Elevating Softly
Lula’s Brazil through the Lenses of Joseph Nye’s Soft Power Theory

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1. Introduction

1.1. Choosing the research question, hypothesis

The general presumption that the world is in the process of a significant change has been in the focus of international political and economic debate. Emerging countries are taking over roles and positions. They have shifted their stand and approach towards international politics, they are engaged at different levels and with different intensity in world affairs. Today’s Brazil is a fast-growing and inspiring example of the progress developing countries made in recent years. Albeit this process dates back to the near past, beginning under the Cardoso era, the most apparent change in Brazilian foreign policy could be observed during the two presidencies of Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva between 2003 and 2010.¹ Brazil has devoted an especially high level of attention for developing its soft power capacities during the last 15 years in order to position itself on the global stage. This agenda is due to many factors Brazil pursued, for example, its aspiration to have more say in world affairs or its engagement to support multilateralism and international cooperation instead of unilateralism, which is associated mostly with hard power and the toolbox of sticks and carrots.

The aim of this paper is twofold: firstly to shed light on the characteristics of Brazilian soft power, what makes Brazil stand out from the group of other developing nations and secondly why this approach gives a special tone to the intensified Brazilian presence in the most pressing global issues. Moreover, with the support of theoretical and empirical facts, this paper attempts to outline and logically back up the initial hypothesis, that Brazil’s reliance on soft power outstandingly manifests itself during the era of Inácio Lula da Silva. It is visible in his domestic and foreign policies and radiates through Brazilian culture. In the meantime, I introduce the actions, tools, methods and discourses within the three key resources of soft power with which Brazil attempted to wield power on the international scene. However, it is necessary to understand the interests of Brazil, in order to understand why it is increasingly important for this country to place distinguished emphasis on the soft dimension in its strategy in order to wield power and fulfil its aspirations as a global player.

¹ See appendix: Figure 1. The portray of the president.
To analyse the questions raised, I use the theoretical framework of the International Relations scholar, Joseph S. Nye (2004), who is the author of the much debated book, 'Soft power – the Means to Success in World Politics'. In this publication, he elaborated his previously developed theory of the 'soft power' dimension of states and its contribution to success in international politics.

After an overview of the altered Brazilian national interest and power during the Lula era, special attention will be devoted to the analysis of the three key Brazilian soft power resources. These three categories developed by Nye (2004) will be applied to organize Brazilian soft power instruments and clarify where attraction originates from. I will examine the soft power instruments Brazil relied on mostly during the Lula era, grouped under the following three dimensions:

- Brazilian culture,
- the domestic values and policies,
- and the style and substance of Brazilian foreign policy. (Nye 2004 p.11)

These are considered to be crucial to support the hypothesis. Within each pillar, I will observe policies, actions and discourses, without the intention to be exhaustive on each of these elements individually. I will rather attempt to create a comprehensive picture under each dimension, and highlight their contribution to Brazil’s pursuit of its national interest. First, a closer look will be given to the cultural pillar, resting on those national characteristics, for instance traditions, music or language, which can be attractive to other nations. This aspect has a more inherent nature, on which governments has only partial ascendancy. The second pillar concerns the domestic sphere, namely the political values and policies a state promotes and implements at home, and their projection beyond the borders. (Nye 2004) Finally, I will elaborate on the style and direction of Brazilian foreign policy, on its main focus areas and tools during the here examined period. As Brazil will be examined between 2003 and 2010, during the two Lula administrations, his vivid presidential diplomacy will impregnate this analysis. In addition, I will also try to point out some context-related difficulties when applying the theory, namely the dilemma of soft and hard power, their interdependence, and why is it still appropriate to separately analyse Brazil’s reliance on the ’soft power’ toolbox.
1.2. Methodology

To analyse the developments and changes of Brazil during the Lula era, I will use a multidisciplinary research method, where the conceptual tools of the following academic disciplines: International Relations, Political Science, Sociology and Cultural Studies will be combined. Joseph Nye’s soft power theory provides the theoretical framework to build upon, within which the Brazilian case can be analysed. However, in order to understand the development of soft power theory and its importance in world politics, firstly, the changed notions of national interest and national power will be outlined based on the works of international scholars like Hans J. Morgenthau, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye himself. The core concept of the theoretical frame concerns the soft power resources, or the three main pillars (culture, domestic values and policies and the style and substance of foreign policies), which support a state to promote its national interest. (Nye 2004 p. 11) This will be based on the academic literature, such as the works of Joseph Nye, Giulianne Gallarotti, and Yanzhong Huang and Ding Sheng.

The examination of the Brazilian case will be conducted after the thorough perusal of existing analysis of several countries’ tendencies and practises to rely upon soft power resources in their pursuit of national interest. This can be tracked in the book of Nye, ‘Soft Power Theory – the Means to Success in World Politics’, in which he applied his theory on the United States precisely and gave a brief analysis on the EU and the Soviet Union. Yanzhong Huang’s and Sheng Ding’s, as well as Shanti Kalathil’s works on Chinese soft power, proved to be a helpful tools to examine ‘soft power’ patterns in the Brazilian case. The appropriateness of the conceptual and theoretical framework chosen is justified by the evidence that more and more scholars apply Nye’s theory in International Relations. This is for the analysis of state behaviour and to explain the changing discourse and shifting foreign policy agenda, lead by the desire to have more influence on the course of international politics.

This study will be based on the analysis of primary literature, such as the speeches of Lula da Silva and Celso Amorim, national and international polls, as well as on secondary sources, such as scholarly works, conference extracts, official news sources and data on the subject, mainly internet-based ones. Due to the limited
availability of space, I will restrict myself to the application of few tools or measurements, for instance that of polls and statistics.

1.3. Structure

In the first part of my paper, I will attempt to delineate Joseph Nye’s soft power theory which will serve as the theoretical framework through which I will approach my research question. Moreover I will define the concept of national interest and national power and the process their realist notion was challenged. This is necessary, as I will build upon these findings throughout my work. The thread will be illustrated by figure 1., disposed in the appendix.

The theoretical section serves to give a broad and abstract picture of the underlying process and transformation, which explains on what grounds Brazil could rely on soft power resources in order to achieve its goals.

The next part is a general portrayal of how the Brazilian national interest concept transformed during the Lula administration and how this made possible the reformulation of the Brazilian approaches towards the means this modified national interest is addressed by. The section continues with the application of the soft power theory and the outlined concepts on the Brazilian case, as well as with the thoroughly analyses of the three dimensions of soft power resources. First, the cultural attributes will be in focus, which is followed by the examination of domestic values and policies. The third step will be the discussion of the changes in the style and substance of foreign policy during the Lula era.

In this section, I will attempt to provide an analysis and overview how the actions, methods and discourses contributed to the strengthening of Brazilian soft power.

Finally, I will make some concluding remarks and share my finding in light of my previous analysis.
2. Theoretical Framework – Soft power and its possible applications on Brazil

2.1. The road to soft power theory: national power and national interest revised

In the introduction, I intend to set the tone by putting forward, that world politics is undergoing significant changes, which restructure the surface of modern interstate relations and the traditional means these are treated with. In order to explain this major shift in international politics, namely the increase of the value of soft power compared to hard power, it is necessary to examine, how the classical realist approach of IR is not adequate any more to explain power-relations in this new, rapidly changing globalized system. (Gallarotti 2011)\(^2\) The traditional realist approach, which has long dominated in IR, assumed that international relations are necessarily competitive and conflictual, with world politics occurring in international anarchy. (Jackson et. al. 2010 p. 60) According to this approach, the mostly regarded ideas and values are national security, state survival and power maximalisation. (Jackson et. al. 2010 p.60)

The disciplinary of IR was revolving around the term, ‘state-centric realism’ for a long time, which argued that states were the unitary actors in world politics and foreign policy was only the outcome of intergovernmental activities. Furthermore, a very cutting distinction was remarked between the realm of foreign policy and domestic matters, with ‘national interest’ being the paramount and primary value. (Webber, M. et. al 2002) In realist thought, to ensure survival and defend national interest, was the main aim of the state. Therefore, states mostly relied on the hard power toolbox, namely military power and economic supremacy, which were worded by Joseph Nye later as ‘sticks and carrots’. (Nye 2004 p. 5) Within IR, old liberal ideas had a very distinctive outlook on world politics and state behaviour, compared to traditional realism. This earlier liberalism encompassed utopistic ideas, values and principles, placing emphasis on the inclusion of morality and ethics in politics. (Jackson et. al. 2010 p. 42) The promotion of liberal democratic values and self determination around the world, were

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\(^2\) See the illustration of the process in the appendix: Figure 1.: The way to soft power theory.
central to this thought, as well as the belief in the peaceful cooperation between states secured by an international organization.

From the ‘50s on, liberals started to reformulate their approach, due to the acceleration of inter-state relations in many specific areas, such as trade or transportation. This era resulted in the repudiation of idealism, but still keeping the basic assumptions and ideas about international relations. (Jackson et. al. 2010 p. 42) This renewed liberalism, often termed as neoliberalism, acknowledges states and their interests as central considerations, as well as realism did. However, they believe, that states are still able to “engage in collaborative and cooperative social action” both on the domestic and the international scene. (Jackson et.al 2010 p. 96) Under this approach, enlightened national interest became a central concept, which presumes that states can find balance between their interests and universal goals, and achieve mutual wins. This moreover provided space for ‘soft power’ resources to gain foothold, mainly by affecting the means and tools national interests are pursued by. The neoliberal thought concentrates on the cooperative behaviour, which can be achieved by decentralization within the international system. (Nye 1988) Thus institutions and regimes, which promote cooperation and consultation, will contribute to address common problems based on the identification of shared values and aims, which emerge as the products of interconnected activities between nations. This approach provided a fresh perception on how the interactions of states, international norms, regimes and institutions reformulate the interests of the states, and mainly on the manner they choose to act upon these newly shaped goals. (Nye 1988)

When the focus is on the instruments to implement national interest, it is about how power can be translated into real action. How can the messages be got through, while representing the specific interests and views of the government on certain issues. (Webber et. al. 2002 p.32) Soft power theory grew out from the neoliberal approach, and it is specific in concentrating on the distinctive toolbox a state uses in order to achieve its goals in international politics. These tools are synchronised with the main assumptions of neoliberalism, because when a state operates with soft power, it devotes lots of attention to the design of cooperation platforms, as well as to the insurance of the balance within the international system and to the compliance with liberal political and economical values.
Most of the new ‘actors’, namely institutions and other less formal forums, entering the scene, don’t really own any of the classical hard power resources, but rather that of influencing and agenda setting power. Here, I would like to refer to transnational institutions and intergovernmental organizations. This work does not intend to elaborate on their roles due to limits of length. Therefore, I would only like to emphasize their function and importance to the extent it is necessary to understand the aspirations of Brazil to hold a permanent seat in the Security Council, to foster multilateralism; as well as to see the role of institutions as tools of Brazilian value and interest promotion on the international scene. These institutions, which enhance “sustainable future”, and by which many times “powerful national governments have been compelled to act”- coping with social aspects like climate change, poverty, famine or peacekeeping-, highlight their instrumentality in effective policy implementation and their importance as tools of ‘soft power’. (Webber et. al. 2002 p.32)

As nation’s power is the nuclear of inter-state relations, it is a tool for the realisation of one’s goals. (Gallarotti 2011 p.4) How can thus power be defined in the simplest sense? As Joseph Nye says, “power is the ability to achieve one’s purpose and goals”, to perform our desires or to shape that of others. (Nye 1991 p.31) The very question is however, what constitutes state power? How can a nation convert its power into influence? The famous realist IR scholar, H. J. Morgenthau, differentiated two groups of resources of a nation, which can contribute to the realisation of power in the international scene. His approach fluttered some of the core notions of Nye’s soft power concept already in 1950, but still undervalued their importance. He separated the “relatively stable” elements from “those which are subject to constant change”. (Morgenthau 1993 p.22) The first group can be merged in the “hard power” pot as it contains geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness and population as core elements. The second group on the other hand lists national character, national morale and the quality of diplomacy as non-static, always fluctuating resources of power. (Morgenthau 1993 p.115)

This section was intending to introduce the traditional realist view of national power and the process, how this notion was transformed and challenged by globalization opening the way for new approaches. The ‘national interest’ concept has been modified and its scope has widened with “milieu goals” to pursue. (Wolfers in: Webber et. al. 2002 p.44) Furthermore, the relevance of soft power in the realization of ‘milieu goals’
is remarkable, such as democracy promotion, the guarding of human rights or environment protection, since coercing states to include these issues into their agendas is harder than attracting them to do so. (Nye 2004) This global shift also brought change regarding the methods power is being applied with, and in the way states attempt to promote their ideas and values. After evaluating the traditional realist approach of power, national interest and power projection, it is no surprise that this modified landscape of world politics gave birth to the neoliberal thought. Keohane and Nye in their work ‘Power and Independence’, argue that foreign policy is no longer the only tool of promoting national interest and this provides space for a variety of agendas to direct decision-making and action. (Webber et. al. 2002) The neoliberal logic can be also spotted in the presumption that states can identify their goals and strategies, thus striving to achieve them with the plentiful opportunities available not tumbling harmony. (Gallarotti, 2011)

Thanks to the emergence of more complex forces and the polarization of aims, values and means to achieve them, the above elaborated perception of national interest and national power was contested in several ways. Brazil’s case will demonstrate how this realistic approach is challenged today, how domestic and foreign actions and policies have mutual impact on one another, how formal and informal multilateral forums challenged the presumption that only nation states can be the carriers of one’s interests.

In the following two sections I will elaborate Joseph Nye’s soft power theory (2004) and introduce the three key resource categories. Secondly, I will highlight why it has special potential to attract others to follow and describe why it can more likely induce legitimacy in the eyes of others. Finally, I will examine the two main dilemmas of soft power theory, namely the overlap between hard and soft power resources and the measurement and assessment challenges one faces when applying this theory.

2.2. What is behind the name: soft power?

Since 2004, when Joseph Nye devoted a whole book to the elaboration of his soft power theory -coined for the first time in his book ’Bound to lead’ in 1991- and used it on the example of the United States, a long lasting debate has developed. In ’Bound to
lead’, he differentiated a state’s hard power, as the power-dimension where coercion and inducements play the main role, and ‘soft power’, which is rather based on ‘intangible resources’: attraction, imitation and guidance. (Huang and Ding 2006 p.23)

Nye defined these resources as those of national cohesion, culture and the influence a state can have on international institutions and processes. (Nye in: Huang and Ding 2006) He also used the term „the second face of power” which refers to a more indirect power with which, one can achieve the desired outcomes on the global arena”. (Nye 1991 p.31) Later this angle of power will be termed as ‘co-optive’ power or ‘indirect power’, referring to the ability to design the political agenda which is able to form the desires and goals of others. (Nye 2004 p.7) This is supplemented with the attractiveness of one’s culture, ideology, institutions or political choices. These above are considered to be the intangible side of power resources, opposite to the tangible ones, used to coerce and command, which are the substances of hard power. If these elusive resources are attractive, it is more likely that they will be able to win others to follow. (Nye 1991)

One might wonder, how can the cultural or political values of certain nations become transmittable to other ones, and how will this contribute to the improvement of leadership quality and better integration in international decision-making? (Wuthnow 2008) As emphasizing soft power can attract one nation to the other, through this approach, one’s international influence is likely to increase, and by the reliance on the resources of soft power, it “converges onto one process of empowerment”. (Gallarotti 2011 p. 21) Thus soft power, in terms of behaviour, can be defined as attractive power. If we take soft power resources themselves, they are the assets attraction is produced by. (Nye 2004 p. 6) Though they are usually not fast-acting and more scattered, they are very useful to rely on when wielding power in world politics.

2.2.1. The three main resources or dimensions of soft power

The overall foreign policy outcome examined through the soft power window, namely how a state acts in front of the global community to create a positive image and generate attraction, derives from three key soft power resources. (Nye 2004)

The first dimension of culture, can be related closely to the national features and distinctive characteristics, mainly leaching through culture, media or language which are not to be strongly associated with a states’ policies or actions, but they can have a
seducing effect. (Gallarotti 2011) Nye defines culture as a value and custom pack, which contributes to a society’s self identification. (Nye 2004 p. 11) A nation’s culture can be broken down into two main components. One of them is high culture, which includes education, scientific merits, literature or art. The other one, low-brow or popular culture incorporates mass entertainment and commerce. (Nye 2004 p.44) When we talk about culture, the universalistic values a nation shares, or the national culture-product it exports, we have to keep in mind that their reception highly depends on the context, therefore on the recipient countries. While certain cultural assets can be sources of attraction, the same ones can have negative impact on the national image in other countries.

The other two dimensions are the main sources, with the second concerning the policies and actions one follows on the domestic scene and the means how national matters are addressed. This specific manner of addressing domestic issues further has international implications and effects. The soft power resources of a country can be trifled or amplified by the quality and content of government policies. These policies can cause harm to others by focusing only on the narrow self interests or by aggressively expressing values others don’t hold. By this, a country’s image can deteriorate and it can become easily perceived as unpopular. (Nye 2004 p.14)

The third dimension concerns foreign policy in the minimalist sense. (Gallarotti 2011) In minimalist sense, because the interplay of these three dimensions of soft power, contributes to the wider scope of national foreign policy. This wider scope is what concerns how a state appears on the international scene, how it acts, utilizes its power resources in a more general sense -including hard power-, and how it optimizes its national interest. Thus a country’s success in exerting soft power cannot be divided from its foreign policy objectives; neither can it be separated from the values which it expresses through these objectives and the style of foreign policy. (Huang and Ding 2006 & Nye 2004) National interests are pursued by foreign policy, therefore the narrower or broader definition of these goals will affect the means one strives to achieve them. The style also implies the tactics, the discourses and the narrative a nation applies in order to attain the desired effect. The quality and form of diplomacy gives weight and direction to a nation’s foreign policy and it is interrelated with the style and means interests are pursued by. (Morgenthau 1993)
This three dimensional model of soft power resources, I discussed above, illustrated and categorized the components what make up a nation’s soft power. This model, often served as the base for several scholars for case study analysis on selected countries, or for developing critical approaches for alternative explanation on how power is exerted and maintained in world politics. The soft power theory opens up a new perspective for examination how a country acts, how it manages to carry through its ideas and values or how much it has influence in interstate matters. Then, by structuring these observations with the help of Nye’s three pillars (2004) empowers the observer to see from what components the whole picture is made up.

2.2.2. Soft power – a source of legitimacy

Legitimacy in the eyes of others is a key driver of the theory. Joseph Nye argues that if one manages to make its actions and promoted values appear legitimate in front of others that will help to decrease the resistance to one’s wishes. (Nye 1991) The shaping of domestic rules and patterns, which do not contradict the international actions and narrative of a state, can also enhance legitimacy, as it avoids the emergence of the image of a hector-state. Therefore a country with attractive ideology and value system, which are represented both within and outside of the borders, can be seen fetching, with this producing the follow-effect on other states. (Nye 2004) This pattern of leading with example is crucial when one wants to stimulate others for action rather them compel them for doing it.

“Soft power represents a form of meta-power”3 argues Gallarotti when he elaborates on a state’s potential agenda-ascendancy or ‘the second face of power’, drawing on the work of Bachrach and Baratz quoted by Nye (2004) as well. (Gallarotti, 2011 p. 11) As it was mentioned in the previous section, the appearance of ‘milieu goals’ in a state’s agenda, contributes to the universalisation of one’s culture, values or stance. This redounds to the acceptance of one’s say when forming rules or institutions with international governing capabilities. (Wolfers 2002 & Nye 1991) This indeed leads to

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3 In the most simple sense meta-power can be defined in terms of having control over “greater social constellations” and by this achieve influence over outcomes. This means that with meta-power the course of actions, situations can be oriented due to the desire of the first actor, possessing abilities to impinge on the other one to move closer to the first actor’s own preferred position.
agenda-ascendancy, to which Nye refers as the ability to practice “control over the political agenda”. (Nye in: Gallarotti 2011 p.12) Under political agenda here, the set of issues to bargain over are understood, which will set the borders of the bargaining processes itself. These bargaining processes then produce outcomes regarding a range of issues or strategies, which will -in ideal- situation meet the national interest of the agenda setters. (Gallarotti 2011) Let’s suppose, a nation has an existing potential to influence the outcome, thus influencing the occurrences, in order to meet its national interest or see it represented in the result. Then it can be done with the development and utilization of soft power resources, as they boost the agenda setting, or influencing capacity of the nation at hand. 4

The other cardinal substance of soft power circulates around preference-forging and co-optation. Gallarotti rewords Nye’s (2004) definition of co-optation, stating that:

“Influence can be acquired if an actor is able to mold the preferences and interests of other actors so as to converge closer to its own preferences and interests.” (Gallarotti 2011 p.14)

The classical approaches differs from Joseph Nye’s point of view (2004), who doesn’t see the resources stemming only from the characteristics of the state but also derived from the interstate relations and practices. This approach presupposes that states possess power only in terms of their relation to the other states, meaning that the context in which power is realised is essential. However this context factor is what creates inconveniences within the theory. Because if the interpretation of soft power resources depend much on the context, how can we clearly declare an action to belong to the soft power instruments?

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4 In the power literature there have been four different faces of power identified, out of which two will be briefly highlighted here to contribute to the explanation of the Nyeian soft power theory. Peter Bachrach’s and Morton S. Baratz’s work emphasized the second face, or to say agenda setting power as well as Steven Lukes’ and Jererry Isaac’s ‘third face of power’ which embraces the ‘power of co-optation’ through which a state’s empowerment can be manifested. Gallarotti brought together these ideas arguing that they are embedded in meta-power and he shed light on the essence of soft power. (Bachrach et al., Lukes and Isaac in: Gallarotti 2011 p. 14)
2.3. The soft power dilemmas

2.3.1. Where does hard power end – is there a way in between?

The dilemma of the interplay of hard power and soft power can be lifted out from the 'soft power' debate and be dedicated more attention, as the borderline is week between the two boxes. This constitutes one of the problematic point of the theory to be highlighted before analysing the Brazilian soft power, mainly with regards of Brazil’s status as a third world state with significantly growing economical capabilities. This indicates on the first place that the 'hard power' dimension can’t be ignored. Usually dynamic economic development is examined under the hard power hat, as –if the thread is followed here about the tangible resources belonging to the hard power assets- it falls under the quantifiable and measurable category. In terms of countries, which experience outstanding economic progress, this growth does not only make contribution to national wealth. It also makes the state appear more attractive, increases its reputation, and encourages others to attempt to model the pattern it followed. (Huang and Ding 2006)

This gives us an incentive to carefully observe the context in which certain events and actions take place. Different resources can sometimes play very different roles of influence. The same one can be used to attract and shape the desires of others, while it can also create the effect of intimidation.

Nye argues, that the closest to reality to succeed is indeed the balanced combination of soft and hard power, which he defined as smart power. (Nye 2008) Brazil has of course a large amount of resources which falls under the category of hard power; we just have to look at the striking economic growth of recent years. In 2011 Brazil overtook the position from the UK as the 7th largest economy in term of GDP. Its fast recovery from the economic and financial crisis and its military power which accounts to be within the 20 largest one in the world, are also significant factors. In 2010, the Brazilian economic growth in GDP reached 7,5%, the highest rate of the last 25 years. (The World Factbook 2012 and Sotero & Armijo 2007 p. 45) It is also noteworthy that Brazil has a large population, which exceeded 200 million in 2012, becoming the 5th largest in the world. Its huge territory, which is just slightly smaller than the US’s, is rich in exploitable natural resources such as petroleum, iron, gold, hydropower etc. (The World Factbook 2012) Albeit Brazil has long had these hard power resources, it did not contribute to any significant progress or development, or
change in Brazil’s global position. In order to produce outcomes a country wants, having the resources is not a sufficient condition. To convert these capabilities into power and to produce an output, which will make the way towards the desired goals, the state needs to design and implement effective and need-based strategies as well as to have the right leadership. (Nye 2004)

Another intersection of hard and soft power resources can be demonstrated through the example of peacekeeping. This is indeed related to military power, a generally hard power instrument, though it can generate fascination if it used in a way that will not “deviate from the politically liberal principles”, undermining the admiration. (Gallarotti 2011 p.25) Brazil’s proactive step to deploy troops in Haiti for the MINUSTAH peacekeeping mission under the aegis of the UN, demonstrates well how military presence can create admiration and raise one’s prestige. (Sotero and Armijo 2007)

The other main dilemma concerns the tangible or intangible nature of soft power. Until now, to simplify the definition of soft power and introduce its key components, it was consistently characterized as intangible thus harder to grasp or define. Nevertheless, “sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire spectrum of behaviour from coercion to attraction.” (Nye 2004 p.9) Therefore according to Gallarotti, the most striking feature to differ it from the hard power asset does not originate from tangibility or intangibility but “the real differentiation of power is in the context of its use”. (Gallarotti 2011 p.28) The politically liberal principles, which must radiate through the hard power based actions and policies, thus can be awe-inspiring in front of other nations, such as the protective steps in case of extremely serious human rights violations, the provision of recipient friendly aid and infrastructure investments or measures for political stabilization. To sum it up, it can be said, that tangibility can be a quality of both hard and soft power resources and that one analysing soft power, cannot forget about the context in which the actions take place. Brazil’s foreign policy actions and the projection of its values are therefore excellent examples to demonstrate the tangible and intangible sides of soft power resources.
2.3.2. Measurement and assessment problems

Soft power, in some ways, can be seen as an approach with a long-term effect, although it does not seem so apparent and obvious. Moreover, its importance is still undervalued in conscious public opinion, compared to that of hard power resources. So why don’t people count more with soft power?

One of the possible reasons can be tracked in Nye’s metaphor; “power is like love, it is easier to experience, than to define or measure it”. (Nye 1991 p.170) This provides the first implication how hard it is to measure something mostly so elusive. Hard power though seems easier to quantify and measure, as it can be converted mostly into the possession of well-separable resources like natural assets, economic potential, military facilities and the indicator of the political regime. (Nye 1991) The reciprocally intersecting nature of the two power faces pointed out in the previous section has a big contribution to the general measurement problem. Namely, how can be the attraction effect of the economic growth separated from the ‘pure economic strength’? In Huang’s and Ding’s opinion one has to pay attention to differentiation between the actions taken for inducing or compelling and the ones applied for seducing. (Huang, 2006) Besides the pillars we received from Joseph Nye (2004) there is a lack of tools to measure soft power and then transform these data into comparable information.

To measure soft power resources is quiet difficult. Opinion polls, domestic or international, mean one way to try to convert these resources into figures. There have been some attempts to do so by creating special opinion polls, for example the one carried out by BBC World Service in 2011 on 27 countries detecting how they saw each other’s influence in the world. (BBC World Service Poll 2011) Other way to attempt to measure soft power besides polling is “through outputs like discrete cultural and/or other activities” though “there is no consensus about the extent” it is manageable to convert them into the required outcome. Partly for this reason, this paper will not attempt to go behind the subjective side of soft power and create or use any elaborate model for measurement, but rather introduce the Brazilian actions and narrative grouped under the Nyeian (2004) three pillars. (Kalanthil 2011 p. 2)

For the first time in the world, a composite index for measuring soft power was created by Jonathan McClory in his work ‘The New Persuaders’, which sets up a model to
make soft power resources measurable, therefore easier to leverage. He tried to address the commonly acknowledged problems of soft power measurement by limiting and defining what to measure. His work builds on Joseph Nye’s but reasonably deviates from it; therefore it will be not used in this paper only referred to it. (McClory 2011)

After the measurement dilemma, one comes to the problem of assessment. How can it be clearly evaluated, if a country’s application of soft power resources leads to the change of preference of the other? Is it possible to set up rules for translating one’s action into the other’s outcome by establishing a connection in between? Huang and Ding express their criticism, saying that Nye (1991, 2004) does not offer such a system which will lead the observer to come up with the judgement, if certain actions fulfilled the objectives of a state or if they did not. They have also set up a model to attempt to overcome this weakness of the theory, albeit it will not be used here. (Huang and Ding 2006) As the three dimensions of the soft power resources by Joseph Nye (2004) will give the frame of this analysis, I will not intend to assess explicitly and proof, if certain policy actions created a certain outcome. Therefore the analysis of Brazil’ soft power resources will be conducted and structured under the three key pillars: cultural attractiveness, domestic values and policies and the style and substances of foreign policy. (Nye 2004 p.11)
3. The Brazilian Soft Power Project

3.1. The shift of political emphasis in Brazil

In this chapter, I will apply Joseph Nye’s theory along the three key dimensions of soft power resources as an analytical tool to examine Brazil under the Lula era, and how its interests were forwarded in the international community. Before that, there is a need for a brief examine to questions. Firstly, how the shift of political emphasis occurred during the Lula administration compared to the Cardoso era. Secondly, how the perception of the means to successfully achieve one’s goals has changed. After this brief discussion, I will focus on the systematized elaboration of the Brazilian soft power resources following the already available three dimensions.

The intensification of Brazil’s political opening and activism in the international scene can be traced back to 1994, when Fernando Henrique Cardoso (FHC) entered into office as the president. Nevertheless, this process was never so vivid and apparent than it became under the two terms of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. FHC’s contribution, furthermore, can be also noted in the way he laid down the tone for his successor by incorporating “presidential diplomacy” as an important and newly emphasized strategy of foreign relations. (Sotero and Armijo 2007 p.53) Lula, who is often referred to as ‘the man of the people’ won the elections in 2002 with 52, 8 millions of votes in the second round, which was very symbolic for the Brazilian people (considering his background to be raised in poverty) and what could be experienced along his government. (de Souza Neto, 2011 p.102)

Although Lula’s election meant a paradigmatic shift in Brazilian foreign policy, it did not occur in the sense of eliminating the previously defined national interests. It happened by the reformulation and application a wider variety of tools with higher intensity and different style. These changes in the substance of foreign policy under the Lula era, followed the traditional Brazilian support of multilateralism and opened new

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5 Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva was born in a very poor family in 1945. He started to work at the age of ten, selling peanuts on the street during the day, and studying at night. When in 1955 he left to Sao Paulo, he worked as a shoe shine boy and then in a dry cleaner, as the family was short of money. Few years later as a teenager he entered an industrial training program. During the military dictatorship of Goulart, Lula developed into a trade unionist. First he became a leader of the Metal Worker’s trade union and then 1980 he became a founding member and the driving force within the PT. Before finally winning the elections in 2002, he lost three times, but did not give up. (Bourne 2008)
channels towards a stronger South-South engagement. The most notable change in this sense was the divergence from the Cardoso administration’s practice, which could be termed as the recognition of international law, informal dialogue with Southern countries, and the prioritization of traditional partners such as the US or the EU. Lula da Silva’s innovation came by the institutionalised South-South Cooperation and the active role in shaping the international space of norms and laws. (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007 p.1317) The other significant shift of focus, which restructured the content of Brazilian foreign policy, was related to the Cardoso administration’ region-centred approach, where the motif of the endeavour for a global role was not apparent yet. (Sotero & Armijo 2007)

These differences between the scope of focus of the two governments hand in hand with the acceleration of globalising trends and shift of political attention paved the way for the innovative Brazilian conduct. Lula’s Brazil confirms this argument, as by the polarization of aims and aspirations integrated in Brazil’s redefined and expanded national interest, a set of universal values, which has important role in nourishing soft power, enjoyed primacy in Lula’s discourse and actions. They were emphasized both in his domestic policies and diplomatic actions. Promoting democracy, embracing the improvement of global health standards, reducing poverty, campaigning for human rights, backing multilateralism were means of exporting values preached in Brazil, as well as creating legitimacy, moral soft power and means to realize Brazil’s reset interests. (Nye 2008 and Pólyi 2008)

Under further examination, it can be seen that these were all added to the Brazilian agenda to serve the realisation of the deeply stretching national interest what we can define in terms of the aspiration for “developing the country economically, while maintaining political autonomy”. (Vigevani and Cepalune 2007 p.1310) In addition to this desire for political autonomy and economic development, the aspiration for deeper insertion into the international community, and the endeavour to cease the persistent asymmetries of power relations, can be noted as definitive national objectives. This is assisted with the incorporation of a social agenda into foreign policy through which international activism emphasizing Brazilian interests can further manifest.

Celso Amorim, who was the minister of foreign affairs during the Lula administrations and also a notable figure in the Brazilian diplomatic corps, noted in a speech:
As it has been pointed out previously, the concept of enlightened self-interest presumes that the state aims to find balance between its interests and universal goals. (Jeffery, 2000) Related to this, there exists the presumption that states can identify their goals and strategies, thus striving to achieve them with the plentiful means available not tumbling harmony. (Gallarotti 2011) This new behaviour of engagement, which served for “redeeming the so-called human, social and cultural debt”, exchanged the moderate and retractive approach of the Cardoso era not intending to take upon responsibility in sensitive global issues. (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007 p. 1319)

### 3.2. The analysis of the Brazilian soft power dimensions

Brazil’s effectiveness in wielding soft power cannot be separated from its foreign policy objectives and actions. Soft power tools cannot be successful instruments for all types of aspirations. Let suppose that Brazil would disregard international commitments. This would indeed decrease its soft power, therefore the chance to achieve its objectives. (Gallarotti 2011) From this point of view it can be said that the increased reliance on soft power tools serves Brazil’s interest in its peaceful rise and development and it’s capability to maintain political autonomy. (Huang et. al. 2006 & Vigevani et. al. 2007)

The classical assumption of national power associated with the tangible resources is as much an aptitude as an attitude. Aptitude in a sense of territory, population, natural resources, but an attitude in terms of military capacity, economic condition and the methods of their utilization. Brazil has most of the aptitude sources, given the vast territory, the 7000 kms long coastlines, the energy resources or its water supply. But Brazil’s attitude sources are differently structured and used. It has been mentioned previously, how narrow is the borderline when we qualify which source falls under the hard power resources and which ones under the soft power resources category. Military power and a country’s economy, which here are identified as attitude resources, can serve as means of coercion or also as means of preference modifiers and mobilizers.
This is well demonstrated by the peacekeeping mission in Haiti and with the attraction a certain economic system can create by its openness, flexibility and ability for innovation. (Nye 2004 and Gallarotti 2011 p. 25)

When we talk about power relations between nations, it can be really descriptive to visualize Nye’s (2004 p.4) three-dimensional chess game. The first dimension embraces the interstate military conditions, where it is possible to talk about unilateralism which is disclaimed by Brazil. Though multilateralism rules the middle stage, where power distribution is more spread between the actors, it still concerns a closed group of states. This is the dimension which embraces international economical and financial issues and in which Brazil requires more space. Here soft power can already create effect. The bottom line is though the most comprehensive, as it embraces several transnational issues where agenda-setting position mostly requires prestige and example-setting behaviour; therefore soft power. (Nye 2004 p. 4) During the last eight years, Brazil focused on forming the agenda on the two lower levels and obtains outcomes, gather followers, set institutions and rules in this power matrix of states, where hard power resources don’t have exclusionary dominance. This process and endeavour of Brazil was conducted on the margin of the three key soft power resource dimensions and the tools within it, which will make up the focus of the analysis in the following section.

In the second chapter, the three dimensional soft power resource models, which serves as the theoretical framework, was presented. Here, Brazil’s manoeuvring in world politics during the Lula administration will be set out by the support of these three pillars. Under each of them I will attempt to collect the tools, sources, actions, values and policies which are contributing factors to Brazil’s desire to wield power by relying on the soft power toolbox. (Gallarotti 2011)

### 3.2.1. The Brazilian culture and its soft power

Samba, carnival, Rio de Janeiro, soap operas, Copacabana, capueira, bossa nova, Amazonas, havaianas, are words, which bring about Brazil in front of our eyes. But what really constitutes this 'culture' pillar of soft power? Often soft power theory is simply associated with popular culture or strong images as above; however, soft power should not be equated simply with culture. It is the other way around, as culture is one
of the pillars which make up a nation’s soft power and it produces its effect where it is attractive to others. (Nye 2004 p. 11)

The soft power of culture has primarily a more elevated segment, which is embedded in the national features and distinctive characteristics. This embraces the more universalistic values such as tolerance, freedom, the tradition of peace, social cohesion and mobility. As Mr. Neil Benevindes, the Deputive Permanent Representative of Brazil to the Conference on Disarmament said:

“For 150 years, Brazil has been living in peace with its neighbours, (...) our international relations shall be governed by the principles, such as of prevalence of human rights, self-determination o other peoples, (...) peace and cooperation among people for the progress of mankind. “ (Benevides 2011)

Brazil with it cultural and ethnic diversity and peace, comprises the feature of a first world and third world country. Its European legacy and African roots contributed to the realization of mixed identities, which reinforce Brazil’s bridge role between the two poles. These traditions of a non-confrontational and cooperative diplomacy, the society’s peaceful coexistences with the differences, prepare the popular support for Lula da Silva’s policies. (Foreign Policy at Brookings pg.16) Another heritage, Brazil received from the Portugal colonization, is its powerful language, which is today the fifth most spoken in the world with 236 million native speakers in Portugal, Brazil and in the member states of the Portuguese Speaking Community Countries. (World’s Observatory 2012) On the other hand Brazil’s cultural belonging to the African continent is reflected in its special interpretation of traditions, religions, social life and attitudes, which is spiced by these common roots. Now this legacy appears in the Brazilian agenda with which Brazil strengthens not only its political, but its cultural relations with the African continent. The opening of 35 new embassies and cultural centres, out of which 13 are located in Africa, represents the Brazilian engagement in projecting itself by diplomatic and cultural means. (de Souza Neto 2011)

One of the other two less elusive cultural elements that constitute the cultural soft power resources is high culture, which includes education, scientific merits, literature and art. The other one, low-brow or popular culture incorporates mass entertainment and commerce, films, music, dances and sports. (Nye 2004 p.44)
Brazilian high culture export just started to open its wings recently, as the number of foreign students arriving for post-graduate studies or professional exchanges increases according to the data held by the Brazilian Educational & Language Travel Association (Belta). Most of those arriving to Brazil come with a purpose to learn Portuguese, which is becoming more and more useful with the Brazilian emergence. (Belta 2009) The Science without Borders Programme launched in 2011 pronounced that 100,000 grants will be offered to Brazilian students to study in abroad, as well as the aim to attract foreigners to work and research in Brazil. Although this monumental project was already launched during the Rousseff administration, its roots go back to the Lula era. (Science without Borders 2012) In advancing Brazilian culture and technology in abroad, another program called PROAFRICA, - initiated in 2003-, also had a significant role. The target countries were the Portuguese Speaking Community Countries where joint research programs, agricultural, health, human and social sciences initiatives, exchanges and scientific events were established and implemented. (Costa Vaz and Inone 2007 p. 16)

The other element, the popular Brazilian culture, until now had a stronger potential and influence on the projection of the Brazilian image. It was highly responsible for making the country an attractive destination as well as a desirable partner in the eyes of others. Brazil with its soap operas entered the households and daily lives worldwide. A new project initiated by Lula, was the establishment of the TV Brazil Internacional in the Portuguese speaking countries in Africa. The channel will broadcast programs with focus on the Brazilian culture and news, soap operas, films, music and sport in Portuguese. As Lula said at the launch of the TV:

"I don't want a TV channel to speak well of Lula," he said. "I want a channel that speaks well of the country, that can show Brazil as it really is." (da Silva in: BBC News 2010)

It is also worth to mention the famous film of Fernando Mierreles, which opened up a new window by giving an insight into the darker side of Brazilian reality with his world famous film, the City of God. (Gibson 2009) The love for football, which was a recurring motif of the film, can be detected in general, as Brazilian football and everyday life go hand in hand and they are interconnected. The happiness of
receiving the bid for organizing the Olympics in 2016, just two years after the World Cup will have been held also in Brazil, could be noticed easily in Lula’s statement:

This will “send a powerful message to the world, that the Olympic Games belong to all people, all continents, and to all humanity. All those people, who thought we had no ability to govern this country, will now know we can host the Olympics.” (da Silva in Gibson 2009)

This exclamation also demonstrates the expectations Brazil has from hosting two events like this. The opportunity given, will be a huge boost to Brazil and will alone contribute to Brazil’s prominence in the world. Brazilian music and dance, such as samba, forró, bossa nova and capueira are spread around the world, with having numerous local samba and capueira schools where the students also get enchanted with the Brazilian culture and language. The wild carnival, strongly related to music, dance and liberation attracts over 500,000 visitors a year and it grow itself out into one of the biggest events the world carries on its back. (Rio Carnival 2012) Although these characteristics of a very vivid and impulsive culture can be attractive to several nations, it can also be repulsive for others. This way soft power can only be generated with these attributes and cultural assets, if the context, therefore the receiving country, finds them attractive. Therefore the attractiveness of the Brazilian open and inclusive society, its acceptance of gay marriage and non-traditional Christianity with its mixed African rites and beliefs should always be observed within the context.

In this chapter I discussed three levels of cultural resources, with respect to their capability to generate attraction and legitimacy within the global community. Firstly, I focused on the more elusive notion of culture, a nation’s legacy, which was followed by observations of how Brazil exercised its soft power through the assets of high and popular culture and what outcomes these practices can cause.

3.2.2. Brazilian domestic policies and values

As Keohane and Nye argued, (in: Webber et al. 2002) foreign policy is no longer the only tool to wield power. Domestic political actions interfere with the foreign ones. It is though important to examine, how Brazilian domestic policy and the Lula government’s action on the national level is projected onto the international scene. How
it supports the Brazilian image and the reception of Brazilian initiatives and endeavours? Brazil is a flourishing democracy without inter-ethnic or inter-confessional conflicts and it has a very long tradition of peace. (Foreign Policy at Brookings 2007) The existence of this domestic condition therefore gives Brazil legitimacy and moral authority, for example when it wants to engage in international mediation or in peacekeeping elsewhere in the world. As it was argued previously, legitimacy perceived by others, is a key component of the theory. The reason for its prominent position is that it contributes to Brazil to make its actions and promoted values appear legitimate in front of others. This helps to diminish others resistance to follow Brazil’s wishes. (Nye 1991)

To see the widening scope of Brazil’s international goals and to understand on what ground the expansion of foreign policy could be made possible, it must be noticed how huge developments took place within the domestic sphere. The rates of consumption outstandingly rose, social security and poverty rates improved, as well as the access to loans, which also contributed to the preparation of the space for increasing Brazilian say in global matters. (Foreign Policy at Brookings 2007) A liberal, progressing and market oriented system also boosts the economic profile of Brazil with this redounding to the vision of a prospering and attractive nation. Brazil indeed projects the picture of a state which promotes an inclusive cooperative model of development. This can be underpinned by, for example, the positive, ‘free’ rating of the country by Freedom House, regarding both economic and political freedoms. (Freedom House 2010)

I will firstly address the question of a nation’s moral attraction and its origins. This will be supported by a figure, demonstrating the rating of Lula and key groups and institutions in 2010. After introducing the poll of the Pew Research Institute I will discuss Lula da Silva’s effort to include a comprehensive social agenda while maintaining economic development. Finally I will review why these policies build legitimacy and introduce some visible results which can be attributed to the success of his policies.

A nation’s soft power, deriving from domestic resources such as: institutions, policies, the government, public support, the condition of the society or the economics, and the complex relationship of these, will make up moral attraction, a nation’s credibility in the international community. (Huang and Ding 2007) The notion of
national moral, a concept emphasized by Morgenthau (1993 p.104), “resides in the quality of the government” as well as it pervades the activities of a nation, and appears in public opinion and public support for government policies. Therefore trust in the government and confidence in institutions is descriptive. Brazil’s adoption of democratic institutions attains legitimacy in the eyes of Brazilians themselves, which will indeed contribute to Brazil’s power projection and place public support behind its diplomatic actions. (Sotero and Armijo 2007) Brazil being a liberal democracy, therefore appearing as a law abiding actor on the international community boosts the country’s global presence and soft power. (Foreign Policy at Brookings)

These claims are supported by national and international polls conducted during Lula’s presidency and also at the end of his second term. Trust in government is supported by the evidence assured by the following results. A prominent share of Brazilians evaluated the work of Lula and his governments’ as constructive, one which creates positive overall impact. In 2010, when resigning, Lula was supported by the 84% of Brazilians who said he had great influence on the progress the country made. As the graph shows, only 14% said he had negative impact. (Pew Research Centre 2010) Albeit his positive international recognition, this wide public support behind him, which also enabled to embark with his policies, is what makes his path special. Besides these figures, most Brazilians (76%), answered that they were satisfied with the government’s handling of national economy; (Pew Research Centre) as well as the chart below also provides the information that confidence in institutions is fairly high.

Source: Pew Research Centre, Chapter 2. Rating of Lula and key Groups and Institutions, 2010 p.13
As I see, Lula in this context has much to do with exporting and promoting the ideas, beliefs and values supported during his presidency via domestic and international institutions, setting trends and ground breaking policies like Bolsa Família was. Lula da Silva’s educational background and the path he travelled, places him on a special stage. As he said in an interview:

„I am the first president in the history of Brazil without a university degree, and I am also the president who created the most universities. „
(da Silva, L.I [2010])

In Brazil, his two terms were associated with the inclusion of a social agenda, the embracement of new economic and social-political programs. Domestic values and the policies launched to realize and then project them are significant contributors to Brazil’s increased soft power. During the last 8 years there were many initiatives to improve Brazil’s overall position at home and in world politics, though the performance in implementation came out with mixed results, which can indeed have attractiveness reduction effects. (Nye 2004 and Pólyi 2008) But here, I will focus mostly on a brief summation of the social, heath, economic and environmental policies as they are the ones which demonstrated best the Brazilian engagement and readiness to take a lead and influence the international agenda.

The Brazilian plans to create a harmonious society which will serve as the foundation of economic development and the insertion into the global community brought with themselves a series of domestic policies which represented this social focused value package. In 2004 January, the Brazilian Ministry of Social Development and Fight against Hunger (MDS) was established with a mission to bracket several social policies. (South-South learning on social protection UNDP 2012) It included the Zero Fome (Zero Hunger) Programme aiming to meet the Brazilian’s right to alimentation and within it the famous Bolsa Família (Family Fund), or conditional cash transfer family support scheme, where the families received support from the government, depending on the number of their children and on their per capita income. The preconditions were schooling and vaccinating the children. (Lehoczki 2011) There were many sub-projects and strategies integrated into Zero Hunger which were
implemented by MDS. It is no surprise that later that year Brazil took a lead in launching the International Action against Hunger and Poverty, as his attractive policies on the domestic level appalled it with credibility. (Lula da Silva on ECOSOC 2008) Besides this, there are numerous other internationally recognized as successful public policies, to mention. The National STD/AIDS Programme, which provides free treatment for HIV/AIDS infected Brazilian citizens, or the Social Agenda launched in 2007 for indigenous people guaranteeing their rights and social development, also belongs to this group. (Amorim 2007 and Embassy of Brazil in London 2007) This promotes tolerant and peaceful coexistence of different social and ethnic groups.

Brazil and the South-American region have long been considered as an island of peace. Nuclear disarmament is an area of international politics where the convergence of the stance of different nations on the issue cannot be identified according their economic power or development status. Brazil is one of those few states which have rejected to acquire nuclear weapons and it included this decision even in its Constitution in 1988. This furthermore can attain credibility for it to stand up in disarmament negotiations, and to take an intense role in designing a new framework for non-proliferation. (Sotero and Armijo p. 46)

The negative impact of climate change became a serious concern during the Lula era; both on the national level as well as internationally, therefore Brazil started to modify its attitude regarding pollution and deforestation. The later created serious concerns as it was responsible for 88% of net emission of carbon dioxide. The Lula government embarked with addressing this misconduct, proven by the fact that deforestation in Brazil was decreased by 52% between 2003 and 2007, and the target is to achieve net reforestation. (Sotero and Armijo 2007) Besides this, another factor which strengthens Brazil’s prestige is the high degree of reliance on renewable energy resources. Being a leading ethanol producer and exporter accounting for 50% of global exports, Brazil’s image as a responsible, environment and climate change cautious country is intensifying. Many argue today, that this will be one of the main pillars of Brazil’s emergence besides it active engagement in environment protection. (Lehoczki 2011 p. 51) It is very well known that Brazil is a leading ethanol producer in the world, 27% of its electricity comes from biofuels and 83% from hydropower. This is indeed a source of soft power, which can enable Brazil to influence and inspire other states to take measures in environment protection, shape an agenda for a sustainable future and
share the experience and know-how. (Sotero and Armijo 2007 p.61) The Brazilian domestic stance on climate change is also demonstrated by the results of the Global Attitudes Project’s poll. The findings show that 95% of Brazilians find climate change a major problem to tackle and 80% of them would prioritise the protection of the environment over growth. (Pew Global Attitudes 2010 p. 30)

Not least, these developments and domestic political actions can be interpreted into some figures. There has been much effort taken to reduce inequality and to fight poverty. The Gini coefficient, which is an indicator of inequality, has declined significantly from 0.58 to 0.54 along with the number of people living in poverty, which decreased with around 20 million. (Lehoczki 2011 p. 45) The poorest slice of the society experienced a 9% annual growth in its income and the Bolsa Família supports 12 million families month by month. (Sotero and Armijo 2007 p.68 and Lehoczki 2011 p.45) This can give leverage to Brazil when it raises its voice on international forums or proposes ideas on the WTO rounds to decrease inequality and asymmetrical interdependence.

The coexistence of these conditions and actions outlined above strengthened and further expanded the presence and prestige of Brazil in the international scene and its influence in world politics. (Foreign Policy at Brookings 2007) The attraction created by these policies will also depend on the receiver end. It is useful to question, who are attracted by these values and who might repel it? Emerging economies and third world countries have different needs and different capacities than developed ones, but particular policies will not incite the same countries to follow or to draw inspiration from Brazil. Even though there are some aspects in which Brazil lags behind in the domestic seen, as argued by Joseph Nye (2004 p.59), “problems that are shared with other societies are less likely to cut into our soft power resources”.

As national guidelines and policies can be influenced by international norms, the export of national policies by setting them as an example can also have impact on other states. (Jackson et al. [2010]) And Lula played it well. His example-setting behaviour was applied when shaping the identity of the country and working towards achieving its aims, extending diplomatic and economic relations bilaterally or multilaterally. Building on political stability, economic growth and universal values are fundamental pillars of
domestic politics and as well as instruments and proofs in foreign policy to verify Brazil’s international aspirations have well-grounded national sources.

3.2.3. The substance and style of Brazilian foreign policy during the Lula era

In this section, I will further explain the underlying national interests of Brazil which has an impact on the choice of style and substance of foreign policy, which constitutes the third dimension of Nye’s soft power theory (2004). After this, I will attempt to highlight why the utilization of soft power resources advance better these interests in world politics. Finally, I will list the means these objectives are pursued by, give several examples and refer back to soft power theory and it’s relation to the changed nature of state behaviour in international politics.

The values projected by the style and substance of a country’s foreign policy contribute significantly to its attractiveness, as well as it is the channel through which national interest is pursued. Although national interest can be defined and interpreted in a narrower self-centred way, as the realist approach would suggest, it can also be defined in a more inclusive one, which encourages cooperation. Moreover, not only the pure content of national interest can influence the reception of certain policies but the means they are pursued by, referring here to soft power resources which contribute to policies appear more attractive based on shared perception of values and preferences. (Nye 2004)

This study, although mentions the successes achieved during the Lula administration, does not intend to build the main conclusions only on them, rather focus on the process and the motivations behind it. In Brazilian foreign policy, during the here examined period, it could be observed that on one side the attention was turned towards regional initiatives, and the deepening of integration at this level, for example shaping the agenda of MERCOSUR. (Pólyi 2008) On the other hand the main stress was placed on the global process, Brazil’s implantation in global governance and its aspiration to wield power in the international political scene. Although recognizing, this paper does not aim to separately analyse the two parallel trends, or shed light on the regional Brazilian activism and its inherences. It will rather treat them as
interconnected, where regional initiatives many time served as the steppingstones for projecting national goals to the broader, global level. (Spector 2010)

Brazil has many aspirations with respect to world politics. These can be more easily understood, as well as the methods they are sought by, if we give a closer look to the underlying national interests first, which drive Brazilian actions in international relations. These can be led back to three main pillars of Brazilian national interest identified as follows:

- the desire for more influence in global affairs,
- balancing excessive unilateralism,
- and the pursuit of political autonomy and economic development. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007 p. 1310)

Brazil’s hope to become unavoidable when it comes to serious decisions and questions with respect to the world is the first factor to be examined here. As Lula da Silva said in his speech after his second election victory:

> I want to continue with the work of a government that (…) continues to consolidate Brazil’s place as a sovereign nation in the global economic and political system. (da Silva 2006)

This refers to Brazil’s desire to have influence not only on domestic matters but also on international outcomes and participate more in global governance. Thus diplomatic actions are created and mobilized with the consideration to increase Brazil’s active integration into global processes. (Sotero & Armijo 2007 p.43)

This endeavour for a bigger role in international politics is interrelated with the second factor, namely the aspiration to balance one nation’s overall power, i.e. the US’s unilateralism within the global political and economic system. This was coined less explicitly in the narrative taken, as the Lula government focused more on emphasizing the interest’s positive side, namely the reinforcement of political multilateralism. (de Almeida 2007 p. 5)

When it comes to political autonomy, before the Lula administration pre-existing international regimes and regulations were observed with suspicion, and developmental political actions focused on the domestic scene. During the Lula administration the response to these preset international norms and principles changed, and the adherence
to them became a core component of the Brazilian foreign policy strategy. This change of stance on international institutions originated from the recognition, that by participation, the rules and guidelines could be more effectively influenced according to Brazilian interests. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007) Therefore active participation replaced the more reclusive behaviour, opened a space for Brazil to project its ideas, and became a central tool to secure the desired political autonomy. Lula’s foreign policy, in search for economic development, focused on the diversification of its partners, as well as it merged liberal economic policies with social programs. It became a tool for securing economic development, as well as preserving political autonomy. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007 p. 1321)

After the examination of the key national interest of Brazil, in the now unfolding section, I will attempt to highlight why the reliance on soft power resources facilitates the achievement of Brazilian goals?

Brazil’s accelerating economic development contributes to shifting the emphasis even more on soft power resources, as international cooperation is a precondition, as well as instrument of economic growth. International organizations and regimes therefore serve as “networks of cooperation” embedding nations into this system where dissociating from the rules, international norms and institutions by illegitimate ways can have serious implications on a state’s success to realize its goals. (Gallarotti 2011 p. 36) Therefore the costs of relying on hard power resources are not acceptable for Brazil, as it could reverse the process of economic progress, as well as impede the goals Brazil strives for. (Burges 2006)

As it was outlined above, the consensus-generating style of foreign policy reshaped the actions of Brazil. These actions were developed in order to realize the deepest Brazilian goals, namely the strengthening of its position in the world, the creation of a more balanced international system and the preservation of Brazilian political autonomy and continuing economic growth. In the following part, I will elaborate what were the soft power tools utilized to facilitate the achievements of these Brazilian aspirations. My observations will be supported by highlighting relevant parts of Lula’s speeches.

The first element to be observed here generating soft power, is the acceptance of existing international laws, norms, institutions, which was a core component of Brazil’s foreign policy guidelines already during the FHC era. Nevertheless, what was a very
innovative stance in this regard by the Lula administration, is that they tried to become active in shaping the global guidelines, unlike the FHC government, which did not go further than complying with these international standards. (Foreign Policy at Brookings 2007) Lula da Silva’s ambitions to apply the Grotian tradition in practice, namely the perception that norms play large role in conforming the international society, could be detected in his efforts to support the formation of a more balanced, multipolar international system. (Cutler 1991 and Lehoczki 2011) This endeavour was manifesting in the strengthened reliance on multilateralism, which is the second point to be looked at.

The reinforcement of multilateral and bilateral relations, cooperation initiatives with Arabic, Asian, African and other South American countries serves this threefold national interest by increasing Brazil’s weight and claiming more space for the developing countries in political and economic issues. In addition, it leads the way to a more proportional representation within the international system. (Vigevani & Cepaluni 2007 & De Souza Neto 2011) In case of Brazil, often national interests are filtered through international institution such as the UN, BRICS, IBSA, WSF, WTO, IMF, WHO, G4, G20, G77 and the list is not completed yet. These serve as frameworks and indeed act as speaking-tubes to spread the Brazilian stance on many issues and advance Brazilian projects and initiatives. Here, I will not address all of these institutions and their roles in Brazilian foreign policy, rather select those, which are the main forums for the realization of the Brazilian national project.

In 2003, the G20 coalition of developing countries was formed by the gathering of Brazil, South-Africa and India to create leverage within the WTO Doha Round, in order to advance agricultural and trading interests concerning poorer countries. (Sotero and Armijo 2007 p. 55) In the same year, the India, Brazil, South Africa Forum (IBSA) was created for asserting the developing countries’ needs in negotiating with developed partners. This was planned to be achieved by modifying the dynamics and by amplifying their voices via collective action. It became a platform of continuing consultations, a tool of multilateral diplomacy. (Foreign Policy at Brookings 2008 and Lehoczki 2011) During the Lula-era, the reform of the United Nations became a central objective of Brazil and strongly related to this, the wish to acquire a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. This was perceived as a step towards a more just, proportional and democratic global system, in which power relations become less asymmetrical, and
Brazil will gain more prominence. In order to this, in September 2004, the G4 was created when Brazil, India, Japan and Germany joined to advance collectively their aspiration for a permanent Security Council membership. (Sotero and Armijo 2007 p. 66) The BRICS and the World Social Forum are also platforms to consolidate certain postures Brazil wishes to represent. With the BRICS, meeting since 2006 but holding the first official forum in 2009, Brazil together with Russia, India and China, works to raise awareness, that major emerging economies cannot be excluded from decision-making regarding issues of global importance. (da Silva 2008) The World Social forum was first held in Brazil in 2001, but it entered public awareness later in 2003. It is held parallel to the World Economic Forum in Davos, and intends to offer the space for designing an alternative future, a new agenda in which innovative solutions can be found to tackle the world’s economic problems. The WSF tries to cope with the “true adversaries” which “are social injustice, inequality and the various ills” still holding back Brazil and other developing nations. (da Silva 2006) The way towards a more fair, solidary and democratic world is envisioned in the attempt to balance out today’s hegemonic globalization. (World Social Forum 2012) Regarding these initiatives, forums and organizations, the most important common feature is not their institutional nature, rather the significance they place on claiming more say for developing countries in world affairs. (De Souza Neto 2011)

Brazil’s opposition against unilateralism is projected through this increased cooperation, as well as through the development and sustainment of multilateral forums and institutions, which attempt to give power to the third world countries. This disposition is supported by many of them, as they can associate with the endeavours of Brazil. This wish to balance out the US, led to the reinforced and closer cooperation with India, China, South-Arica and several other non-traditional partners. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007) Brazil is seeking to modify and equate the consolidated hierarchy of states within the international system, thus balancing happens with soft power tools, such as emphasizing sovereignty, forming diplomatic coalitions or relying on international institutions.

Besides the primary factor of adherence to norms, and the will to broaden them, the shift towards multilateralism cannot be only noted in the multiplied number of initiatives, but also in the diversification of partners and South-South alliances. Prior to the Lula administration, the power asymmetries faced by peripheral states were
acknowledged, but the main economic and political partners remained the US and the EU. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007 p. 1313) With the upswing of South-South partnerships, the one-dimensional relations weekend, although it did not mean that Brazil would turn away from its traditional partners, as many thought. As it can be noted form Lula’s statement:

„I diversified Brazil’s relations, without losing our relationships with the United States, Europe and Japan.” (da Silva 2010)

Proving this, the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership was launched in 2008 in order to strengthen political, economic and social cooperation, defined in the Joint Action Plan. (Pólyi 2008 p. 61) Furthermore the 2007 US-Brazil Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) opened the way for trilateral cooperation with selected countries in relation to biofuels. In 2010 this initiative was further broadened with the MOU for the Implementation of Technical Cooperation Activities in Third Countries aiming to jointly implement projects in the area of food security, child and forced labour, HIV and environment protection. (US Department of State 2012) This expansion of Brazilian cooperation both on the South-South and North-South poles and its engagement in trilateral projects as co-financer raises the question of Brazil’s role as a bridge between developed and developing countries. The statement of Celso Amorim also illustrates how Brazil’s activism and devotion to social matters in its diversified partnerships contributes to lift Brazil out from the group of other developing nations.

„...for the first time the World Bank is co-financing a cooperation project by a developing country.” (Amorim 2007)

The Lula government in order to promote its diplomatic priorities, mobilized the possible soft power instruments of multilateral forums and other informal mechanisms and took up an unusual and innovative political agenda. (de Almeida 2007) This agenda and example setting behaviour demonstrated itself in the increased participation in foreign-aid programmes and in technical and health care development initiatives. Furthermore it included poverty alleviation programmes, campaigns for environmental protection, peacekeeping and mediation attempts as part of the Brazilian foreign policy. As Joseph Nye argued, foreign policies which embrace broadly shared values can create credibility and contribute to a country’s boosted soft power and prestige. (Nye 2004 p. 62) Celso Amorim’s following sentence illustrates well, how Brazil’s engagement was
not only philanthropic, but the manifestation of certain well-thought actions towards the achievement of Brazil’s selected goals.

“The well being of our people, must be a central tenet of government policy. But the national interest must be combined with active solidarity with other people.” (Celso 2007)

The endeavour of Brazil to increase its international status and to be granted a permanent seat in the UN was supported by the engagement in the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) as well as with other peace promoting initiatives. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007 p.1318) This can be strongly linked to the Brazilian tradition of promoting peace, previously in Angola and East Timor or lately attempting mediation in the Middle East. These imply Brazil’s capability to take international responsibility in world affairs and project the image of a nation, which is capable to carry out complicated and financially demanding projects. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007 p. 1318)

In 2004, upon the initiative of Lula da Silva, the International Action against Hunger and Poverty was launched and the parties to the action agreed that good global governance and renewed political cooperation is needed to fight world hunger. (FAO 2004) As he said at the special meeting of ECOSOC later:

“Ever since my first day in office I have devoted myself to the fight against hunger and poverty, both in Brazil and elsewhere in the world.” (da Silva 2008)

Lula’s tentative and devotion to include the aim of eradication of hunger and malnutrition into the global political agenda was not experienced before, and it produced not too demonstrable results on the international scene. (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007 p.1322)

Another new soft power instrument, with which Brazil intends to demonstrate its readiness to take on bigger role in the international community, is its engagement as an emerging donor in international development cooperations and humanitarian projects. Brazil, working along the UN, became involved in the development of the notion of Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries (TCDC). The main aim of these
projects is to overcome structural backwardness and to remove the obstacles from growth in the areas of agriculture, heath, water supply, energy, etc. (Costa Vaz and Inone 2007 p. 9-20) The technical assistance is operated by the Brazilian Cooperation Agency (ABC), but the aid arriving through the budgeted of this official organ, presumably constitutes only a small proportion of the total development aid. Some argue, that by the indirect aids, not reaching its destination through ABC, the Brazilian contribution could have amounted up to 4 billion $ in 2010. (The Economist 2010) Thus aid is a marked part of Brazil’s soft power strategy, as it helps to embed the Brazilian presence in the consciousness of other developing nations; furthermore it boosts Brazil’s prestige in comparison to other emerging countries.

Lula, who had a large role in setting these social policies and renewed political agendas into motion on the international scene, had a large impact simply by his speeches on several forums, his example setting behaviour on the domestic sphere and by his special personality. This strengthened presidential diplomacy, which was underpinned by his special charisma and magnetism, became an indispensable instrument of Brazilian soft power. Barack Obama expressed his opinion about Lula with stating the following:

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„I love this guy. Lula is the most popular politician on Earth”. (BBC News video 2009)
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Albeit his wide international recognition, which has also provided support to embark with his policies, it is the biggest public support ever behind him, which makes his path special. When resigning, he held the backing of over 84% of the Brazilian voters, which is an unmatchable record. (Pew Research Centre 2010)

Lula, through his speeches, held for example at the ECOSOC meetings or at the World Social Forum and World Economic Forum in 2003, became an iconic figure. Someone, who took the lead and showed example on behalf of an emerging economy and developing country, which in its fight to realize its interests did not forget to include social issues in its agenda. As soft power aims to create attraction, motivate and inspire, he managed to personalize these task by the narrative and values he represented by being in office. His stance on letting the doors open for everyone, engaging in discourse and practicing active listening can be easily noted from his statement:
Politics is one politician talking to another. (...) I have never seen political isolation helping anything. (...) So I talk to everyone, I am everyone’s friend. I don’t make distinction based on my personal relationship, I act as a head of state. As head of state I maintain cordial relations with the whole world. I don’t treat anyone in a second rate way. (da Silva, L. I. [2010])

Finally, it is worth to note, that Lula da Silva has a significant role when accessing the benefits deriving from the utilization of soft power sources, as well as when it comes to the decision how to integrate them into foreign policy in a way, that it can contribute to Brazil’s prominence in world affairs. (Gallarotti 2011)

The last soft power instrument to be briefly mentioned here, which contributes to the creation of a favourable image of Brazil, is public diplomacy. Public diplomacy is a tool of the contest for reputation, prestige and credibility which intends to shape the non-governmental agents’ opinion. (Nye 2004 p. 106) It involves communication in the general sense, the transmission of one’s image beyond the borders. It appears within all three soft power resource dimensions. It is although reasonable to introduce it here, as its notion is mostly related to the quality of a nation’s diplomacy and its ability to transmit the message wanted to the rest of the world. Taking the cultural dimension, it is a powerful tool of public diplomacy to attract international students, establish exchange and support programmes and build the opportunity for long-lasting relations. (The New Persuaders II. 2011) In case of Brazil, it was the extention of professional and educational exchanges, conferences and forums. The new initiative Science without Borders probably will have a large impact on transmitting a positive image of Brazil. The creation of media access to Brazilian news in Africa with the launch of TV Brazil Internacional -which will operate as a means of daily communication-, will constantly construct Brazil’s image, as well as transfer the Brazilian interpretation of government policies to the nations where the broadcast is done. This is also supported by the establishment of Centros Culturais Brasileiros (Brazilian Culture Centres) around the world, now having 21 culture-embassies in very different spots of the globe. In 2008 one was opened in Hungary. (Itamaraty 2012)

6 See Appendix: Figure 2 and Figure 3
Brazil’s perception in the world also draws on the diplomatic resources and corps it is represented by. (New Persuaders II. 2011) The already mentioned presidential diplomacy, Lula’s active engagement and appearance in forums and in the international media have a large impact on Brazil’s forming image. (Lula da Silva in: Al Jazeera 2010) However, Celso Amorim foreign minister and the Itamaraty (Ministry of Foreign Affairs) made significant contributions to the Brazilian government’s policies to be spread and familiarized. To strengthen the Brazilian presence in the world, the Lula da Silva administration established 35 new embassies around the world to stand in the service of diplomacy. With them, the total number of official representations of the country was swollen to 151. (De Souza Neto 2011 p.106 and Global 21 2012)

The quality and recognition of one nation’s soft power and the success of its public diplomacy can be visible in public surveys and polls, attempting to measure the attractiveness.

The BBC World Service conducted a poll\(^8\), in 27 countries in 2010 and 2011 to attempt to measure the selected countries’ perception by the population of the project states. The poll’ outcome, which intended to measure the global attitudes, shows that Brazil experienced a positive rating among the 27 countries. 25 out of 27 expressed positive views and 2 were divided in their stance. It can be seen from the graph that these two countries were China and Germany. The overall result however shows that in average 49% of the respondents think positively and 20% negatively about the country. Finally it is noteworthy to mention, that Brazil received the highest rating from itself with 84%. (BBC World Service 2011 p. 25) Why is it important? It is, because Brazilians have confidence in their country’s future and role in the world. The majority thinks that Brazil is popular and 53% claimed that Brazil is eventually a world power supported by that 24% who said it is already.\(^9\) One more interesting and unique fact is that in Brazil the most popular politician is Lula da Silva himself and Obama far lags behind.\(^10\) (Pew Global Attitudes 2010 p. 21-23)

\(^8\) Figure 4: BBC World Service Positive Views of Brazil on the Rise in 2011. BBC Country Rating Poll. See in: Appendix.
\(^9\) Figure 5: Global Attitudes Project 2010; Brazil Sees Itself as Rising Power
\(^10\) Figure 6: Global Attitudes Project 2010; Lula Rated Higher than Others.
This gives leverage to Lula and his actions and proved that the government’s foreign policies and the direction towards the country heads are cherished by most Brazilians and positively perceived by large slice of the international community.

In this section I discussed the substance and style of Brazilian foreign policy of the Lula era and how it contributed to the country’s flourishing soft power. I argued that its quality and content had significant effect on Brazil’s attractiveness, as well as it functions as a channel through which the national interest is pursued. Then I elaborated a set of tools Brazil utilized to cement Brazil’s place in world politics. I emphasized multilateralism and the extents of the list of partners besides keeping the traditional ones. After tying to highlight the significance of the adherence to international laws and principles, I shifted to analyse Brazil’s involvement in peacekeeping and development cooperation. Finally I discussed public diplomacy and the Brazilian image’s perception in the world.
4. Conclusion

In my analysis, as a starting point, I took the fast-changing and globalizing international system and Lula’s Brazil as the main ingredients, and placed them into the framework of soft power theory, in order to examine the emergence of Brazil in world politics, and the means and tools this process is pursued by. In my hypothesis I presupposed that Brazil’s reliance on soft power tools during the Lula era is highly visible and that it is a tool to achieve more prominence in international politics. To facilitate the understanding of Brazil’s reformulated national interest concept and how power is exercised by it, I reviewed the transformation of these notions, from the traditional realist assumption towards the neoliberal approach. This was necessary to clarify the way to the environment in which Joseph Nye’s soft power theory was born.

After laying down the foundations of my analysis, I turned to elaborate on the soft power theory and the three main pillars it rests upon. These three dimensions are categories, under which, the actions, tools and values exercised and projected by a nation, can be grouped and examined. Namely, they comprehend a nation’s culture, its domestic values and political actions and the substance and style of foreign policy. To be consistent I followed these three key groups of resources established by Nye, when I later embarked on Brazil’s soft power resource analysis during the Lula era. Prior to that I outlined the main problems one can face when choosing the soft power approach as the theoretical framework. The dilemma, where soft power ends and hard power starts is a protagonist problem, which is highly relevant to the Brazilian case where the shooting economic growth and its implications cannot be separated from the soft power toolbox and placed peremptorily in the hard power pot. The other problematic area of analysis concerns measurement and assessment. Some scholars and institutions, such as Giulio Gallarotti or Yanzhong Huang and Sheng Ding, the Chicago Council or Jonathan McClory attempted to develop measurement tools to examine, how soft power tools lead the way to the achievement of desired policy outcomes. This brings up the idea of the creation of a survey in the future which will focus on Brazil besides others, and produces more palpable results, which can serve for further comparative analysis and justify the prominence of soft power in today’s world.

Following this, the main body of my analysis will be centred on the elaboration of Brazil’s three main sources of soft power. All the three are important, but domestic and foreign policies, their substance and style are the most volatile and susceptible to
government control. (Nye 2004 p. 70) Therefore, in the introduction of the third chapter I attempted to highlight this non-static nature with introducing the changed context on the domestic scene, which was brought by Lula da Silva’s inauguration in 2003.

From my analysis I concluded that the domestic and diplomatic actions of the Lula government had significant mutual impact on one another as the domestic agenda strongly mirrored on the international scene. The social developmental programmes, the environment protection initiatives, the strong presidential presence and innovative narrative are simultaneously appearing concerns on both levels, therefore contributing to an internally and externally reinforced legitimacy.

The aim of this paper was twofold. First it intended to shed light on why the utilization of soft power resources makes Brazil stand out of the group of other developing countries. From my observations, it is provable, that by the Brazilian engagement to include a strong social agenda, and to participate in several developmental projects, Brazil overwrites the traditional expectations towards developing nations. Brazil, during the Lula era, launched the big project to create the image of a developing country, which is sensitive to world matters and pursues its national interest through and by a filter of universal values. Although it acknowledges the difficulties the country still faces, such as deep social inequalities and high crime rates, the intention to grab a role which is unfulfilled yet, dominated its political actions. This role is none other than an alternative of what Norway represents today, with the added value of being a developing nation. Brazil has the advantage to speak from the same height; it has the knowledge of a large scale of burdens other developing nations carry. It has legitimacy as coming from below, and well as the will to become engaged in peacekeeping, lead the global climate agenda and enter the global common knowledge as a responsible emerging economy.

The second intention was to examine why this soft power approach contributes to an intensified overall Brazilian presence? It can be ascertained that the Brazilian soft power strategy intended to increase the country’s participation and diversify the forums and areas of it. With this, Brazil appeared in more and more segments of world politics making itself visible. From this point of view it can be said that the increased reliance on soft power tools serves Brazil’s interest in its peaceful rise and development and it’s capability to maintain political autonomy. (Huang et. al. 2006 & Vigevani et. al. 2007)
Brazil is not a paper tiger. Although this study focuses on the soft power sources’ contribution to the Brazilian global empowerment, it did not argue that hard power resources would be eradicated. Albeit, the progressing economic development by itself would be incapable to create the effect Brazil experienced during Lula’s presidency; as well as it was on one hand a precondition for Brazil to exercise its soft power and on the other hand a goal to achieve and maintain. Celso Amorim’s and Susan Glasser’s short joking dialogue, if Brazil was the ultimate soft-power power, illustrates this finding.

“ Susan Glasser: So you’re the ultimate soft-power power. 
Celso Amorim: (...) it’s not totally soft. People say we have our music; I won't say our beautiful women because that would sound not very like a... 
Susan Glasser: Retro, not the future. 
Celso Amorim: Exactly.

(Celso Amorim 2010)”

Brazil’s wish to catch up with the group in the front but also offer hand to those lagging even more behind is apparent in its actions. This is enlightened interest itself, as humanity did not get lost from the political agenda. Lula’s successor Dilma Rousseff, the first woman president of Brazil received his legacy, a path opened to follow. Though it remains a question, how Lula da Silva’s departure from the Brazilian political life will affect the county’s soft power. As I argued, his special personality and charisma, his comfort to talk with everyone in the same tone, largely contributed to Brazil’s popularity and recognition. It made possible the negotiation with politicians with whom others refused to talk. The passion with which he transmitted his aims and stood up in front of other politicians in international forums made it easier to associate with them. He brought colour into politics. He was subject of jokes and praises, but he was the one, who started a new phase in Brazilian politics. Dilma, now has the task to refill this space and continue with the strengthening of Brazilian soft power.

Summarizing my findings about the Brazilian style of politics, I can say, that the special posture Brazil took with the “diplomacy of development” emphasized by Lula da Silva, was not a self-sacrificing maneuver. It was rather an offbeat selection of means with which Brazil’s national interest and soft emergence in world politics is pursued by.
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**Interviews**


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**Polls**


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6. Appendix

Figure 1: Luíz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil’s president 2003-2010

Source: (Nossa! Brazilian Culture & Music 2009)
Figure 2: The Way to Soft Power Theory

Sources: (Jackson et. al. pp. 30-40, 42-44, 58-94, 95-126)

Based on: [Jackson, et al., pp. 30-44, pp. 58-94, pp. 95-126]
[Nye, J.S., 2004]
Figure 2: George W. Bush and Lula da Silva  
Source: (Real Clear World 2009)

Figure 3: Lula da Silva and Ahmedinejad  
Source: (Foreign Policy Association 2010)
Figure 4: Views of Brazil’s Influence by Country, 2011

Source: (BBC World Service 2011 p. 25)
**Figure 5:** Figure 3: Global Attitudes 2010; Brazil Sees Itself as Rising Power  

**Figure 6:** Global Attitudes 2010; Lula Rated Higher than Others.  
*Source:* (Pew Global Attitudes
Figure 7: Lula da Silva and Dilma Rousseff
Sources: (Novinite 2010)
Szelíden felemelkedve:
Lula Brazíliája Joseph Nye puha hatalom elméletének tükrében
Magyar nyelvű szakdolgozat összefoglaló
Deák Dorottya
2012


Kiinduló hipotézisem, hogy Brazília Lula da Silva két egymást követő elnökségének nyolc éve alatt kiemelkedő hangsúlyt fektetett a puha hatalom eszközrendszerére, ami tapasztalható volt bel- és külpolitikájában. Ennek vizsgálatára ismertetem és elemzem az egyes brazil politikai lépéseket, eszközöket, módszereket és diskurzusokat a puha hatalom elmélet három fő erőforrás kategóriáján keresztül. Ez a három dimenzió, amely az elemzésem szempontjait adja, Joseph Nye Puha Soft Power- The Means to Success in World Politics című könyvében jelenik meg, ahol a szerző az amerikai puha hatalom eszközrendszerének sikerességét és korlátait ezen három kategória mentén elemzi. A felállított hipotézisemet én is ebben a három dimenzióban vizsgáltam, amelyek a következőek:

1. brazil kultúra
2. belső értékek és politikák
3. külpolitika tartalma és stílusa. (Nye [2004] 11. old.)

Kutatásom aktualitását az adja, hogy a korunkban végbemenő változások, különösképpen az egyre intenzívebbé váló globalizáció, átalakította a nemzetközi erőviszonyokat, ezzel késztette a világpolitika szereplőit nemzeti érdekeik újradefiníálására és egy újfajta narratíva felvételére, amely egyben indukálja azt is, hogy az államok érdekeiket és befolyásaikat már nem csak a hagyományos kemény hatalom eszközrendszerére támaszkodva kívánják elérni. A nagyobb befolyásért való
versengésben a feltörekvő országok, amelyek gazdaságilag nagyütemű gyarapódásukkal és a világgazdasági válságból való gyors kilábalásukkal is magukra vonták a figyelmet, új eszközöket keresnek érdekeik megvalósítására. Brazília több szempontból is különleges elemzési alany. Elsőként példaértékűen demonstrálja a tényt, hogy a puha hatalom stratégiájának alkalmazása napjainkban elengedhetetlen módja a hatalmi elitre gyakorolt vonzerő tekintetében, mind pedig a nem kormányzati alanyok véleményének formálásában. Másodsorban kiemelendő, hogy Brazília nemzetközi jelenlétében 9 éve egy új szakasz kezdődött, amikor 52,8 millió brazil Luíz Inácio Lula da Silvát hatalomra jutatta. (de Souza Neto [2011] 102 old.) A szegény családból származó politikus, aki 10 évesen otthagyva az iskolát cipőpucolóként dolgozott, hogy családját támaszassa, egy ipari képzéssel egészen a fémmunkások szakszervezetének vezetői pozíciójáig emelkedett majd az elnöki széki. (Bourne 2008) Az diplomával nem rendelkező Lula elnöksége alatt azonban Brazília kilépve elődje, Fernando Henrique Cardoso alatt folytatott visszafogottabb, normálhoz alkalmazkodó, főként regionális fókuszú külpolitikából; a tradicionális célokat szem előtt tartva, de helyenként módosítva elindult az ország globális hatalmi pozíciójának megerősítése irányába. (Sotero és Armijo [2007]) Ezt igazolja a Dél-Dél együttműködésre helyezett hangsúly, amely az inter-regionális kapcsolatok intézményesítéséig vezetett. (Vigevani és Cepaluni [2007] 1317 old.)

Dolgozatomban elemzésem megalapozásához elsőként ismertetem a puha hatalom elmélet kialakulásához vezető utat, amellett érvelve, hogy a klasszikus realizmus a globalizálódó világban nem képes önmagában megmagyarázni a nemzeti érdek és az erőviszonyok átalakulását túl szűk értelmezési köre miatt, és amely a kevésbé kézzel fogható hatalom források szerepére nem nyújt magyarázatot. (Gallarotti [2011]) A neoliberalizmus, válaszként jelenik meg a 70-es években azokra a dilemmákra, amelyekre a realista megközelítés nem ad magyarázatot, és a hagyományos liberális elvek mentén kibontakozva, de az idealista elképzeléseket elvetve, elismeri az államérek központi szerepét. (Jackson et. al. [2010] 42. old.) Érvelését azonban kiböviti azzal a feltételezéssel, hogy a nemzetéredekkel párhuzamosan az államok képesek együttműködni a szociális programok politikába való integritzálása tekintetében. (Jackson et.al [2010] 96 old.) Joseph Nye puha hatalom elmélete erre az alapfeltételezésre épül, nem vetve el az államérek fontosságát, hanem vizsgálatának központjába a módszertant állítva, amelyen keresztül az államok céljaik elérésére
törekszenek, tehát a hatalom gyakorlásának formájára és stílusára helyezi a hangsúlyt. (Nye [2004] és Jackson et. al. [2010] 96. old.])

Az elemzésem alapjainak lefektetése után a következő lépés a második fejezetben a puha hatalom elmélet általános elemzése, a három említett pillér bemutatása és annak ismertetése, hogy a puha hatalom eszközrendszerének felhasználása miért indukál nemzetközi legitimitást és miért járul hozzá az adott állam hitelességének megalapozásához a nemzetközi közösségen belül. Joseph Nye munkájában megkülönbözteti a hatalom puha és kemény arcát. Kemény hatalom az a dimenzió, ahol az állam a kényszerítés vagy a feltételekkel való ösztönzés eszközeihez nyúl. (Huang and Ding [2006] 23. old.) Tehát amikor nem a másik állam preferenciáit formálja, hanem csak az akciót irányítja, amely önmagában nem jelent megváltozott nézőpontot, hanem csak felszínes beleegyezést. Ehhez képest a puha hatalom eszközrendszere eltolja a hangsúlyt és olyan kevéssé megfogható módozatokra támaszkodik, mint vonzerő, rávezetés és útnyomtatás. (Huang and Ding [2006] 23. old.) Nye erre a “hatalom második arca” kifejezést is használta, amely a nemzetközi térben a kívánt célok megvalósítása érdekében az indirekt hatalomgyakorlás módszerének alkalmazására utal. (Nye [1990] 31. old.)

A második fejezetet, a puha hatalom fogalmának részletes bemutatása után pedig, a választott keretrendszerem által felvetett problémás területek elemzésével zárom. Ezt két részre bontottam, elsőként a puha és a kemény hatalom keresztmetszetét vizsgálva, ugyanis a kemény hatalom egyes elemeinek lehetnek vonzerőt kiváltó formái is. Brazília esetében ezt két példa is demonstrálja. Az egyik a növekvő gazdasági fejlődés, a másik pedig a katona erő felhasználásának mikéntje. Ha a gazdasági hatalom nyitottságáról, példaértékűségéről beszélünk, amely másokat követésre buzdíthat vagy a katona erő felhasználásáról békefenntartó akciókban, az a puha hatalmi kvalitások gyarapításához és az ország pozitív megítéléséhez fóg hozzájárulni. (Nye [2004] és Gallarotti [2011] 25. old.) A második probléma, ami felmerül a puha hatalom elemélet használatakor, a vizsgálat tárgyának és eredményeinek mérése és kiértékelése, ami pont az elmélet nehezen megfogható természetéből fakad. A hazai és nemzetközi közvélemény-kutatások elemezése egy módszere annak, hogy a puha hatalom forrásokat átfordítsuk konkrét mutatókká, azonban a tény, hogy ezzel az eszközzel főként csak nem-kormányzati alanyok véleményét kerül felszínre, a puha
hatalom számos más aspektusának mérése nem válik lehetővé. Ezen összetett nehézségekből fakadóan tanulmányomban nem kíséreltem meg egy konkrét mérési rendszerszer kidolgozását, hanem a puha hatalom szubjektív oldalára koncentrálva vontam le kvalitatív következtetéseimet a három pillér alapján csoportosítva.

Ezt követően a harmadik fejezetben rátérek Brazília puha hatalmának három pillére bontott elemzésére, amelynek bevezetésében először röviden ismertetem, hogyan tolódott el a hangsúly a tágán értelmezett külpolitikában a Cardoso korszakhoz képest Lula két elnöksége alatt, és hogy ennek milyen hatása volt az eszközök kiválasztására, amellyel Brazília a céljait kívánta megvalósítani. Ezt követi az egyes pillérek részletes vizsgálata, itt már Lula Brazíliájával a főkuszban. Elsőként a kultúrát, azon belül is először egy elvontabb, a tradíciókban és értékekben gyökerező vonzerőt, majd a magas kultúra és a populáris kultúra puha hatalomra gyakorolt hatását vizsgálom. (Nye [2004] 44.old.) Ezt követi a belpolitikában megjelenő lépések és értékek elemzése. Puha hatalom generáló hatás ebben a dimenzióban az intézményekből, politikákból, a közvélemény támogatásából, a társadalmi és gazdasági kondíciókból, az univerzális értékek jelenlétéből és ezek kapcsolatából ered. Végül pedig rátérek a Lula adminisztráció külpolitikájának elemzésére, ahol megvizsgálom Brazília három fő célját és azok hatását az eszközök és a megvalósítás fórumainak kiválasztására, amelyekkel Brazília operál. A fejezetben végül kitérek Lula da Silva diplomáciájának és narratívájának, az ország megítélésére és a politikai célok megvalósítására kifejtett hatására és megvizsgálom, hogy a hazai és a nemzetközi közvélemény kutatások mennyiben támasztják alá a Brazília és a Lula kormány puha hatalmi eszközrendszerrel elérni kívánt törekvéseinek sikerességét.

Dolgozatom célja kettős volt. Elsősorban azt kívánta vizsgálni, hogy a puha hatalom eszközrendszerének használata miben emeli ki Brazíliát a fejlődő országok csoportjából. Megfigyeléseim alapján megállapítható, hogy Brazília formabontó elkötelezettsége az észak-dél pólus közötti összekötő szerep betöltésére, a szociális aspektus beemelésére a bel-és külpolitikába, mintúgy a fejlesztési programokban való aktív részvételre, felülről a fejlődő országok felé irányuló hagyományos elvárásokat, amelyek legtöbbször a folyamatosan beáramló nemzetközi segélyek fogadói és nem kibocsátói. Ezt demonstrálta Brazília elkötelezettsége a nemzetközi segélyprogramok finanszírozásában, és a technikai és egészségügyi fejlesztést célzó trilaterális
kezdeményezésekben való aktív részvételle. Brazília, Lula da Silva elnöksége alatt elindította a világ szociális problémáira érzékeny és ezért tenni akaró ország imázsának kialakítását célzó nagy projektjét. Habár az ország maga is sok problémával néz szembe, a mélyszegénységtől, a szociális egyenlőtlenségen át a magas bűnözési rátákig, a késztetés, hogy betöltse ezt a szerepet, áthatotta az ország politikáját. Lula vezetése alatt Brazília, amely egyszerre rendelkezik a fejlettek igényeivel és a fejlődők terheivel, nemzeti érdekét az univerzális értékeken átszűrve kívánta megvalósítani, ezzel is megkülönböztetve magát a többi feltörekvő országtól.

A második kérdés, amire dolgozatomban a válasz kerestem, azt az összefüggést kutatja, hogy a puha hatalom eszközrendszerének alkalmazása mennyiben járul hozzá Brazília azon céljához, hogy a globális kérdésekekkel kapcsolatos döntéshozatalban nagyobb szerepet kapjon. Megállapítottam, hogy Brazília puha stratégiájának egyik komponense a megerősített részvétel és a stratégiai partnerkapcsolatok diverzifikálása volt. Brazília egyre intenzívebbé váló jelenlété a világpolitika különböző prominens fórumain (ENSZ, G20, WTO, BRICS, WEF, stb.) is egy eszköz, amely a békés felemelkedés és a töretlen gazdasági fejlődés célját szolgálja egy sokkal demokratikusabb nemzetközi rendszeren belül. (Huang et. al. 2006 & Vige vani et. al. 2007)

Dolgozatom végén arra a megállapításra jutottam, hogy a Lula kormány diplomáciai és belpolitikai lépései szoros kölcsönhatásban álltak, hiszen ez utóbbi kiemelkedően tükröződött a nemzetközi téren megjelenő brazil programban és narratívában is. A szociális fejlesztést célzó programok, a környezetvédelemben felvállalt aktív részvétel és kezdeményezőkészség, az erős elnöki jelenlét és ezek innovatív tolmácsolása a bel- és külpolitikában hozzájárult Brazília belső és külső legitimációjának felerősödéséhez és az ország „szelíd” felemelkedéséhez.