, such as the reinforcement of the defence industry, the unification of the Armed forces and the first-ever national defence strategic plan, were reached thanks to the securitization schemed created to protect natural resources, where transnational crime in the Amazonas and the Triple Frontier, as well as, the unknown threats to offshore oil reserves were portrayed as the most pressing security issue, and worthy of securitization to protect state sovereignty (military and political security) and the ongoing economic development of Brazil’s people (economic security).

To recap, the strong rhetoric used by Lula’s administration, and later Dilma’s government, to securitize the threat of transnational crime resulted from a series of motives. First, bringing a new approach to criminal activity in endanger zones like the Amazonas and the Triple Frontier. Second, gain political momentum due to the language of securitization that add urgency into an issue and puts it at the top of the agenda. Finally, draw a framework in which the increase of spending on military modernization would not be taken as a threat by neighbouring countries. As a result, The
National Defence Strategy (END) and the Defence White Paper (LBDN) became historic milestones for the establishment and dissemination of the foundations and parameters of Brazil defence (Lula’s defence). Both being a legal framework that guide the organization and modernization of the Brazilian military, as well as its training and employment, in a manner that is compatible with Brazil’s political, economic and strategic stature (Ministry of Defence, 2012:55).

5.2 Securitization process by Chile

Chile’s international diplomatic and political influence, based on its soft power, mainly in its strong political institutions, democratic politics and sophisticated diplomacy (Lowenthal & Baron, 2015). But at the same time, Chile’s military represents the third largest producer of military equipment in Latin America. The Chilean Army is gradually diminishing the number of armed forces personnel, trying to focus on professionalising the army and give a technological advantage to it. By 2011, Chile consistently outspent all countries in the region on military spending, mainly due to the Copper Law established in Pinochet's era. The law provides that 10% of the annual revenue of the state-owned copper company, Codelco, is to be allocated to the military. Therefore, Codelco being the owner of the world's largest copper reserves and the rise of international copper prices have dramatically increased the military budget (BMI Research, 2018:19).

Chile’s security issues are reduced to, the control and protection of its territories in the Antarctica, and its historic border disputes with neighbouring Bolivia and Peru. (BMI Research, 2018:21). Peru and Bolivia border disputes have been resolved through the International Court of Justice, thus, the risk of an armed conflict is low. Because of this lack of external threats, Chilean Army has prioritized its participation in defence cooperation agreements, including in the UNASUR framework at the regional level, and the Rio Treaty with the US and other Latin American nations has resulted in Chile playing a greater role in global peacekeeping operations (BMI Research, 2018:20). It is important to highlight that, Chilean troops have participated in every single UN Peacekeeping Operations, and its involvement has its political basis in the country’s commitment to assist the international community in the maintenance of international peace and security (Gutiérrez, 2010:708). As noted in their own National Defence White Paper of 2010, ‘Chile went from a limited role of ‘observer’ to the active role of ‘actor’ in international peace cooperation.’ (Chilean Ministry of Defence, 2010:137).
Securitizing Social Protest: The Mapuche aboriginal people as a terrorist threat

The main internal conflict that Chile faces is one involving Chile's largest indigenous group, the Mapuches. The Mapuche people are an indigenous American group living in southern Chile and southwestern Argentina and have been fighting to defend their ancestral lands throughout Chile's history. The conflict dates to the 1800s when Chile declared by law that the Mapuches had to move to an area delimited by the government to become Chilean citizens (BMI Research, 2018:21). Although the Chilean State recognizes the existence of Mapuche territories, these territories have been progressively reduced, and tensions have increased in regions such as Araucanía, where the Mapuche people continue to claim ownership of their territory and respect for their cultural identity. (Amnesty International Chile, 2017) The conflict has yet to settle completely since then, and social protest by the Mapuches has always be one of the main ways to show opposition. The Mapuches demands are, among other, jurisdictional autonomy, the recovery of ancestral lands, economic benefits and recognition of their cultural identity (BMI Research, 2018:21).

In this context, social protest of the Mapuche people has gone through a securitization that is still and ongoing process, where the current Chilean President Sebastián Piñera is defined as the securitization actor. He is part of a centre-right political coalition in Chile, and as the head of the state twice in the last 10 years, he has been the most vocal about the fact that Chile has been facing terrorist attacks coming from the Mapuche people, first in his administration from 2010-2014, but also in his new term as President of Chile started in March 2018. The referent object, as it has been described in the declarations and decisions made by President Sebastián Piñera, refer to the protection of the Chilean State, its democracy and its people from the dangers of terrorism (societal and political security). Finally, as the relevant audience, the public opinion, Chilean prosecutors, as well as international institutions, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nation, have played an important role. Moreover, former President Michelle Bachelet (2014-2018) and currently UN High Commissioner for Human Rights since 2018, and political representatives from different political parties in Chile have also been functional actors in this process.

Concerning this securitization process, it is important to give some context on two different topics: the status of the indigenous population in Chile, and also the infamous Anti-Terrorism Law. First,
despite the long historic differences between the government and the native population, it can be said that the ‘Mapuche conflict’ detonated in Chile in the early-1990s, as a consequence of the neoliberal measures by the Chilean government, forcing the Mapuche to move either to urban peripheries or isolated southern regions and leaving them without their natural resources and ancestral territories (UN Human Rights Council, 2017:2). There was a small step forward in the relation in 1993 when the Indigenous Law 19.256 was created by the National Corporation for Indigenous Development (CONADI), establishing a policy for the restitution of land, among other matters related to indigenous development. However, despite attempts to gain constitutional recognition, the constant opposition of right-wing parties, and the quorum of ⅔ necessary for constitutional reform made it impossible to achieve. However, after 25 years of its application, the so-called Indigenous Law shows serious inadequacies regarding its limited scope in relation to Convention 169, with regard to the autonomy of indigenous territories and the institutions in charge of indigenous policy, clearly surpassed by the dimension of the problem, among other more specific matters (Grimaldi & Cárdenas, 2017:125-126). It was not until 2008 that Chile ratified Convention No. 169 of the International Labour Organization, the most important legal tool for indigenous rights at the international level, ushering in a new era in relations with indigenous people (International Labour Organization, 2018).

Second, another important topic is the Anti-Terrorism Law (No.18314) currently being used against the Mapuches people has a questionable history as well. This Law is one of the legacies that Chile inherited from Pinochet dictatorship, it was approved and promulgated by the Military Junta in 1984 to face a wave of protests (Molina, 2014), and to persecute the armed resistance of groups such as the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front and the Revolutionary Left Movement (Freixas, 2018). After the fall of the regime, none of the following governments used this text, only in 1991, the law was modified to eliminate its most ideological aspects. But at the same time, the government included arson, allowing stronger sentences for crimes already established in the Criminal Code (arson, homicide, use of explosives and kidnapping), even allows to triple the sentences for these crimes, the use of ‘faceless’ witnesses, restricts access to precautionary measures and extends periods of pre-trial detention (Molina, 2014).

The use of the anti-terrorist law on the Mapuches was questioned in 2003, 2009 and 2013 by indigenous rights special rapporteurs Rodolfo Stavenhagen, James Anaya and Ben Emmerson. The
UN reiterated its concern over the same issue in different instances in 2004, 2007, and 2009. Following UN Human Rights Council (2017:2) The use of the Anti-Terror Law:

“undermines the presumption of innocence. When applied at early stages of investigation, the accused may face significant disadvantages, such as the use of anonymous (unidentified) witnesses, compromising telephone tapping or interception of correspondence (including e-mails)”.

Moreover, this Anti-Terrorism Law has been criticized by several international organizations, such as the UN Special Rapporteur on Terrorism and Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee, and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, because it does not respect human rights and because it is selectively applied to Mapuche indigenous when protesting for their rights (Amnesty International Chile, 2017).

Despite the fact that there was no evidence of real terrorist activity by the Mapuche in Chile, Presidents Ricardo Lagos (2000-2006) and Michelle Bachelet (2006-2010) applied the Anti-Terrorist Law to the Mapuche people in some very specific cases. In particular, the US the document mentions that in 2007, members of the Special Police Operations Group (GOPE), a force of 300 police officers belonging to the Carabineros, who participate annually in the Southern Command Forces exercises, participated in a seminar organized by SOCSOUTH aimed at "(...) refining the tactics, techniques and procedures used by the Special Operations Counterterrorist Forces" (Department of State, 2008:154). In addition, a GOPE commander attended that year a conference in Paraguay called "Combating Radical Ideology", given by the Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) (Department of State, 2008:154). These military training run by the US military are not something new. This Foreign Military Training (FMT) programs led by the US include taking military and police personnel from Latin America to the US for training in different areas to promote better interoperability between different military forces (Sánchez, 2018). All of this to promote military cooperation and influence the different governments. The following year, the FBI provided support to the Chilean Carabineros, the Military Police and the Gendarmería in "matters related to domestic cases of terrorism", specifically cooperating in the more efficient prevention, identification and control of violent crimes and transnational organized crime (Department of State, 2009). However, the document published by the Department of State
referring to the year 2008 on terrorist attacks in the world, did not register any considerable attack as terrorist in Chilean territory since 2002.

In September 2009, Bachelet’s government issued a decree to ‘provisionally’ regulate the Anti-Terrorism Law, but Piñera’s administration was currently undergoing a new consultation process to strength it instead. By 2010, there were already nine Mapuches convicted under the anti-terrorist law and fifty-three others indicted. Of those, forty-two were in pre-trial detention (Molina, 2014). The same year, President Piñera surprised everyone, announcing the installation of a negotiation table that will try to solve the Mapuche conflict and put an end to the hunger strike that 34 community members have been carrying out for two months. Finally, the law was modified again after a dramatic hunger strike of more than 80 days (El Mostrador, 2010).

Piñera’s securitization efforts started in 2011 when Minister of Interior Rodrigo Hinzpeter accused Mapuche groups of setting fires that destroyed 30,000 hectares of forest, leaving two indigenous people dead shot by the police and dozens imprisoned (Molina, 2014). Rising the tension again, opening new focus of conflict, President Piñera implied that the forest fire in Araucanía, which caused the death of seven officers while fighting the fire, was a terrorist action by Mapuche organizations in the area (Vergara, 2012).

In 2013, two other arson attacks occurred in the zone of the Mapuche conflict, one in which Werner Luchsinger and Vivianne Mackay, a married couple died. The elders, owners of a piece of land on which the Mapuches were claiming rights, were burned to death inside their home (Molina, 2014). Celestino Córdova, the only Mapuche convicted in the Luchsinger-Mackay case, had great media coverage throughout the country (La Razon, 2013). Both the executive and prosecutors asked for life imprisonment and the application of the anti-terrorist law against him. When she was still a presidential candidate, Michelle Bachelet said it was "a horrible murder" but that she would not invoke the anti-terrorist law. "We don't need the anti-terrorist law. The law we have against anyone who kills someone is strong enough" (Freixas, 2018). Celestino Córdova always defended his innocence declaring that he was victim of a set-up by the Intelligence Unit of the Special Services of the Carabineros. In fact, the same unit had been previously accused by the Public Ministry, of committing a setup in the so-called ‘Operation Hurricane’, which accused several Mapuche community members of burning trucks in Araucanía (Freixas, 2018). The case ended with a the Mapuche Celestino Córdova sentenced to 18 years in prison. The court refused to apply the
controversial law because it failed to prove the terrorist motivation of the defendant. According to this last reform, still in force at that time, it was established that a crime could only be classified as terrorist, when it was acted ‘with the purpose of producing fear in the population’ which had to be judicially proven (Molina, 2014).

This situation changed in 2014, when a ruling of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) condemned the Chilean state for applying the Anti-Terrorist Law against seven Mapuches and one activist, prosecuted for events that occurred between 2001 and 2002 with sentences ranging from five to ten years in prison for crimes such as the threat of terrorist arson, terrorist arson, and terrorist behaviour. Thus, the new government of Michelle Bachelet guaranteed that it will comply with the court's sentence, which ordered the annulment of the convictions and a monetary compensation to each of those involved (Montes, 2014). This situation brought up the topic with several declarations against the Anti-Terrorist Law, acknowledging that “(it) has been totally useless from the point of view of what was pursued with it. That is why we have said so reliably and clearly that applying it sometimes is not the solution to the problem,” said the Minister of Justice, José Antonio Gómez (Freixas, 2018). At the end, Bachelet's government has created a commission of experts to propose a set of measures to modify the Antiterrorist Law, the measures were intended to update the Chilean legislative system and adapt it to the international context, as has been repeatedly requested of the Chilean State by the United Nations (Montes, 2014).

The application of the Anti-Terrorist Law to the Mapuche people, has created a social conflict in Chile, and the different administrations keep focusing on modifying legal aspects instead of addressing the territorial and cultural claims raised by the indigenous community. Throughout the years, the Mapuche have been discriminated against and oppressed because of their race. The application of the anti-terrorist law only seeks to degrade them and portray them as delinquents, subversives and criminals. Indeed, "In Chile there is no terrorism", according to Ben Emmerson, a UN human rights observer (UN Human Rights Council, 2017). Alberto Espinoza, a lawyer with a long trajectory in the defence of Human Rights, who claimed that the application of the Anti-Terrorist Law obeys a political objective that does not have anything to do with criminalization but is more related to the securitization of the threat. According to Casal (2010), this lawyer argument is that, if one starts from a basic premise, that is, terrorism must cause fear, a very ambiguous term if one understands that everything can cause fear, a robbery, a rape, etc. Therefore, according to
him, the Anti-Terrorist Law is being used to cause fear in the Mapuche, in their militants, sympathizers and leaders, thus, discourage them to protest. Then, why aren't the Mapuche demands terrorist? First, because the Mapuche fight is based on an ancestral nature, which is supported by international laws dictated from the UN itself. In addition, the Mapuche have not shown any intentionality to provoke acts that could be categorized as terrorists. At the end, Slings and stones are not a threatening power for a state (Casal, 2010).

The Anti-terrorist Law has been proven inefficient, for instance, "Of 111 cases in which the Anti-terrorist Law was applied, there were only 10 conviction" said the secretary general of the government, Álvaro Elizalde (Molina, 2014). Consequently, it can be argued that the solution of the conflict is not in the hands of the police or the courts, but rather it is the politicians the ones that had to take control of the situation. However, Piñera had shown no desire to do so. For instance, the Minister of Justice stated that "If every time there is a hunger strike, the authorities begin to negotiate it would be the end of the functioning of the prisons and of the principle of authority" (Freixas, 2018). Further justifying the use of the Anti-Terrorist Law. There is no sign of easing of tensions between the Chilean government and the Mapuche population, nonetheless, the government continues to treat Mapuche activists as terrorists, while violence has intensified since early 2016 (BMI Research, 2018:21-22). Diego Ancalao, political leader and professor, in conversation in the program "Sin Pretexto" of Radio Universidad de Santiago, claims that:

"when [a group] people is catalogued as an internal enemy, we have a state problem and that has no other name. The Mapuche people do not commit terrorist acts and to say the opposite is to be, simply, irresponsible, is to speak without arguments, without any basis and the elements of judgment are not proof of anything (...) it is time to stop demonizing the Mapuche people and address the issue of atrocities against the community, as a State policy, not from the political, small and accommodating viewpoint" (Piensa Chile, 2017).

In the Chilean Book of National Defence of 2002, the Mapuche people are describe and characterized as part of the Chilean population, being almost the 9% of the population by that time. Moreover, one of the National defence goals in 2002 is defined as a need to contribute to the safeguarding of Chilean historical and cultural identity. Thus, Mapuche culture is part of the values that the States is planning to protect (Chilean Ministry of National Defence, 2002:77). Going forward, in the Chilean Book of National Defence of 2010 there is no mention of Mapuche people
or any other aboriginal group, nor as a threat to the state or as a subject of protections. The goal of protecting the cultural identity is no longer a National Defence concern. Likewise, Terrorism is barely mention and has no considerable role (Chilean Ministry of National Defence, 2010). Lastly, Chilean Book of National Defence of 2017 only mention to the Mapuche community regarding the fact that since 2014 the Ministry of National Defence started a set of initiatives on the inclusion of indigenous peoples to the military and motivate them to start a career in the army (Chilean Ministry of National Defence, 2017: 195-196). To recap, this issue has been highly politicised, and the Chilean Ministry of Defence has never been directly involved on defining the status of the Mapuche people as a threat or as a subject of protection by the state, instead, the Chilean National Defence strategy has not included them at all.

In 2017, Mapuches denounced an unauthorized operation of Chilean soldiers into Mapuche territory. "They entered with implements of war, with military vehicles, weapons, threatening every person who circulated freely in our community (…) we heard bursts of machine guns (…) our people are not going to allow the police to enter our territory, either military or uniformed police" declared the leader of the Autonomous Community of Temucuicui to Radio Villa Francia. The community has taken the determination that of not allowing the entry of police or military to their territory without being consulted (Diario Uchile, 2017).

President Piñera, took again office in March 2018, and not even one month into his government, he announced a reform which intends to harden the controversial Anti-terrorist Law even more, indicating that he will ‘improve’ the regulations, pointing out that “terrorists do not have to be given a millimetre of advantage and they have to be combated with all the force and all the rigor of the law” (Espinoza C., 2018). Alerting Human rights advocates and indigenous people alike. Mapuche Defence Attorney Rodrigo Román declared: "The new law will open the door to more criminalization, more repression and more militarization in Wallmapu [Mapuche territory]” (Freixas, 2018). President Piñera justified his decision with statements such as "Terrorism was advancing in our country, because there was an attitude of ambiguity, of weakness and that fosters impunity. With the strengthening of this law, we are defending our democracy, human rights, peace and security" (Freixas, 2018).

The murder of the Mapuche Camilo Catrillanca, on December 2018, triggered another outrage throughout Chile, and fear that the country is becoming increasingly militarised. Catrillanca's death
was at the hands of a special unit, known as the Comando Jungla, trained by the US and Colombia. Responding to public pressure, Piñera ordered an investigation, yet openly stated his support of the Comando Jungla, saying that the special forces have the right to defend themselves when attacked. At the end, the minor who witnessed Catrillanca's killing was arrested by the special forces, beaten and interrogated. His testimony describes an unwarranted assault on Catrillanca that goes beyond an incident (Wadi, 2018).

Assuming a new strategy for this issue is imperative mainly for two reasons that directly involve the Chilean State. First, indigenous movements worldwide have succeeded in having their rights recognized by international law, and Chile, by assuming them, as it has done with Convention 169, is forced to improve its relationship with indigenous peoples. Second, because the very dynamics of the Chilean society with indigenous peoples has reached a breakpoint that makes it unavoidable to advance in new forms of relationship. The involvement of corrupt policeman and Anti-terrorist special unites will maintain the same clash and violence. For now, the new administration of Piñera has planned to keep trying to securitize the Mapuche protests, and regarding their acts as a threat to the state, instead of as a criminal act.

5.3 Securitization process by Colombia

Colombia is the second country in South America with the highest military spending, only after Brazil. However, it is the first country according to the percentage of GDP. In 2013, 14.3% of total government spending was allocated to the defence sector, while the Ministry of Education received 13.8% and the Ministry of Health only 7.7% (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2015). Historically, the defence sector has been the focus of the National Government. In detail, Colombia's national security has been framed and focused in the actions of groups outside the law, especially Marxist guerrillas such as the FARC and ELN, organizations that have always tried to destabilize the Colombian state. The result of this has been a militarization of the civilian, something that has allowed the civilian population to be involved in the conflict with the only objective of eliminating that internal enemy (Silva S., 2009:292). At the same time, the concepts and approaches of national security in Colombia have been based on the War on Drugs and Terror determined by its close foreign relations with the United States.

With the arrival of the new millennium, Colombia took a 180-degree turn in security, starting with the government of Andres Pastrana, by carrying out the largest restructuring in the history of the
Colombian military, providing them with great mobility, intelligence, air power and training. Along with the U.S. government as main security partner, the Plan Colombia was structured as a strategy to fight drug trafficking, thus seeking to diminish the economic power of illegal groups, which was continued and strengthened during the next eight years of President Uribe's government (2002-2010). From 2002, the Colombian state began to regain control of its borders and to defeat the FARC and the ELN, regaining control of a large part of its territory, focusing on the National Army and the Public Force to maintain and defend the sovereignty and the national territory (Payá, Delgado, & Tapías, 2017:205).

Taking into account that, in addition to the internal armed conflict, the military actions were aimed at combating the problem of illicit drugs and organized crime (Garay & Ramírez, 2017:434-435). President Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) was focused on fighting the guerrilla groups through direct armed conflict, thus underestimating the importance of the illegal mining as one of the main sources of financing for this armed groups. At the end of his two terms, the government of Uribe granted almost 9,000 mining titles, without respecting páramos (the high-altitude ecosystem that produces most of Colombia's water), national parks, indigenous reservations, or collective Afro-descendant territories, and this mining fever helped to find organized crime the perfect way to launder money repatriating its profits from drug trafficking (Ronderos, 2011).

Securitizing illegal mining: The new security threat in the post-conflict era.

Illegal mining has gone unnoticed by Colombian public opinion compared to problems such as drug trafficking or kidnapping, even though illegal mining has generated a lot of resources for the armed groups, and in addition, has produced a significant percentage of violence in different regions across the Colombian territory (Gómez B, 2013:77). Ironically, it was the improvement in security that made the world discover Colombia as an interesting mining destination yet to be explored. In 2011, Colombia was the first coal producer in Latin America and the tenth in the world. This rise in world prices, motivated in particular by a high demand by Asian countries, generated unprecedented interest in the development of mining projects in Colombia, which saw the massive arrival of foreign investments. However, this avalanche occurred in a moment when the country had not prepared its legislation, nor had it adapted its institutions to handle it (Gómez B, 2013:78); (Ronderos, 2011).
The securitization process of illegal mining started with the arrival of a new administration in 2010 and developed under a new post-conflict period (2012 - 2018). During this time, Colombia transformed the traditional conception of National Security related to the actions of the Armed Forces focused on counteracting the effects of the Armed Conflict, to a Multidimensional Security model. Taking into account the military dimension, but approaching other spheres such as the economic, political, environmental, social and human spheres (Garay & Ramírez, 2017:437). The main securitization actor was President Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018), former Minister of defence (2006-2010), as well as his ministers of defence and ministers of interior. However, the recently elected President Iván Duque (2018-) has been playing an important role keeping the same understanding of the matter even though he was always critical of Juan Manuel Santos’ administration. As a referent object, the declarations and resolutions refer to the protection of the environment, natural resources, social and moral fabrics of the society, but also to economic prosperity and sovereignty (environmental and economic security). Finally, the relevant audience in this case are high officials of the Ministers of Environment, Interior, Mines and Energy and the Colombia’s National Confederation of Miners, but also Members of Congress and House of Representatives whom are presenting new bills and approving modifications regarding illegal mining, its criminalization, and the role of the Armed Forces in the topic.

First and foremost, it is important to highlight that the decision by Santos’ government to securitize illegal mining resulted from a series of motives. Above all, illegal mining produces irreparable damage to the environment due to deforestation and the devastation which largely affects the ecosystem by discharging big quantities of mercury into water sources without any control (Niño & Palma, 2017:209). This phenomenon results in a loss of wealth for the State. To understand the gravity and magnitude of illegal mining, it is necessary to show an incredibly alarming figure recorded by CITpax Colombia in 2012, of all the gold sold in Colombia, only 14% was legally exploited. This has been the tendency for the past few years (Massé & Camargo, 2012:6).

Illegal mining represents a multidimensional threat to the Colombian state. At the social level, the lack of respect for human rights has forced many people to leave their homes and those who have remained have been forced to live in a territory dominated by violence and characterized by the absence of the State. In these areas, criminal organizations seek to obtain social recognition by offering work to the local population that cannot or cannot escape (Mancuso, 2017:338). Between
2002 and 2012, 80% of human rights violations were registered in mining areas and from these regions nearly 87% of the population was displaced by the use of forced (Massé & Camargo, 2012:4). Moreover, the Colombian State, due to the illegal mining loses a great potential to develop eco-sustainable tourism based on the discovery of Colombia's nature and uncontaminated places (Mancuso, 2017:339). The combination of better prices and lower risks resulted in an avalanche of petitions for legal mining concessions that strained the limited national mining sector. Taking advantage of flexible legislation passed in 2001, individuals and companies applied for titles for 20,000 exploration and mining concessions - one title serves both - covering 22 million hectares of the country's 114 million hectares (Ronderos, 2011).

These factors created a lot of issues for the mining sector. For instance, anyone claiming to be an informal miner could apply for a mining title, and continue to exploit his mine until his situation was regularized. That way, many mafias associated with paramilitarism and drug trafficking took advantage of this legal gap and pretended to be artisanal miners. This gave them an open letter to put dredges and expensive pumps to explode the mines on a large scale, causing great ecological and health damage. When the government tried to close the mines, they claimed they had regularization processes underway. The organized crime and guerrillas forced traditional miners to ask for titles, and at the moment that they already had the registered application, they entered with their armed men and their big equipment, they took them out of their mines or worst turned them into their workers, almost in condition of slavery (Ronderos, 2011). Not enough, for these armed groups, illegal mining generates more profits than illicit crops, which are estimated at six to eight billion dollars a year (Niño & Palma, 2017:208).

As it can be observed, illegal mining represents a threat to the environment, to the country's economy, and to the safety of its population, thus it requires a multilevel response and not only a control by the National Police. However, President Santos response was to securitised illegal mining and hinder is growth mainly through military and police operations. Under the first government of Juan Manuel Santos (2011-2014), the main concern continued to be the fight against the FARC guerrilla and other armed groups, among others, continued to be confronted mainly by military means. The government's intentions were articulated through the PND "Prosperity for All", specifically in the section "peacebuilding" oriented to security (Garay & Ramírez, 2017:437). Within this framework, the strengthening of justice was proposed, within other guidelines to
consolidate security and public order, such as: a) consolidation and borders, b) strategic capacities, c) citizen security, and d) fight against armed groups and organized crime (DNP, 2011:500). However, no real strategy to stop illegal mining was proposed in this National Plan. Likewise, the "Integral Security and Defence Policy for Prosperity" of the Ministry of Defence was established in 2011, did not proposed any military solution to the illegal mining. Instead, its strategic guidelines aimed at a higher purpose, aimed at contributing to democratic governance, prosperity, eradication of violence, through security and defence.

The important fact about the whole situation is that illegal mining in that moment was not criminalized in Colombia. The only thing that could be done was to penalize it for causing serious damage to the environment, however, there was no clear legislation about it. At the beginning of his government, President Santos announced in an interview with Dinero magazine a new crusade against illegal mining with the objective of differentiate it from informal mining:

"There are a significant number of artisanal miners, of informal miners. To them we say: don’t worry, we are going to formalize you. We are going to provide the instruments and mechanisms so that they can formalize themselves and exploit the minerals in the correct way, respecting the environment, not spilling cyanide or mercury in the water, which then kills our fish or human lives" (Pardo, 2012).

Two years after these declarations, Colombian population continued to hear the same rhetoric: “We are going with everything against illegal mining”. The President talked a lot about a way to help artisanal mining wanting to be formalized and indicated that there were 30 billion pesos available for this formalization strategy, however, the president showed more disposition for a “hard and forceful hand against criminal mining” (Pardo, 2012). With the military approach, there is always risk of mixing the small and medium miner with few resources, and without licenses that seek to scratch the earth a part of the bonanza, with the big illegal mining, owner of the dredges and real criminal empires, that with bribes or intimidation impose their will (Gómez B, 2013:80). Only until November 1, 2012, the government stated that it would seek to classify illegal mining as a crime. The President Santos proposed the strategy to combat illegal mining in a bill, which was debated in Congress, and which tried to define precisely the conduct in the Penal Code and thus punish illegal mining with more severe penalties. The proposal, presented by the Ministries of Environment, Justice, Defence and Mines suggested to classify the illicit exploitation of mining deposits and other materials as a source of money laundering (Gómez B, 2013:81). However, the bill was suspended in 2013 because the First Committee of the House of Representatives did not
process it. At that time the Government sought to criminalize only the illegal exploitation of mineral deposits as a source of laundering. But no mention to the illegal use of renewable natural resources, the violation of frontiers for the exploitation or exploitation of natural resources, illicit management of toxic species, damage to natural resources or environmental pollution (Infolaft, 2016).

It was in January 2012 that the government declared war on illegal mining. President Santos ordered it to change it status to "a high-value target, since it is one of the economic sources that have been supplying the illegal armed groups" (Gómez B, 2013:81). Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos ordered the security forces to intensify operations against illegal mining in eight departments of the country where armed groups use the activity to finance it. "I have instructed the Defence Minister Juan Carlos Pinzón, and the police commanders to conduct operations in eight departments that we have identified as the most active in criminal mining," Santos told reporters from Medellín, capital of the department of Antioquia (El Imparcial, 2013). The president said his administration will have a tough hand with criminals who are taking advantage of artisanal miners. "This is an obligation of the government, of the authorities, against a phenomenon that is causing tremendous damage to Colombians, to our society, to our environment, and that is also fuelling violence in its different forms". The first intervention against illegal mining was carried out in the town of Segovia, Antioquia, where seven heavy machines were destroyed, and five people were captured for being involved in this illegal activity (El Imparcial, 2013).

At the same time, Decree 2261 of 2012 was approved to give legal tools to the first decree Santos signed on the destruction of unauthorized machinery dedicated to illegal mining, receiving criticism mainly from the Colombia’s National Confederation of Miners. Its president and spokesman, Ramiro Restrepo, claimed that "the only purpose of these decree is to clear the way for big foreign mining companies” According to Restrepo, the government is unaware that more than two million people in the country work in informal mining conditions. He also added that "the fault that we are like this is the same government that has not wanted to formalize us and persecutes us to eradicate us, as if we were insects”. Moreover, another mechanisms President Santos stablished was the recompenses in exchange of information on illegal gold mining locations. "If a citizen denounces that there is illegal mining or that there is gold that is product of illegal mining; the
The second administration of Juan Manuel Santos (2014 - 2018) established the PND ‘Everyone for a new country’, and was articulated around three main axes: peace, equity and education. Specifically, Chapter VIII Security, Justice and Democracy for Peacebuilding, proposes a series of objectives aimed at strengthening the State to guarantee the rights of the population, transitional justice and the rights of victims (DNP, 2015). This will be achieved through a series of strategies oriented to the prevention and fight against crime, implementation of technologies for citizen security, strengthening of police presence, protection of critical infrastructure, fight against criminal mining and smuggling, strengthening of control, administration and security in border areas, national strategy of Cybersecurity (DNP, 2015; Garay & Ramírez, 2017:439). Hence, illegal mining was identified as a security threat for the first time in Colombia, giving way to a series of reforms and new projects to tackle this threat in a more direct approach.

As a result, in 2014, Santos’ administration created the Army's Special Brigade against Illegal and Criminal Mining with the main goal of protecting the country's natural resources and the environment, in addition to neutralizing the finances of the illegal structures dedicated to illegal mining. The Defence Minister, Luis Carlos Villegas, revealed on Caracol Radio that fighting against illegal mining, in an operation called 'Anastomus II', a total of 12 dredges, 18 mines and six open-pit mining fronts were disabled with the support of 700 men, 16 airplanes and 3 river vessels. This type of operation had never been carried out before in any part of Latin America (Espinosa, 2015). Colombian and Brazilian Military Forces carried out the 'Anostomus II' operation, whose objective is to fight against illegal organizations dedicated to illegal and criminal mining that directly attack natural resources and the environment in the department of Guainía.

The operation ‘Anostomus I’ was developed in a joint coordinated action by the Army, Navy, Air Force and Police, resulted in the capture of 24 people, who later accepted charges before a judge of control of guarantees for the crimes of damage to natural resources, environmental pollution, invasion of areas of special ecological importance and illegal exploitation of mining deposits (Espinosa, 2015). ‘Anostomus II’ is the second operation carried out in this region of the country in 2015 against illegal and criminal mining, consolidate a direct struggle by the Military Forces, the National Police, the National Prosecutor's Office and other state entities to preserve one of the
most important 'lungs' in the world, the geographical region bordering Brazil known as the Guiana
Shield.

Due to the success of this operations, Santos’ Government went one step ahead and presented a
bill to add new functions to the National Police, so they could join the fight against illegal mining
with better capabilities. In addition, under the new state plan, following the previous experiences,
rewards were established for those who report river pollution (El País, 2015). One of the main
novelties of this new policy against illegal mining presented by the National Government was the
inclusion of the National Police as an environmental authority with the power to confiscate and
suspend illegal activities. President Santos gave very clear orders to create in the National Police a
division that will be in charge of the fight against illegal mining, which will be in charge of a
General Officer, added to the special unit of the Army with a military point of view and of territorial
control. This was announced by the Defence Minister, Luis Carlos Villegas, when he explained
that they were in the process of selecting the possible candidates to lead these new special police
units UNIMIC to cope with this illegal industry (Espinosa, 2015).

As it has been explained, President Santos created the special operative units of the Brigade against
Illegal Mining of the Army and the UNIMIC of the Police. Two special groups established in 2014
and 2015 respectively to fight against the illicit exploitation of mineral deposits throughout the
country. However, these initiatives brought controversy since the country was already over-
militarized. On contrast, in 2013, the Colombian Congress discussed the bill No. 133 that talked
about the “means by which measures are dictated to combat armed and organized criminal groups
within the national territory”. This bill was presented by the Senator Juan Lozano Ramírez to enable
the Military Forces to use all of their capabilities in the confrontation of illegal mining that by
virtue of the fulfilment of their constitutional duties, to maintain the integrity of the national
territory, defend the constitutional regime and safeguard national sovereignty from internal threats.
During its procedure in the Congress of the Republic, this bill was strongly criticized because its
content implied the categorization of criminal gangs as armed actors in the internal conflict. In this
way, to enable the intervention of the Armed Forces. Military within the framework of International
Humanitarian Law. However, categorizing criminal gangs as an actor of the internal conflict would
prolong the armed aggression in the country, as General Rodolfo Palomino, Director of the
National Police at the time, warned in a report he addressed to Congress in which he stated:
"Applying this to confront criminal gangs would place illegal armed groups as possible 'political interlocutors', which would also mean that the government itself, through a public policy, prolongs the armed conflict" (Rodríguez, 2017:486-487).

On the contrary, trying to find an alternative solution to the securitization of illegal mining, and avoid the direct intervention of the Military Forces, many argued that a more comprehensive solution was needed. Mining should be better regulated so criminal activities are easily identify, but also the solutions need to fully integrate the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, the Ministry of Mines and Energy, Education and Agriculture, but also other institutions such as Migration Colombia or the Natural National Parks organization. All of this, in order to coordinate national and regional institutions reaching to strengthen the institutional presence and promote development in the different affected regions (Gómez B, 2013:80).

Later, the next President Ivan Duque proposed for the next 4 years the PND ‘Legality, Entrepreneurship and Equity’. This is a milestone for the defence and security policies in Colombia mainly because, for the first time, water, biodiversity and the environment are identified as the primary and overriding national interest. Its protection and preservation are key against foreign interests but also against the depredatory action of drug trafficking, illicit extraction of minerals and deforestation becomes a matter of security (Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, 2019). The first chapter of this PND defines the main concerns of Duque’s government ranging from criminal organizations to external threats related to the intention to affect territorial integrity, instability in neighbouring countries and interference from extra-hemispheric powers. In addition, and related to the securitization of Illegal mining, “Illicit economies, criminal economy circuits, constitution of new criminal groups and permanence of existing ones are analysed, in addition to the growth of their main sources of financing: illicit crops and illicit extraction of minerals” (Presidency of the Republic of Colombia, 2019).

In practice, this new attitude towards protecting the natural resources and society seems to be just the same that the previous administration, the full strength of the military. For instance, in 2018, the multinational Gran Colombia Gold, GCG, with an undemocratic request, sent a letter to President Ivan Duque and other national authorities, calling for a military and police deployment in two illegal mines set in the company's premises. This petition created uncertainty and fear in said territories because during the last mining strike in the area, it was agreed to suspend mine
closures and stop the use of public force. "We ask the Colombian government to defend the rights granted to GCG, through military and police deployment, as well as any other force necessary to combat illegal mining, protect our employees, the inhabitants of the area and the environment...", explained the Canadian multinational in the letter. In contrast, the president of the National Confederation of Small Miners, Rubén Darío Gómez, described the document as a call for violence and manipulating of the government. If this request from Gran Colombia Gold is fulfilled, the miners plan to protest, because, according to them, if there is a military intervention there will only be miners looted, captured and affected (El Espectador, 2019).

Despite the discontent generated by the request of military intervention in a private mine, in January 2019, an unrelated operation by the Army's Seventh Division gave an important blow to the illegal groups that manage the illegal extraction of mining Northeast Antioquia through a military action involving the Air Force, Police and Public Prosecutor's Office, where seven excavators, six dredgers and three engines were confiscated. The organized armed group known as Los Caparrapos would be the cause of the serious damage to the ecosystem that was being caused to the water sources, flora and fauna of this area. It is estimated that the impact would be greater than 430 hectares, whose environmental recovery would have a value of more than [14 million U.S. dollars] " said General Juan Carlos Ramirez, commander of the Seventh Division of the Army (Monsalve, 2019).

These examples are of course a continuation and formalization of the securitization process started by Former President Santos. Santos administration proposed a multifaceted solution that finally ended up being implemented as a military response to external triggers and Duque’s administration, which began in 2018, suggests that a new comprehensive approach will be implemented as requested during the past few years by the national associations of miners and the Members of Congress. Ultimately, all of this suggests a transformation of the state rhetoric, specifically, Colombian state realizing that the post conflict scenario had been creating new challenges that need to be address, and they need to be included in the National Plan and the Defence Strategy.
5.4 Discussion

The process of how Brazil, Chile and Colombia addressed security threats during the period 2008-2018 showed different processes of securitization worth analysing individually as well as collectively (Figure 1). First, the case of Brazil is interesting because President Lula da Silva securitized transnational crime in the Amazonas border and Triple border to indirectly justify the purchase of military equipment, the implementation of new military software to monitor all the inland and offshore territory, as well as a space program and cooperation agreements to developed military aircrafts. All of this, by constantly repeating that defence investment was necessary to protect the valuable natural resources that Brazil owned. However, it is important to highlight that transnational crime and illegal exploitation of resources in the borders was not a new threat for Brazil, nonetheless, Lula’s administration and later Roussef administration presented this threat as an unusual risk that needed to be address promptly and effectively. To do so, they brought up the first-ever National Defence Strategy (END), a milestone that not all the Brazilian bureaucracy and politicians approved mainly because of the Military regime that haunted Brazil a few decades back. This modernization and refurbishment of the whole military and defence strategy was aimed to strengthen the position of Brazil in the world, and at the same time trying to diminish the influence of the US in the region.

This securitization effort extended to the regional level were Lula proposed combating drug trafficking on the continent needed to be dealt with in the framework of the recently created South American Defence Council. Specifically, regarding the vast area that Brazil and Colombia share in the Amazonian border and the trafficking in the Triple Frontier in the south. This is an example of how the rhetoric used by President Lula reaffirmed his commitment to the internal securitization process and defined a trend on how all regional and national threats were being dealt on the framework of natural resources and borders, as he had promoted (environmental and economic security). Despite all the efforts by the president of Brazil, regionally other South American countries were not so willing to securitize their natural resources so to protect them of uncertain threats. The South American Defence Council remain a consultative organism of UNASUR that did not agreed to introduce any guideline regarding the protection of borders a natural resource as Brazil proposed.
Despite Brazil and Colombia evident differences, they have both shown interest in protecting at any cost their natural resources in the past decade, likewise they presented interrelated securitization practices (consistent with the RSCT) regardless of the differences in their political views (President Lula Da Silva being from the Labour party in Brazil and Santos being a right-wing conservative). At the same time, in a regional framework, Brazil projection of soft and hard power in the region added to their willingness to move away from the influence of the United States, can help as an empowering boost for the region, especially for Colombia or Peru, countries that share natural borders with Brazil and historically have been faithful partners of the US. Thus, following a common objective, through a regional institution or bilateral cooperative agreements, the region can start addressing environmental, military and societal security issues in a more effective way.

The Chilean case on the other hand shows a different approach to securitization. The Chilean Army has been gradually diminishing the number of armed forces personnel, trying to focus on professionalising the army and give a technological advantage to it. Moreover, Chilean troops have participated in every single United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, and its involvement is based on the country’s commitment to assist the international community in the maintenance of international peace and security. Nonetheless, internally they are facing a social outbreak by the native population Mapuche who are calling for the respect of previously established territorial agreements, and the government of President Sebastian Piñera started applying an old Anti-Terrorist Law, instead of just criminalizing the violent protest acts. The Chilean government securitization of the right of Native population to protest, defined as a terrorist threat, is an ongoing process, even more now that Sebastian Piñera returned to the presidency (societal and political security). However, it has received backlash from international NGOs, but also from internal and external actors, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the United Nations.

Regarding the regional aspect, the rights of native populations have not been a topic addressed in the SDC or any security committee of the UNASUR, because many countries in the region do not approach this topic as a security threat. Countries such as Colombian, Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia have recognized and respect rights of native populations and had honoured previous commitments with the natives. In this aspect, this securitization process has brought more problems to the Chilean State in terms of Human Rights abuses and violation to international rule of law than solutions,
instead of fighting the Mapuche social movement with police force and special counterterrorist units of the army, Chile could benefit from the experiences and processes of other countries in the region and improve their approach towards the Mapuche challenge.

Table 1 Securitization in South America 2008-2018

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Driver of Securitization</th>
<th>Referent Object</th>
<th>Securitizing Actors</th>
<th>Emergency Policy Response</th>
<th>Relevant Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Transnational crime</td>
<td>Natural resources (located in the Triple frontier, the Amazonia and territorial waters)</td>
<td>President Lula Da Silva (following same approach President Dilma Roussef)</td>
<td>First-ever National Defence Strategy (END) in 2008 Defence White Paper in 2011</td>
<td>Ministers of Defence, politicians and the government bureaucracy in Brazil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>Protest and social mobilization by Native population</td>
<td>Democracy, human rights, peace and security</td>
<td>President Sebastian Piñera (2010-2014) and (2018-)</td>
<td>Application of the Anti-Terrorist Law (No.18314) and modifications to it</td>
<td>Public opinion, Chilean prosecutors and attorneys, as well as International Courts, Institutions and NGOs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colombia</td>
<td>Illegal mining</td>
<td>Environment, sovereignty, people and society</td>
<td>President Juan M. Santos (following same approach President Ivan Duque)</td>
<td>Creation of Special units in the Armed Forces and National Police. Regulation of the mining industry</td>
<td>Ministers of Environment, Mines and Energy, National associations of Miners and the Members of Congress</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own elaboration.

Finally, in the case of Colombia securitizing the illegal mining across the country has been a natural and smooth securitization process, however, maybe not the best solution. In the past decade, the Colombian Armed Forces and the local government were finally in a good and comfortable position
having more control of the territory. With the guerrilla groups decimated and the violence decreasing day by day, the focus of the military changed from the armed confrontation and the eradication of illicit crops to the peacekeeping and illegal mining activities. It was an easy transition without much discrepancy or disagreement by the referent audience because illegal mining was easily recognized as a threat for the environment and the society, but also as the fuel that was helping organized crime and guerrillas to get economic resources. Nonetheless, as in the case of Chile, securitizing issues regarding farmers and miners might not be the best approach to solve and social-economic issue really rooted in the Colombian societal structure (environmental, societal and economic security). Colombia, as a country that just signed a peace treaty with the biggest internal enemy of the last fifty years cannot keep solving the issues with the intervention of the armed forces. Instead a strong regulation and criminalization could be resolved in the long term. Some good steps were made during 2008-2018, however, fighting miners with bullets is not an effective way of dealing with this issue. Again, taking this security threat to a regional debate, learning from other countries and cooperating with regional actors could bring more support to the local legislation and solved the issue quicker and peacefully.
6. Conclusions

South America has been a relative peaceful region with regards to inter-state conflicts, however, internal struggles has always been part of the daily life. South American countries, specifically, Brazil, Colombia and Chile have shown a steady economic growth and social development changing the way that politics and social issues are dealt with. Armed insurgencies, transnational organized crime, uncontrolled migration and border conflicts are some of the issues presented in every country of the region, however, the way each country reacts to these challenges is very different from one to another. For instance, the military threats and defence concerns of Brazil, one of the biggest economies in the world, are different to the security needs of Chile, the most developed country in the region, or even the case of Colombia dealing with guerrilla groups and drug dealers has been a very complex social, political and military reality. All these factors, added to the administration’s individual goals, modify the way each country decides to face new security challenges.

Regarding the thesis of this research, it was argued that during the past ten years, new security challenges emerged in South America, but the different administrations barely articulated solutions to tackle these security threats. Then, the paper addresses this question through the lenses of the Securitization theory introduced by the Copenhagen school, analysing specifically how Brazil, Chile and Colombia articulated or at least tried to integrate solutions and policies to face the new security threats. In addition, the Regional Security Complex Theory (RSCT) presents a complementary analysis to frame the regional situation more appropriately. However, the results of this research show some interesting factors to analyse, thus a proper answer to this inquiry needs to be divided in two parts.

First, the individual analysis of Brazil, Chile and Colombia showed different processes of securitization from 2008-2018. Yet, in accordance with the theory, this case studies show that securitization can be understood as a discursive practice that a government or administrations adopts at a given moment, according to its interests, strategies, and possible alliances (Buzan & Wæver, 2003:264), so to achieve a change of the regulations or established rules. In the case of Brazil and Colombia, it can be argued that the securitization processes were a good and effective way of dealing with a new threat, but at the same time, fulfilling their government’s agenda without much opposition due to the language of urgency and promptness been used. Chile on the other
hand, securitized the fundamental democratic right of social protest by bringing up an outdate anti-terrorism law from the dictatorship years. Former President Michelle Bachelet (2014-2018) and currently UN High Commissioner for Human Rights had the opportunity to change this securitizing approach during her administration, however, despite her efforts and unfruitful attempts, it seems like this topic was not really part of her agenda, and more importantly, against international and national recommendations this securitization process has not been stopped or interrupted up until today.

Second, regarding the South American overall framework this research helped identify security interdependencies among different countries in the region. Hence, the RSCT was useful to understand how the securitization processes occurs in South America. Again, this can be analysing in taking in consideration to aspects. One, the role of the regional security architecture, and second, the influence of the United States in the region. To begin with, the existing regional security architecture did not play any visible role regarding the securitization of new threats during the past 10 years. Despite the fact that the South American Defence Council was created at the beginning of the analysed period and is still in operation, there was no consensus regarding any real and legitimate initiative in Security aspects. During this period, UNASUR lost its relevance as a regional organization with the death of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez, and the beginning of an economic and humanitarian crisis in Venezuela, causing several leaders to suspended their participation in UNASUR, then leaving definitely the organization in 2017 and 2018. Moreover, the creation of the South American Forum for Progress (PROSUR) is the most recent Latin American regional integration initiative. This project is the work of right-wing leaders Sebastián Piñera of Chile and Iván Duque of Colombia, and was born with the aim of ending the UNASUR created by the left-wing pole Lula-Chávez-Kirchner (Herrera, 2019). If South America wants to claim a leading place on the geopolitical world and solve security issues that transcend its borders -such as drug trafficking or migration- it will have to achieve a non-ideological regional integration in the coming decades, leaving behind the Left-Right debate and focusing in the common issues.

Concerning the influence of the United States, the beginning of the century showed a moderate position of Brazil, Chile and Argentina, and a natural friendship with Colombia and Peru (Herz 2010:598), and even though the concerns and characteristics of the regions have changed, the US strategies have remained intact throughout the years. Fighting drug trafficking and illegal migration
remain the only evident priorities for the US after 25 years. Nonetheless, the present research showed a different situation taking place during the past 10 years, for instance, Chile kept the same moderate position with the US, participating in regional military trainings under the OAS and being active in the United Nations Peacekeeping operations. Differently, Brazil has done everything possible to maintain an independent security policy, and its Heads of State had searched for different military and defence alliances around the world to accomplish this goal. Likewise, Colombia seems to be developing an independent and more mature attitude towards defining security strategies depending on its own current needs. For instance, the fight against illicit crops and armed groups was highly influenced by the US in the past, but nowadays, after the peace agreement with the FARC and the decreasing overall violence, the way Colombia has addressed illegal mining has been so far totally independent. Ultimately, any of the countries analysed show inclination or tendency to replace the influence of the United states with any other country nor even considering Brazil as a regional leader.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that, as it was expected the Securitization theory shows some limitations. First, the definition of speech act is ambiguous and sometimes difficult to determine, not always what the politicians claim in their declarations reflects what is in the government’s agenda. The results showed that Acácio, Brancoli, & Suarez (2017:277) are right when they claim that securitization could be defined as a security process or just as a political discourse, or both. Hence, the analysis needs to be careful and comprehensive so there are no biases or misjudgements. Moreover, McDonald’s criticism (2008:564) is also valid when stating that the framework of securitization is narrow because it can be defined solely in terms of the designation of threats. Nonetheless, the application of the securitization theory was appropriate to determine how the different countries were addressing the new security issues they were facing, who exactly was the agent/actor initiating the securitization, which premises are being used and it was also useful to analyse the reaction of different parties and the new policies being implemented.
7. List of the literature and references


