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Political Development of Georgia and Ukraine from 1991 – 2016

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Abstract

This paper will discuss internal and external factors that influenced political development of Georgia and Ukraine from 1991-2016. The major aim of research is to present the reasons and results of political development of Georgia and Ukraine and explain why they choose given political course. On the basis of research question: What internal and external factors had an impact on the political development in Georgia and Ukraine? On the basis of research question three persons have been interviewed and relevant sources, books and articles have been used. Paper includes hypothesis: The core values of Western countries are crucially important for political development of Ukraine and Georgia. This paper will argue about decisions countries made and options that were available for them, the path of political development. Furthermore, paper will examine the past and present political course of countries and discuss the main reasons for political transition of Georgia and Ukraine. The paper will start from the independence of countries and conclude with the events that influenced countries political course and changed it significantly. Moreover, paper will show the development path of Georgian and Ukrainian public and show how they transformed and changed for the given period. The main aim of this paper is to argue that these two countries internal and external processes were the result of political transition and development. Also, paper will claim and show that countries Western choice had no alternative, because in other way both countries would still be in same economic and political level, which means extreme poverty, corruption and lack of future perspective.
Alexander Kandelaki

Political development of Georgia and Ukraine after the collapse of Soviet Union

Timeframe 1991-2016

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1 Introduction

Since the collapse of Soviet Union post-Soviet countries gained independence, however they were not fully sovereign states. Russian influence on states had important impact on political development of Georgia, and Ukraine, together with other ex-Soviet countries. On the one hand, political readiness of countries were present, both Ukraine and Georgia were fighting to gain independence for decades, and it was a big challenge for them. On the other hand, countries faced serious economic challenges that could not be handled for that period. Therefore, countries faced such problems as: Extreme poverty, lack of goods and supplies, absence of jobs, increased criminal and violence in the states together with civil war in Georgian case. It was hard for Russia to give up Soviet Union and let other states enjoy their independence, thus they used every economic and political tool to keep states under its influence. Ukraine and Georgia changed their political course drastically in the beginning of 2000’s and start to implement Western values such as democracy, freedom of speech and expression, basic human rights. The Transition on Western values were the only outcome for the countries to come out from political and economic crisis. Furthermore, countries made their decision to integrate in NATO and European Union and set it as primary goal of the state. Shortly after the countries have made decision for transition it became obvious that Russia would fight for its influence in the region and challenge the sovereignty of both states. Good examples for that are 1991-1992 Georgia civil conflict that ended with Russian intervention and occupation of Georgian territories, 2008 Russia-Georgian war that resulted further occupation of Georgian territories, and 2014 Russia-Ukrainian war that caused annexation of Crimea. Research question given in paper is: What internal and external factors had an impact on the political development in Georgia and Ukraine? Based on research question hypothesis is: The core values of Western countries are crucially important for political development of Ukraine and Georgia.

I will elaborate on main internal and external factors that took place in the countries. The timeframe is 1991-2016. The transition path was challenging for both countries, in this process they faced lot of obstacles however they have a lot of progress in their path of democratization.

Shortly to talk about the structure of paper, I will start it with the fall of the Soviet Union. Firstly, I will talk about the 1989 protests in the Baltic States, the fall of the Berlin wall, and the 1989 protests in Georgia. Secondly, I will talk about how Ukraine left the Soviet Union and what difficulties they faced after the withdrawal. Thirdly, I will discuss the revolutions that took
place in both countries and how these revolutions changed the foreign policy and political trajectory of the countries. Fourthly, I will talk about the political development of countries using liberal approach together with other International Relations theories and discuss the reasons why states prefer Western partnership over their neighbors. Also, I will mention the achievements that countries made towards European integration. Fifthly, I will talk about 2 wars that took place in 2008 and 2014 in Georgia and Ukraine and emphasize how these wars affected countries development.

The motivation behind this research paper is to analyze the political decisions of countries political elites and make comprehensive analyzes for the given period. The main reason of choosing topic is to draw attention to the political development of states and main events that took place during and after transition process. Further reason for choosing the topic is to get deep knowledge about the topic and talk about what have countries achieved in a given period. Also, it’s important to show how relations with neighboring countries have changed from 1991 to 2016 and talk about their future, most importantly challenges that countries faced in the way of political development. Another motivator for the topic is the region itself, because it’s one part of the world, were frozen conflicts are largely present till today and solutions for the conflicts are hardly acceptable for the disputing sides.

My research will mainly be based on books, articles, and publications, relative to topic. Liberal theory, realism and neorealism are the theories that will be used in my paper because mostly given countries fit to liberal theory due to their geographical location. The sources will be used according to state behavior and foreign decision-making process. Also, I will use primary and secondary sources according to the relevance, credibility and accuracy of the sources. Mostly sources will be selected according to its date, relevancy, and credibility.

As a last chapter of my paper I will sum up the main points and emphasize the key events and their influence on countries political development. Furthermore, I will undermine the factors that influenced political development of Ukraine and Georgia. Also, I will write down the similarities and emphasize the importance of internal and external factors and events that had positive and negative effect on countries path of political development.
1.1 Concepts

1) Borderization – stands for the border markers installation, barbed wire along the Administrative Boundary Lines (ABLs) and fencing, that separate South Ossetia and Abkhazia from rest of Georgia (Laren, 2017).

2) Bandwagoning – Strategy to conserve basic security concerns by looking for protection from a stronger and bigger or even threatening power (Chong Ja Ian, 2003).

3) Nomenclature – system of names together with procedures for establishing and preserving system (Thompson, 2003).

4) Democratization – deepen legitimacy problem of regimes and promote transition on democratic values and principles (Huntington, 1991).
2 Ukraine and Georgia as part of the Soviet Union and their independence

Georgia gained independence and became known as the Democratic Republic of Georgia in 1918 till 1921. This was the period when the Soviet regime lost its influence over neighboring states, but quickly regained its power. Beside the fact that the country made decisions to separate from the Soviet Union, Georgian politicians were not ready to break ties with Russia. Later Prime Minister and leader of Georgian Mensheviks party, Noe Zhordania, in late November 1917, declared that Georgia made its historic choice to join the West. However, at that time Bolshevik ideology was not attractive in Georgia. In 1918-1920 in Georgian province of Shida Kartli, populated mainly by the Ossetian minority, Bolshevik groups organized rebellion. The riot or uprising was brutally taken down by Georgian army in 1920. Ossetians believed that their minority was the target of Georgian repression, however Georgians claimed that they were fighting against Bolsheviks, not Ossetians. On February 25, 1921, red army invaded Georgia and established Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, year later Republic became member of a Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (TSFSR) it also incorporated Armenian and Azerbaijanian Soviet republics (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 2009).

After 1921 Georgia became full member of Soviet Union and since than they only gained independence after the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991. The speed of Soviet system disintegration and transformation was surprising for international society. In 1985, after Konstantin Chernenko left the position Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party, none of the states could even think that after less than 7 years they would live in independent states. There was huge difference in the education level of society between the periods of Stalin’s death and Chernenko’s death. Millions of people had access to higher education in the end of Soviet regime plus the information and knowledge about outside world was more accessible. Soviet society was ready to accept cultural liberalization which was introduced in early era of Gorbachev. Moreover, Gorbachev used term democratization even before he became General Secretary of Soviet Union. Gorbachev lost his position partly because of his liberal views, democratization and liberalization were hardly criticized. Number of critics was big, including future president Boris Yeltsin. Gorbachev’s concessionary foreign policy, “new political thinking” showed that world had become interdependent, universal values and interests showed that East and West might have same
concern. Moreover, the Soviet states started to feel that all states have the right to decide themselves the nature of their economic and political system. In 1989 East-Central European people understood that it was time to move away from Soviet Union and leave the camp. Beside the fact that new governments rejected reformed Soviet Union, Gorbachev refused to use force against Central European nations. This act was perceived as loss of everything that Soviet Union built for decades. As a result, Central and Eastern European countries became responsible for their internal politics and foreign policy course, they took their destiny into their own hands. When Czechs, Hungarians, Poles and others successfully became independent states, it triggered domino effect and resulted protests in most states of the Soviet Union, including Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania (Brown, n.d.).

2.1 The Independence of Ukraine

In the first years of independence, many people were concerned about the possible conflict of Russia and Ukraine over territory, particularly regarding, specific economic issues, Crimea, Black sea fleet, and nuclear weapons. Samuel Huntington argued that possibility of violent conflict between two nations was low, because both are Orthodox, Slavic peoples who have had close relationship among each other for centuries. Historical connection is evident between Russia and Ukraine however, the content and substance of this connection is debatable. Russian imperial historiography was traditionally characterized by the desire and ambition to create the myth of a thousand-year-old and great empire. Till present days not only Russia but Europe as well sees Ukraine as a “young sister”, which proves and demonstrates a strength of an ideologically driven history version, composed by Russian historian of the 18th 19th century (Sushko, 2008).

Ukrainian vision and perception of statehood is completely different, the middle age state of the Kievan Rus appeared as early as the 10th century. Between 14th and 17th century, development of Russia and Ukraine was rather different. Ukraine was integrated into the Great Lithuanian Kingdom and partly into the Polish republic, the Rzeczpospolita. Russia for that period was forming heavily centralized state. Cities were not allowed to govern themselves, so the instrument of self-governance was taken away, thus the prince of Moscow controlled full system of power. From 15th to 17th century so called Moscovian Tsars collected unlimited power that caused the limitation of European influence. Russia was trying for more than 300 years to
convince others and itself that Ukraine is a part of Russia and that Ukrainians are a Russians subgroup. Until the end of the 1st World War, Western Ukraine (Transcarpathia, Galicia, Bukovina), became part of the Austrian Empire. For a long time, representatives of Ukraine were present in Austrian (later Austro-Hungarian) parliament. In the early 20th century Ukraine had chance to gain national unity and independence due to the collapse of Habsburg and Russian Empire. In January 1918, Ukrainian independence was declared, however national elites were divided and too weak to form independent state. According to Riga treaty of 1921, Ukrainian territory was incorporated into Soviet Russia and Poland. In 1922, Ukraine enjoyed far-reaching autonomy because they became one of the founding members of Soviet Union. Moreover, Soviet Social Republic of Ukraine was also one of the United Nations founding members (1946), however, membership was formal and fictive, because they were strictly subordinated to USSR. After the 2nd World War, Ukrainian territories were re-unified under the Soviet governance and umbrella. Transcarpathia had been withdrawn from Czechoslovakia, South Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Romania, and East Galicia from Poland. In 1954, Crimean Peninsula was granted to Ukraine from Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic. Transfer finalized the Ukraine’s formation of present-days borders, which were recognized by international society after the Ukraine’s declaration of independence. In 1991, August 24th Ukraine announced its independence, on the same year national referendum took place that confirmed countries independence. Since then, Russian-Ukraine relations proved to be one of the most indicative and important issue for Ukraine. The essence of these bilateral relations is much more than traditional understanding of interstate relations. Therefore, the study of Russian-Ukrainian relations, gives possibility to better understand on the one hand foreign policy of both countries and on the other hand link between foreign and domestic policy making and the phenomenon of external influence on internal politics (Sushko, 2008).

2.2 Referendum in Ukraine and the first years of countries independence

National intelligence council provided a report where probable outcome of Ukrainian referendum, concerning leaving Soviet Union would be supported and Ukraine would be independent state. According to council more than 70 percent of voter’s support declaration concerning withdrawal of country, even in the areas where most of the population are Russian (Crimea) 60 percent of the residents voted for independence. According to council there were
two presidency candidates for elections namely Leonid Kravchuk and Vyacheslav Chornovil, elections took place after two weeks’ time from referendum. No matter who won the presidential elections the state would become independent, however it was a fact that it would be very hard process and it wouldn’t be manageable overnight. Chornovil called for full independence within 18 months, Kravchuk was more pragmatic person therefore he continued dialogue with other republics on security and economic cooperation. Moreover, Kravchuk preserved strong existing ties with Russia in order to safeguard the interests of ethnic Russians inhabited in Ukraine. More likely Chornovil would take confrontational stance towards Russian government. Even though Kravchuk had more friendly policy towards Russia, Crimea remained the biggest possible threat for Ukraine because of Russian separatist attempts to rejoin Russian federation or establish independent republic. On the one hand under Kravchuk governance Ukrainian parliament would be more pluralistic, he planned to create smaller, professional and effective parliament. On the other hand, Chornovil’s goal was to create more Western-style democratic parliament. Regardless of political will and people’s choice to change political system in the country, authoritarianism was still strongly present in Ukraine. The former Communist party had lost its positions, but they still had power to gain supporters and express their protest. They planned to defend position of those people who would suffer from market economy transition most (National Intelligence Council, 1991).

Path of Ukrainian independence went through difficult transformation processes. 2 phases of Transformation were:

- Government decentralization facilitates and promotes a transition from totalitarian to democratic regime. In other words, decentralization encouraged development of democracy and liberal institutions in country.
- Denationalization of economy, which results refusal of a directive type of administration in favor of stimulation and regulation.

Authors also mention 4 types of East-European post-communist transformations:

- Substitution – Modernization of institutes in post-communist European countries.
- Transplantation – has 2 versions. 1\textsuperscript{st} in the process of transformation certain old elements remain untouched and unchanged. 2\textsuperscript{nd} keeps the old institutional structure and implements only certain elements of new system.
• Recombination – implies that neither individuals nor institutions are able to perform radical changes.
• Retrogression – stands for the threat and fear of future, because transformation process can mean a return to mental and organizational forms of the pre-transformation times and therefore, steer transformation towards authoritarianism and collectivism, as a result fear of future might be generated.

Transformation process with its multidirectional nature erode the stability of Ukrainian public institutions, thus it led to long-term political, social and economic crisis. Accordingly, Ukrainian public administration, together with social values and priorities remained totalitarian. Moreover, another problem of transformation for Ukraine was the absence of internal integration. Ukrainian independence was more political compromise than political will. On the referendum of 1991, 17 March only 20% voted against preservation of the Soviet Union, whereas in December 1st, 1991 90.3% voted for independence of Ukraine, the result of discrepancy is the lack of determinacy and courage because 20% still had courage to vote against the Soviet Union. Moreover, above mentioned two referendums showed how undetermined the Ukrainian society was for that period. Referendum of December 1991 was recorded as first democratic plebiscite that carried out in Ukraine for seventy years (Kuczabski, Mishalski, 2014).

Referendum of 1991, was an attempt to prolong Soviet Union existence and offer new policy, meaning the presence of sovereign states within the Union and fully granted respect of human rights and freedom of individuals. Even though, majority of the voters said yes to the preservation of Union, break-up was unavoidable because the desire for independence and freedom was too big in most Post-Communist states. However, it should be emphasized that more people voted for withdrawal, including Russians living in Crimean Peninsula. (Salenko, 2015).

In December 1991, Leonid Kravchuk worked efficiently to ensure his presidency and to ensure Ukraine’s complete independence from Russia. Fearless policy decisions in Kiev, remarkably taking over control on all Ukrainian military assets, together with disarray in Moscow, gave chance to Ukraine to create fact on the ground concerning to which neither Soviet leaders nor Russia had power. Boris Yeltsin, Russian president for that time understood that he had to accept the disintegration of Soviet Empire and finalize defeat of the Soviet power. Once this was done, possibility of taking back Ukraine was fully lost, however Russia continued
to question Ukrainian sovereignty for six more years. From independence declaration through late 1994, Ukraine was isolated triangle member (Russia-US-Ukraine). General relations of US and Russia were positive for that time, and the US primarily viewed Ukraine through the nuclear weapon lens. USA and Russia agreed that Ukraine was obliged to give up its nuclear weapons. Ukraine leaders facing Russian unwillingness to accept Ukraine’s sovereignty used nuclear weapons as bargaining tool in exchange of sovereignty. In 1993, at Massandra Summit, Russia used coercion to make Ukraine surrender its nuclear weapon, specifically they cut off Ukraine gas supplies to force them to abandon Sevastopol naval base and nuclear weapons. It was the first of many coercions, meaning change preferences according to its will, so Russia used its energy dependence to change Ukrainian preferences. Ultimately in January 1994, in exchange for Ukraine’s denuclearization, US and Russia recognized Ukrainian sovereignty (D’anieri, 2012).

Economic independence for Ukraine was more positive and sustainable compare to other post-Soviet states. Ukraine after the disintegration of Soviet Union was industrialized, possessed large number of natural resources, was large in geographical sense, and had educated workforce. Albeit, in 1993, Ukraine moved into hyperinflation phase by having largest inflation rate in post-Soviet sphere. As one of the causes of inflation was lack of trade and increase of poverty in post-Soviet countries. Another cause for increased inflation was appreciation of US Dollar and dependence of country on imported oil despite its large processing capabilities (Ustenko, Johnson, 1993).
3 Literature Review

In the article of dependent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, (2009), authors talk about the Russia-Georgian relation and 1st years of Georgian independence. Article mentions Noe Zhordania who was the Leader of Georgian Mensheviks party and later became prime minister. Furthermore, article discuss Georgian independence from 1918 to 1921 Soviet invasion and 1st constitution of Democratic Republic of Georgia. Article also talks about Georgian membership of Transcaucasian Soviet Federative Social Republic (TSFSR) that also incorporated Azerbaijan and Armenian Soviet republics (Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia, 2009).

Brown, (n.d.) in his article, talks about transition period from Konstantin Chernenko to Mikhail Gorbachev. Author declares that Gorbachev era was oriented more on liberal views and meant more soft governing system, which was highly criticized by his opponents and government members. Gorbachev era was named as ‘new political thinking’ and emphasized that East and West might have same concerns and world has become interdependent. Furthermore, Brown in his article talks about 1989 protests and referendums that took place in Europe. Moreover, author points out that Gorbachev refused to use force against Central European nations, it triggered domino effect, namely after the independence of Czech’s and Hungarians, protests took place in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia that ended with countries independence (Brown, n.d.).

Gia Nodia (2016), in his article talks about the early independence of Georgia from 1918-1921. He claims that the given period was not successful for country because of the poor conditions that were present for that time. Author declares that by the time when Ukraine, Belarus and Russia were signing the agreement concerning dissolution of Soviet Union, Georgians had civil war because of the internal political tension and external factors that further escalated conflict. Furthermore, author talks about 1st president of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who was forced to leave the country for some period because of the opposition forces that took control over the country and government. Moreover, author gives short analyzes concerning the minorities that were present in the country for that time and claims that crime situation made some members of minorities leave the country and migrate to neighboring countries. Also, very important factor that influenced political and economic development of Georgia was corruption. Almost 90% of the parliament members were involved in the corruption and controlled by
criminal authorities, therefore every decision was under the control of street gangs and warlords who did not admit the government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia (Nodia, 2016).

In their article Kornely Kakachia and Salome Minesashvili (2015) discuss the role of ideology in foreign policy making. The article refers to approach such as foreign policy analysis, social order and ideas chosen by small states. Their analysis explore the liberal theory aspects and examine foreign policy preferences according to state interests. Moreover, authors look at small state behavior from constructivist perspective with its notion of identity and ideas. Furthermore, authors state that neorealist approach is best explanation for Georgian foreign policy decision making as small state. Small state behavior in case if state is weak or perceives himself as weak state, balance of power theory suggests that they will either join the powerful state which will mean bandwagoning or exhibit balancing behavior against state which is most powerful in the region, in case of article it is Russia. Authors use Stephan Walt’s realist theory revision which suggests that small states balance not against hegemons or most powerful states, but against the states that are most threatening, and that perception of state threat are influenced by aggressive intensions, offensive power, and geographic proximity. Authors find it difficult to explain anomalies of balancing and bandwagoning when it applies to post-Soviet States. One of the examples is Georgian maintenance of pro-Western foreign policy course after 2008 war with Russia, when it became obvious that West could not militarily support Georgia or play balancing role in conflict. The neorealist logical response to the given situation would be to bandwagon with powerful neighbor (Russia) however, this did not occur. Furthermore, authors declare that economic dependence theory can’t explain the reason why Georgia distanced itself from Russia after 2006 economic embargo, even though economic dependence of Georgia on its northern neighbor was high. Authors argue that systemic factors are not enough to explain Georgian behavior, fundamental sources of foreign policy preferences will give more comprehensive explanation concerning Georgian foreign policy decision making process. In the article Moravcsik (1997) argue that state preference configuration matter most in the world politics, interests, institutions and societal ideas, has impact on state behavior by forming state preferences that is fundamental social intensions underlying government’s strategic calculations (Kakachia, Minesashvili, 2015).

Also, authors emphasize the role and importance of ideology in case of regime promotion in the world. Ideologies are mainly built on state preferences and intensions, state leaders advocate
regimes based on specific ideology interests and reject the understanding that state solely concentrate on material and economic interests, thus ideological polarization and regime promotion are placed at the same level. Authors use David Skidmore idea of social order to analyze and evaluate foreign policy decision of states. They declare that state behavior is function of purposes and interests invoked by the extensive social orders in which states are involved. In the article Skidmore, refuses the presumption that state preferences are merely conditioned by inter-state rivalry but rather socially formed in a fluid environment. This makes the international system a ground of competing or rival social orders rather than states. Power and interests are structured in social order by consecutive factors:

- Political regimes (Institutions) which are built according to state preferences.
- Dominant ideological systems (Ideas) generated by social groups and political elite.
- Structures of economic distribution and production (socio-economic interest)

In the article authors state that degree of compatibility in foreign policy between social orders defines friendship and enmity of states (Kakachia, Minesashvili, 2015).

Authors continue their analysis with constructivism and talk about the effect of identity-based preferences in foreign policy, more precisely through the idea of other/self-nexus. Based on the hypothesis that social threats are not natural rather constructed, perceived interests and identity are believed to form perceptions of population and elites, which are in turn reflected on foreign policy behavior and orientation. Authors argue that national identity is relevant and related to foreign policy because it is formed in the process of self-identification in contrast to the identification of others. Authors state that material interests and ideas can coexist, however, ideas determine how material interests matter for state. Similarly, they see the link between identity and security, they assume that search for identity and search for security coincides with each other. The article is built on soft positivism while it considers constructive approach to demonstrate that in case of Georgia ideas matter. Authors consider the lack of awareness of Georgian population concerning European institutions, political elite is the target of research because of information shortage. Especially, when Georgian foreign policy is directly considered to be driven by elite and elites are assumed to be more instrumental and important in defining priorities and foreign policy goals compared to the general public. The article also aims to explore the rationale through which identity and ideas find incursion into foreign policy behavior. It is argued that ideas concerning social compatibility that impact how political
leaderships identify others and themselves, meaning state or nation itself, defines the enemies and allies. The article looks back at historical development of Georgia’s way to Europe (Europeanism) and uses the content analysis method to analyze speeches of last two government representatives and foreign policy documents. Authors cover the 20 interview of major foreign policy decision makers and provide the elite perception concerning the same issue. Mainly analyzes cover last two governments namely United National Movement (UNM) and coalition of Georgian Dream (GM) (Kakachia, Minesashvili, 2015).

3.1 Role of individuals and political development

Sobchak (n.d.) in his article talks about 1989 protest that took place in capital of Georgia Tbilisi, with the demand to leave Soviet Union and question its legitimacy. Author declares that protests started because of increased tension among Georgians and Abkhazian’s in April 6 and then changed with the demand to remove leadership of Abkhazian oblast and withdraw country from Soviet Union. In his article Sobchak, talks about the process of protests and mentions how organizers gathered people and who were the people involved in protests. Author claims that every social group was present on protests including students, teachers, workers, elite groups. Furthermore, author talks about the terrible results of protests and Russian behavior and attitude towards protestors (Sobchak, n.d.).

Kakachia and Minesashvili declare that after Georgia declared independence, they embraced western liberal democratic values. However, inherited political culture had a lack of democratic traditions, imperfectly designed competing social forces, foreign policy elite with lack of experience, scarce financial resources, initially Georgia was not able to develop feasible security and foreign policy towards West. Authors claim that Zviad Gasmakhurdia 1st president of Georgia struggled to establish meaningful diplomatic ties, because international actors were uncertain concerning recognition of countries independence. One of the examples about international uncertainty is speech of President George H. W. Bush in August 1991, he stated that non-Russian Soviet republics should accept union treaty proposed by Gorbachev. However, West was expected to respect principles of self-determination and international law and was the epitome of fairness. Authors also criticize security and foreign policy because of his pan Caucasian project and nationalist narrative (Kakachia, Minesashvili, 2015).
Emmanuel Karagiannis (2012), in his article talks about Russian intervention in Georgia’ occupied republic of South Ossetia which was known as 2008 August Russia Georgian war. Author tries to analyze the 5 days war from lens of offensive realism and emphasize points and reasons of Russian aggression towards Georgia. In his article he talks about assumptions of Offensive Realism theory and explains why regional hegemons try to expand their power. The main reason author mentions are the same for Weak and Small states, it’s the survival. The regional hegemons try to expand their influence and military capabilities to have a bigger chance for survival. The big regional powers are using economic, diplomatic, and military tools to influence region or itself international order. Therefore, author claims that for Russia, biggest contemporary threat is expansion of NATO, thus country is taking necessary measures to avoid expansion and increase their influence in the region (Karagianiss, 2012).

In his book, Urban, talks about Eduard Shevardnadze who for that period was the minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union. The author discusses his role in the Afghan conflict, in the end of 1990’s Eduard Shevardnadze together with his American colleague reached an agreement concerning withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan. In December 1990, when Soviet Union was on the edge of disintegration and country faced economic chaos, Gorbachev relied on forces that promised him the order and rule of law. Eduard Shevardnadze was the one who claimed that Communist Party nomenclature, would result in authoritarian regime or even dictatorship and would farther worsen USSR’s Europe relations and that initial orientation would be damaged. In the fall and winter of 1990-1991 Shevardnadze left the position of foreign minister, it was one of the reasons why confrontation in Georgia over South Ossetia began (Urban, 1992).

Minesashvili and Kakachia argue that Eduard Shevardnadze, 2nd president of Georgia, was forced to enter Common-wealth of Independent States (CIS) in 1993, in order to strengthen countries and president’s position, solve internal ongoing conflicts and survive in struggle for power against warlords. However, as the situation stabilized in country Georgia started to look towards West again. In Georgian political discourse the 2nd half of 1990’s Western integration became more notable. Younger generation vision and political orientation was strongly pro-Western. Authors state that 1994 Georgia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace Programme (PFP) and in 1999 a Planning and Review Process (PARP), 1999 Georgia’s entrance into Council of Europe was important step on the way back to Europe, it was best encapsulated by
Zurab Zhvania parliamentary Chairman words: “I am Georgian therefore I am European”. These programs and processes helped Georgia to get close to West and Western values (Kakachia, Minesashvili, 2015).

In his article, Voronkov and Khutsishvili (2011), characterize 1995-2003 as period of stability. Authors talk about the characteristics of the given period and mention increased centralization of control as one of the characteristics of the Shevardnadze’s governance. “Nomenklatura” in the article stands for the list of those people who had influential posts. It is also list of those people who should have been appointed on various high positions. Authors claim that distribution of sphere of influence had good impact on countries political development, because governors of different regions were mainly controlled by center (Tbilisi). It was necessary for the country because criminal authorities were trying to control businesses and governors, however, they could not influence central governmental authorities if they were not corrupted. Authors claim that increased centralization caused change of economic groups that weakened their power and ability to control governors and influence Georgian economy. The new economic elite was loyal to government officials. Old economic elite group was not able to appoint its representatives in the administration district or at high positions of government (Khutsivhili, Voronkov, 2011).

In her book Guehenno, (2015), talks about role of Shevardnadze in Georgian politics, describes his character and calls him a master of survival. The reason why author gave to Shevardnadze such nickname is simply because during his political activity and life he was always fighting for survival, author declares that Shevardnadze’s father was arrested by Stalin’s secret police, but he joined the communist party and reached important post during his career, Shevardnadze was even known as White Fox. Furthermore, author states that for Shevardnadze possible solution of Abkhazian conflict could be found by new generation and new political elite in Russia and Georgia. However, the fact is that he was wrong simply because of 2008 war during presidency of Mikhail Saakashvili and Vladimir Putin. Author declares that West, had a lack of interest to solve the Abkhazian conflict because of the economic and political situation in Georgia for that period. Furthermore, author talks about the importance of peaceful Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and change of foreign policy trajectory that caused economic and political development of country. As an example of political development author mentions French ambassador Salome Zurabishvili, who was the Minister of Foreign Affairs in 2004 with
important international connections, she was articulate and tough individual who was never afraid to express her own opinion, even though it was contrary to high rank officials’ ideas and political visions (Guehenno, 2015).

Kakachia and Minesashvili (2015) declare that political course of Georgia was changed drastically after the independence. Authors claim that official documents reflect the aim of the country and chosen orientation, for example Basic Principles of the Sustainability of Social Life, the Strengthening of State Security, Sovereignty and Restoration of Territorial Unity of Georgia states openly the need to integrate into European structure and Georgia’s European orientation. According to the document that was prepared in 2000, Georgia’s foreign policy goal is to reach full integration into European economic, security and political structures, therefore fulfilling the historical ambition and aim of Georgia is to fully participate in the European community. Consequently, since 1994 Georgia’s primary goal was to balance Russian power for country’s security and safety. Authors declare that Georgia perceives security only through integration in EU and NATO. Furthermore, Kakachia and Minesashvili, declare that Georgia reclaimed its place in Europe and consequently set EU and NATO membership as main foreign policy goals after the Rose Revolution that took place in 2003. The Revolution was perceived as masses supporting Georgia’s democratic values and national dignity that meant re-entry into Europe. Authors also discuss further problems like economic embargo in 2006, 2008, 5 days war, 2012 parliamentary elections, and 2013 presidential elections, 2014 signing Association Agreement, that includes Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) (Kakachia, Minesashvili, 2015).

Gueheno (2015), in her book talks about the importance of peacekeeping operations and argues against hypothesis that peacekeeping operations prolong conflict, since the parties have a lack of motivation as time goes by. She claims that cost of peacekeeping operations is much smaller than cost of a smallest war in both financial and human terms. In her book she talks about frozen conflicts and mentions Georgia as one of the examples. She mentions 1991 Georgian and Abkhazian conflict and 2008 Georgian and Russian 5 days’ war. She declares that negligence of international community concerning situation in Caucasus would farther complicate situation in the region and would lead to resumption of war. 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia proved that her assumptions were right. Author also talks about the United
Nations and declares that in divided international community, organization is powerless (Gueheno, 2015).

In his book Peimani (2009), author talks about the importance of NATO expansion towards EAST. He mentions the 1994 NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program (PFP) and declares that this program legitimized NATO’s presence in Caucasian states and talks about the concerns that China, Iran, and Russia, have because of this fact. The biggest problem for these 3 countries according to author is that PFP laid the grounds for future membership which means American military presence in states that signed PFP program. Author declares that in the aftermath of 2008 Georgian-Russian war, NATO’s criticism and condemnation of Russian aggressiveness caused farther degradation of NATO Russian relations and cancelled certain cooperation activities that were present for that period. Furthermore, author talks about 2004 elections that brought Mikhail Saakashvili in power and was the result of Rose Revolution in 2003. Author declares, that revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine was a part of Washington plan to fully replace political elite of countries. Moreover, author mentions crucially important project that started from 1990’s and finalized in 2006. Namely Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC), this increased economic interest towards country and investments helped to solve basic economic obstacles that country faced. Peimani (2009) also declares that, Georgia was trying to find alternative sources of Gas supply, because till 2007, Georgia was mostly depended on Russian gas. Russia was using this dependence to control and intervene in Georgian politics and internal affairs, therefore, Georgian Prime Minister Zurab Noghaide in 2007 stated that Iran would provide gas supplies for Georgia. Diversification process helped Georgia to safeguard its internal and external political interests and its sovereignty (Peimani, 2009).

3.2 Ukrainian Identity

Oleksandr Sushko (2008), in his article talks about first years of Ukrainian independence, and the concern of Ukrainians about possible conflict with Russia. Author discusses the Russia-Ukrainian relations and declares that Europe and Russia were considering Ukraine as ‘younger sister’ in the 18, 19th centuries. Furthermore, author talks about the role of Ukraine in 1st and 2nd World Wars and covers historical facts that were present for that period. Also, Sushko (2008), mentions that Crimean Peninsula granted by Russian Socialist Federative Soviet
Republic to Ukraine. In his article author mentions the 1991 withdrawal of country from Soviet Union and national referendum that confirmed Ukrainian independence (Sushko, 2008).

In his article Paul Danieri (2012) talks about the Leonid Kravchuk and analyzes his foreign and internal policy decisions that were mainly based on complete independence of Ukraine. Author emphasizes the importance of military assets control that was effectively taken by Kiev. Furthermore, author claims that Boris Yeltsin Russian president for that period, had to admit the disintegration of Soviet empire and finalize defeat of Soviet power. Author declares that relation of Ukraine with US and Russia was positive. Ukraine used its nuclear power as a bargaining tool with Russia and gave it up in exchange of accepting Ukrainian sovereignty by Russia. Author mentions coercion used by Russian side for the denuclearization of Ukraine, coercion meant cut off gas supplies to them. Finally, with the mediation of US and agreement reached in 1993, Ukraine was denuclearized, Russia and US recognized Ukrainian sovereignty and country became fully independent (Danieri, 2012).

Volodymyr Kulyk (2016), in his article talks about Ukrainian identity and how dramatically country changed its national identity. Author claims that in different media sources person can frequently encounter assertions of individuals stronger attachment to nationhood symbols, enhanced self-identification as Ukrainians, increased solidarity with compatriots, grown readiness to do work for Ukraine or protect Ukraine, enhanced assurance in the people and belief that they can change country to better, bigger pride in being a Ukrainian citizen. Most of the people speak of those people around them or from their own experiences, while some generalize personal changes and claim a greater unification or even birth of Ukrainian nation, supposedly such individuals have a lack of national consciousness. The contrary side of Ukrainian’s unification is a feeling of enmity and alienation towards Russia, which according to author is primarily targeted to state, but occasionally to people as well who intensely support Russian aggressive policy towards Ukraine. These changes are reflected in 2013 Euromaidan protests and consecutive Russian offensive policy against Ukraine which began with Crimean annexation and continues with Donbas war. According to article, some argue that merger of national identity is direct result of the war, while the readiness for democratic changes begun in the social mobilization to fight against authoritarian regime and promotion of the democratic values in country are obvious. As an example, author states the point of journalist Mustafa Nayyem, who claims that one of the causes of Maidan has become fear of society by political
class, while conscious national identification, rise of patriotic feelings and other post-Maidan positive changes come directly from the war. Others believe that national consolidation and transformation begun on Maidan itself is in readiness to support and protect each other in fighting for common cause and aim. In his article author uses another journalist point, namely Fedir Sivstov, who became nationalist in December 2013, after police riot attack on the Maidan. Author declares that together with many other revelations, Russian speaker who proudly proclaimed his Ukrainian identity which he saw not as connected to language use or ethnic origin, but rather as dominant view of protest participants, defense of country and free choice of people in the Maidan (Kulyk, 2016).

Author in his article, talks about people’s perception of nation and national identity, he claims that people as members of certain national identities or collectivity’s have been conceptualized on both collective and individual levels. Furthermore, national identity can refer to either a civic (political) or ethnic (cultural) community, both are routinely to nations, especially in the West. Kulyk declares that, some scholars are concerned about prevalent confusion in elite and popular discussion of what they see as conceptually distinct aspect of nationhood. Author uses Bhikhu Parekh points who argued that on the one hand many discussions look for the identity of a political community, while it is perceived as territorially concentrated group of people who are bound together by their admission of a customary mode managing their affairs, in the ethno-cultural or cultural characteristics that are assumed to be common to every member. On the other hand, author uses Alfonso points who emphasized that nationality (Incorporation in a cultural community) and citizenship (be part of a political collectivity) are not conterminous, even though in the empirical reality of European countries, they always have been perceived as synonyms. Author states that, Ukrainian identity starts to gain salience and shifted towards civic content, when they became independent state. Albeit, content and salience of identity were strongly challenged, it was reflected in dissimilarities between certain groups of the population and disagreements instilled by cultural and political elites, some of which inherited form Soviet times. People even disagreed about understanding of national collectivity, that is, whether it should encompass only ethnically Ukrainian part or entire population (Kulyk, 2016).
3.3 Ukraine internal and external factors of political development.

In report of National Intelligence Council (1991), discussion is about Ukrainian referendum and presidential elections that took place in 1991. Report shows that Ukraine was not willing to join any union or alliance if their sovereignty will be limited. Furthermore, report discusses the aims of two presidency candidates namely, Vyacheslav Chornovil and Leonid Kravchuk. On the one hand Kravchuk policy is friendlier towards Russia and aims to preserve economic ties with them. On the other hand, Chornovil policy is more oriented on Western values. However, both candidates agree that independence is inevitable, and that Crimean Peninsula will remain big problem and threat for Ukraine (National Intelligence Council, 1991).

Kuczabski and Mischalski (2014), argue that Ukrainian independence development is connected to difficult transformation processes. Authors state 3 phases of transformation:

- Decolonization of governance
- Government decentralization facilitates and promotes a transition from totalitarian to democratic regime.
- Denationalization of economy

Authors also mention 4 types of East-European post-communist transformations:

- Substitution
- Transplantation
- Recombination
- Retrogression

Authors declare that, transformation processes together with its multidirectional nature undermined the steadiness of Ukrainian public institutions, thus it led to prolonged economic and social crisis. Correspondingly, Ukrainian social values, public administration and priorities remained totalitarian. Furthermore, as another problem of political transformation, authors state the internal disintegration. They argue that, independence of Ukraine was rather geopolitical compromise than political will. They declare that, on the referendum of 1991, 17 March only 20% voted against preservation of the Soviet Union, whereas in December 1st, 1991 90.3% voted for independence of Ukraine, the result of discrepancy is the lack of determinacy and courage because 20% still had courage to vote against the Soviet Union. Moreover, above mentioned two
referendums showed how undetermined the Ukrainian society was for that period. Referendum of December 1991 was recorded as first democratic plebiscite that carried out in Ukraine in seventy years (Kuczabski, Mischalski, 2014).

In his article Salenko, (2015), talks about the withdrawal of Ukraine from the Soviet Union, internal and external factors that caused disintegration of Soviet Union and legitimacy of referendum concerning preservation of Soviet Union in 1991 and referendum concerning Ukrainian independence that took place in 1991. Author declares that referendum of 1991 concerning preservation of the Soviet Union was effort to prolong the existence of the Union and present new policy that meant existence of sovereign states within the Union and fully granted freedom of individuals and respect of human rights. Even though majority of the people voted for preservation of the Union, desire towards freedom and independence was so big that disintegration could not be avoided. Another referendum that is discussed by author in the article tackles Ukrainian withdrawal from the Soviet Union. Majority of the Ukrainian citizens voted for withdrawal and independence of Ukraine. Even Russian minority who lived in Ukraine voted for separation. Furthermore, author talks about Crimean Peninsula, he declares that referendum that took place in 1991 is linked to conflict that took place in Ukraine in 2014 (Salenko, 2015).

In their article Johnson and Ustenko, (1993), talk about economic independence of Ukraine after independence that was declared in August 1991. Authors declare that, beginning of independence for Ukraine was more positive and economically sustainable comparing to other post-communist countries because of its industrialization, endowment of natural resources, educated workforce, and large size. However, in 1993 Ukraine had one of the highest inflation rates in the post-Soviet area and moved into hyperinflation phase. As one of the obstacles of transition author mentions Ukrainian trade with Soviet countries. Another problem highlighted by the author is complete reliance of country on imported oil, regardless Ukraine’s large processing capability. In their article Ustenko and Johsnon (1993), also talk about countries’ nuclear power and how state used it to get close to West and influence international politics. Furthermore, author mentions appreciation of US dollar as another cause of inflation in Ukraine (Ustenko, Johnson, 1993).

In his article Kurth and Kempe (2005), talk about the democratic transition framework of Ukraine, together with the role and importance of elections in the country. Also, authors emphasize the importance of Orange Revolution and the effect that it made on international
society. The Orange Revolution was a big step forward towards democracy and European society. European neighborhood perceived Orange Revolution as people’s will for more Europe in Ukraine and vice versa. Authors talk about Viktor Yushchenko the 3rd president of Ukraine and his role in changing the foreign policy course of country. Authors declare that, Yushchencko for West was the chance to promote liberal democracy and have free market structure in the country. Yushchenko was perceived as pro-Western person and as individual who could build new bridge between Ukraine and West. Furthermore, authors talk about democratic transformation of country that started since early 1990’s. They state that Ukraine was the most successful state in terms of democratic transformation among European countries. Also, they claim that transformation from authoritarianism to democracy was a hard but only option in order to develop institutions and fight against corruption in the country. Moreover, authors discuss the importance and role of elections in Ukraine as a measuring tool for democracy, they declare that the quality of elections show the democratic level of state and can be used as a measuring tool (Kurth, Kempe, 2005).

In their article Minakov and Rojansky (2015), argue about 2 revolutionary cycles of Ukraine orange Revolution period and Euromaidan. Furthermore, they discuss the development of Ukrainian Constitutional order and talk about key dichotomies: clan persistent politics versus institutionalized democracy, parliamentarianism versus presidentialism, and local self-governance versus centralization of power. In 1996 country had semi-presidential constitution. Authors claim that, the Orange Revolution result was 2004 constitution that transformed Ukraine into parliamentary - presidential republic. In 2010, Viktor Ynaukovich used corrupt and informal influence to protect control over Ukraine’s constitutional Court and restored 2004 semi-presidential system (Minakov, Rojansky, 2015).

In his article Peisakhin (2015), talks about Ukrainian regime and reasons of its change, namely Euromaidan protests that took place in 2013 in Ukraine. Author mentions Viktor Yanukovich who was 4th president of country and main addressor of Euromaidan protests. Author asks questions about the result and management of the protests, meaning the coordination, aim of the protests and various other important issues. Author declares that mass protests did not cause overthrow of government, it was more result of inadequate and aggressive response of government. Author argues that, Yanukovich’s refusal to sign Association Agreement with European Union did not cause violent public reaction. Author claims that it is a
misperception of the event and effect of US and European media outlets together with opposition parties. According to article, Yanukovich ran his presidential campaign in 2009 on a balancing platform between Russia and Europe. During 2013, Yanukovich foreign policy course was more oriented on Europe, however course was soon changed because of threats coming from Russia. On the one hand, Russian threat was cutting off trade ties because of the European aspiration. On the other hand, Russia offered 15 billion aid packages to increase transition cost and make sure that Ukraine foreign policy trajectory would not be influenced or changed. Furthermore, author talks about public opinion concerning Russia-Ukrainian relations. He declares that, society was divided in 2 parts, one part was ready for European future and integration, another part was supporting Russia and closer relations and friendship between countries. Author also talks about Yanukovych’s escape and emphasizes the causes of his removal to Russia. Moreover, author talks about the role of international players including, Russia and Austria together with Western Europe (Peisakhin, 2015).

3.4 Political Theory of Georgia and Ukraine

Classical Realism emphasizes that human nature is mostly concentrated on power. Hans Morgenthau claims that both international and domestic politics are struggle for power, all human associations concentrate on tendency to dominate. On the international level, anarchy gives possibility to powerful states to do whatever they want, the weak do what they must do, or must do they have scarcity of options. Classical Realism on the international level shows that states fight to gain power, to put it more simply states perceive power as the ability to do what they want and when they want. Therefore, if state gains power, it will happen at the expense of other state. Powerful state will make efforts to shape international community in order to protect its interests and preserve their standing, this behavior will sometimes make powerful states to engage in warfare to avoid rising of other states (Clark, n.d.).

Another theory that explains the Georgian foreign policy and internal politics is structural realism, also called neorealism. Neorealism is a theory of international politics, because it tries to explain the result of the state interaction. Neorealist theory offers a better explanation of state-to-state behavior. Neorealism external security environment does not determine state’s foreign policy choices, however it has very important influence on it. State foreign policy decisions are based on its own internal processes, but its decisions are shaped by interactions with other states and presence of them. Level of cohesion and state capacity are important variables to see how
small states respond to external threats and security environment. Elite agreement and understanding over challenges and foreign policy goals together with state capacity will determine the assertiveness, timing, and intensity of foreign policy behavior (Gvalia, Lebanidze, Siroky, 2019).

In order to apply theories and define state behavior properly firstly it will be necessary to explain it and describe it. Mearsheimer begins to talk about offensive realism with the assertion that great powers such as (Russia, United States, China), try to maximize their relative power. Offensive realism emphasizes the importance of power and limitless struggle for it, however it also shows that it’s not appetite for power that makes states to struggle and fight for it, but the search and preservation for security that is caused by anarchic structure of the international order. In other words, states seek to extend its sphere of influence in order to insure its own security. Waltz and Mearsheimer agree that because of the possible attack or threat coming from other countries states seek to increase their power in order to protect themselves and insure security. However, they can’t agree on the amount of power that state seeks or wants. Theory of offensive realism argues that power can hardly be enough for state in world politics, because international system creates strong incentives for big powers or states to look for capacities to gain power at the rival’s expenses, and to benefit from those situations when the profit outweighs the price. Eventual goal of the state is to be or become hegemon in the system (Snyder, 2001).

Theory of Offensive Realism can further explain the state behavior during war periods and can be used as a tool of analysis. Theory is based on presumptions, which emphasize the importance of anarchy, the lack of certainty about each other goals and intentions, rationality of states, great power acquirement of offensive military capabilities, survival as primary goal. More precisely, the theory claims that international system is anarchic, meaning that it remains state-centric and lacks global government. For every state survival is the most important objective, this enforced them to enhance their relative power positions through the unilateral diplomacy, mercantile foreign economic policies and arms building. It basically means that more powerful state is compare to others, the bigger chance it has for survival. Furthermore, the big states or powers do not seek for more power and hegemony for survival and security. Regional hegemons always perceive alliances as threat thus they force small states to be either under their influence or to avoid any integration that might challenge them. Thus, it can be claimed that on the one hand foreign policy decision of Georgia was mainly built on survival and at some point, desire
for unification. On the other hand, Russia had same target mostly Georgia as a pro Western country was a threat to Regional hegemon thus with various economic and military tools Russia tried to control and keep Georgia under its influence. In Georgian case one can say that neorealism or structural realism, is theory that can best explain the state behavior and foreign policy decisions (Karagiannis, 2012).

During the most 1990’s the US policy cornerstone towards South Caucasus was the development of oil pipeline Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC). In 1999 November, Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia signed an agreement supported and witnessed by US and President Bill Clinton, declaring the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) route as the major export pipeline for Azeri oil exports. Even though, several companies were against pipeline building and heavily criticized it as too uneconomical and costly, in autumn 2002 construction of pipeline began and completed in 2005 May. From American perspective, pipeline was crucial step towards unlocking new resources and tying the South Caucasus to Turkey, especially Georgia and Azerbaijan and thus decrease Russian influence in the region. Pipeline building for Georgia was one of the most important economic events that helped country to survive and increased the costs of conflicts. Furthermore, it was another step made forward to get close to NATO countries. As Russia felt increasing threat from NATO expansion their military intervention in South Ossetia was not spontaneous it was predictable reaction. Throughout the 1990’s US buck-passing strategy worked effectively. Ankara supported Baku and Tbilisi aspirations to integrate into Euro Atlantic structures. Turkish army supported modernization of poorly equipped Azeri and Georgian forces, moreover Turkey also provided logistical and financial support to the Chechen independence movement. As a result, Russia-Turkish relations sharply deteriorated. As theory of offensive realism claims, the USA supported and allowed power growth of intended buck-catcher (Turkey), so that it could weaken the position of aggressor state (Russia). Furthermore, in October 1997, in Strasbourg GUAM organization was established, the member states were, Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan, and Moldova. The aim of the organization was: firstly, to check Russian influence on former Soviet space. Secondly to cooperate in the fields of energy, trade, low security (pipeline security, antiterrorism) and transportation. Georgian Ambassador for 2000’s in the US declared that GUAM is a strategic alliance of states with common threat perception and common problems. Another important aim of the organization was to prevent
threat coming from neighboring countries and insure stability and security in the region (Karagiannis, 2012).

Since 2003, Rose revolution of Georgia, countries pro-Western ambitions have been grown significantly. 3rd president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili made it clear from the beginning that Georgian relations with EU and US will improve importantly and that West was the only potential guarantor of countries security and development. Symbolic gestures like, European flag in his inaugural speech and European anthem sang by choir were clear indications of Saakashvili’s goals and foreign policy course. Together with the implementation of domestic reforms and foreign policy initiatives for the first time of independent Georgia, a major strategic document, National Security Concept was adopted by new government, which notably stated that the primary aim of foreign policy of Georgia would be integration in European Union and North-Atlantic Alliance (NATO). Together with countries Westernization, in 2004 Georgia became the 1st country to sign the Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the NATO. The foreign policy decision of Georgia and Westernization was the cause of the threat coming from neighboring country and desire to become notable actor in the international arena. State capacity and elite cohesion are important variables to understand Georgian political decision-making process. The administration of Saakashvili and Shevardnadze his predecessor, responded differently to similar incentives and constraints the reason behind that is the different state capacity and elite cohesion under two administrations (Gvalia, Lebanidze, Siroky, 2019).

Stephen Waltz’s in his review of realist theory argues that, states balance against most threatening not against most powerful, and that threat perceptions are impacted by aggressive intentions, geographic proximity, and offensive power. However, when we talk about Post Soviet countries, structural realism has little room to explain some of the anomalies of both balancing and bandwagoning. Accordingly, this approach fails to define why Georgia kept its pro-Western foreign policy orientation after the August war of 2008, when it became obvious that the West was not able or willing to play balancing role and protect Georgia from Russian threat. The coherent neorealist response would be to bandwagon with Russia, but this did not happen. Furthermore, nonetheless in Walt’s theory, aim is considered together with power, he still does not propose an irrefutable explanation as to why states can form antagonistic intension among each other. Moreover, Economic dependence theory, likewise fails to explain the reason
why Georgia further distanced itself from Russia, after 2006 economic embargo, regardless its immense economic dependence on its neighbor country (Kakachia, Minesashvili, 2015).

The Russia-Georgian war in 2008, showed that the United States and Russia were not able to find a solution or common ground during the crisis. As a result, Russian president Dmitry Medvedev, together with the Russian political elite, quickly turned the war into a zero-sum game and acted as realist theory dictates, meaning they felt the threat to their core strategic objectives as a result they deployed troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and launched air and land-based operations. On the one hand Georgia had some support from its strategic partners Europe and USA however still country was left on its own, so they start to fight for survival and took every possible measure to stop aggression and reach for ceasefire agreement as soon as possible. On the other hand, Georgia together with its strategic partners were trying to increase the cost of intervention and emphasize the importance of peace in the region and called for parties to sit on the table of negotiations and find peaceful outcome from the crisis (Jensen, n.d.).

Theory of liberalism can be implemented to Ukrainian state behavior and foreign policy-decision making process. According to Andrew Moravcsik Liberal theory is based on three core assumptions: private and individual groups, not States are the central actors of world politics (Non-State Actors). States represent dominant subset of local or domestic society whose interests they assist or serve. State behavior is determined by the configuration and composition of preferences across the international system. Furthermore, one of the most notable developments within liberal theory has been the phenomenon of democratic peace. Immanuel Kant declares that democratic peace defines the reason of absence of war among liberal States (Slaughter, 2013).

Ukrainian shift towards West and increase of cooperation with EU can be explained through the glance of liberal theory. One of the reasons of changing political course was the governance form and influence of Russian federation and interference in domestic affairs of Ukraine.

Contrary to realists, liberals believe that processes and events taking place inside the state are important. Importance of internal processes leads to formation of ideology, state-society, and system of governance according to these state acts in international arena and sets foreign policy priorities. Liberals argue that there is a close connection among, on the one hand international politics, and on the other hand domestic politics and institutions. Therefore, international politics
can’t be separated from internal interests and compositions of the state, they can’t be analyzed separately. Furthermore, liberals also believe that there is connection between probability of war and state regimes, that’s why democratic states are more peaceful with each other. Also, another very important part of liberalism is economic interdependence, which increases costs for war and creates incentives for cooperation and peace (Jensen, n.d.).

Russian aggression in Ukraine and Ukrainian behavior can be explained from liberal perspective. On the one hand Ukraine was trying to increase the level of economic interdependence to avoid military confrontation and increase costs of possible conflict in the country. On the other hand, Russia as a non-democratic neighbor of Ukraine could not accept Ukrainian aspiration to integrate in NATO and European Union, because for Russia, NATO and EU with their Western values represent threat. As a result, in 2014 the conflict of Crimean Peninsula took place that showed to Ukraine that Russia won’t allow Ukraine to make its choice easily and choose its foreign policy course as it is preferred by a state. The Referendum that took place in Crimea showed that while Ukrainians democratize its society and implement Western values, Russian influence and authoritarian form of governance will always cause problems for Ukraine on its path to Western integration (Onati, 2016).
4 Independence of Georgia

Since the early 20th century, excluding 1918-1921 years, Georgia existed only as part of Russia and later Soviet Empire. Therefore, nearly a quarter of century ago, Georgia started to form a new state and new nation. The early years of independence were not promising, because of poor conditions. In late December 1991, when leaders of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine were signing an agreement that ended existence of Soviet Union, Georgians were fighting with each other in capital city Tbilisi. In few days, first democratically elected president of Georgia, Zviad Gamsakhurdia, was forced to leave the country, but for another two, three years country was plunged into violence and chaos. Economic system was collapsed, overall output of state production decreased around three times. Public infrastructure collapsed, electricity and heating became precious rarity. Most part of the people had doubts concerning viability of Georgian state, many citizens left the country and migrated to Russia or other states. Paradoxically, most Georgians were not overwhelmed by nostalgia and perceived future of Georgia as independent, institutionally developed, sovereign state. In the process of Soviet break-up, Georgia was diverse place ethnically, around 70% of the population was ethnic Georgian 30% was from various nations (Including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, Ukraine etc.). Georgia’s independence showed that all the minorities could not have and enjoy equal rights because of increased sense of nationalism. Georgia was considered as administrative unit within Soviet Union, therefore every other minority who lived in Georgia perceived themselves as Soviet Union citizens (Nodia, 2016).

After the collapse of Soviet regime, they had to change their identity and either identify themselves as Georgians or leave the country because of the difficulties that they might have faced. Georgian nationalism was suspicious and ethnically exclusivist, which was the trigger of ethnic conflict. Such conflicts could take place everywhere however, Balkans and Caucasus were two regions where most of them happened. There was important difference between these 2 regions: Balkans were considered as part of Europe by Western powers therefore, they took responsibility to establish peace there, even though it took lot of time, effort and bloodshed. The West never perceived himself as one who should be responsible for peace in Caucasus, where Russia was mostly the leading player. Georgia got engaged in two territorial-ethnic wars, in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and lost both. In the early 1990’s Georgia was run by street toughs and competing warlords who did not admit any legitimate state authority. While country
overcame the existing situation by the middle 1990’s, the state was counted as one of the most corrupt in the world, public infrastructure was ruined and public servants’ salaries were below the living wage. Many foreigners as well as Georgians believed that corruption was endless disease for the country, any attempt to change would cause failure of government and official legitimate forces that tried to control the country (Nodia, 2016).

From 1990 – 1991 Eduard Shevardnadze 2nd president of Georgia left the position of Foreign Minister of USSR and returned in Georgia. Eduard Shevardnadze who was foreign affairs minister of Soviet Union, played important role in peace process and troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. He was the politician who claimed that Communist Party nomenclature, would result in dictatorship or authoritarian regime, that would damage USSR, EU relations. Because of economic crisis and chaotic situation in USSR Shevardnadze knew that disintegration was close, so he left the position of Foreign minister, went back to Georgia and became 2nd president of country (Urban, 1992).

Eduard Shevardnadze played a big role in Georgian politics, he was known as white fox, because he was master of survival. During his political life and activity, he was always fighting for survival, Stalin’s secret police arrested his father however he still joined the communist party and had high position in Soviet Union. Shevardnadze knew that his presidency could not solve the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, but he had hope that new political elites in Russia and Georgia could have come to an agreement of peaceful solution for conflict. Unfortunately, his hopes were mistaken new political elite with the head of Mikhail Saakashvili engaged in war with Russia, as a result Georgian territory got further occupied by its neighbors. Even though, Western interest towards Georgia increased significantly after 2003 revolution, 2008 war showed that big superpowers would not increase tension among each other (Guehenno, 2015).

4.1 Protests in Georgia

After Baltic protests took place Soviet countries felt that it was good time to question the legitimacy of Soviet Union and started demonstrations with the demand to leave Soviet Union. At the beginning of April 1989, increased tension in Abkhazia, caused protests in Tbilisi in front of Government House. By 6th of April anti-Abkhaz protests changed with the demand to remove Abkhazian oblast leadership and withdraw Georgia from Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. Hundreds of demonstrators stayed for nights in front of Government House, which resulted disruption of institutions and peace in capital. The organizers of the protests sent their members
to higher educational institutions, and work groups to gather people and call for strike, as a result classes were suspended in many schools and higher educational institutions it should be mentioned that majority of employees and workers of the Georgian capital supported protesters but continued to work. During demonstration, organizers spread word to disobey instructions of authorities. Furthermore, slogans that were present in front of Government House were very anti-socialist, anti-Soviet, and nationalist. Some of the examples are:

- Concerning Abkhazian autonomy liquidation.
- USSR is a prison of people.
- Concerning overthrow of Soviet Communist regime.

(Sobchak, n.d.).

The organizers called for hunger strikes until 14th of April in order to increase the awareness and number of protestors in front of Government House. More than 100 people participated in hunger strikes. In the evening of 9th April, Tbilisi political situation was characterized as an emergency and demanded the adoption of crucial and urgent decisions by Soviet leadership and Republic government. In their notes Commission emphasizes that investigation could not find any evidence that identified terrorist acts, or attempts to seize power, demonstrators were not motivated for violence or assaults against party members or workers of government. Leaders made decision to stop unauthorized demonstration, however it should have been done by authorities who were entrusted by law. Ministry of Internal Affairs of Soviet Union took the task under their control. The Commission also notes that The MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs) officials of Georgia together with directorate did not take necessary measures to stop unauthorized demonstration. However, according to Georgian MVD, they constantly raised the question to cease protests, and restore normal situation in Tbilisi, capital of Georgia with the demonstration organizers. Because of the increased tension and uncontrolled situation in capital, leaders of republic decided to address Soviet authorities for help. In the morning of 8th April 1989, three helicopters together with armed soldiers and combat equipment’s entered the city. Demonstrators perceived that government behavior was provocative, it caused increasing their number significantly around 85% of the capital population went out in street. The operation was planned and implemented by General Yefimov, and Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia Gorgodze, the plan was approved by General I.N. Rodionov. Investigative Commission emphasized that serious violations and oversights of law were committed by both, Republic as
as Soviet authorities in the process of implementing and preparing measures to cease the protests on the night of 9th April at Government House, in Tbilisi. The operation to stop protest began at 4am on the 9th of April and ended tragically with number of deaths including women, children and men, in total 19 people died (Sobchak, n.d.).

4.2 Rose Revolution

As one of the most important external factors that influence countries political development is increase of Western interest towards Georgia and desire for political and economic support. NATO expansion was the only possible protection and security guarantor for Georgia thus country started its integration process with NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program (PFP), in 1994. This program legitimized presence of NATO in Caucasian region however, countries such as Iran, Russia, and China are concerned about NATO’s expansion in the Caucasus region. Project of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (BTC) that started in 1990’s and finalized in 2006 was first step towards increase of economic interest in the state (Peimani, 2009).

The late period of independence and the end of civil war period resulted in relative stability of Georgia. From 1995 to 2003, the local regional military group known as Mkhedrioni, established its power and became informal head of the district nomenclature. The management system was quite complex, crime bosses mainly controlled districts together with members of parliament. The distribution of spheres of influence was among provincial representative of President (governor) and informal local elite leaders (Crime bosses) or local elites who had strong connections and ties with criminal authorities. However, in the beginning of 200s increased centralization of control over the districts weakened the influence of local elites and criminals, step by step government was taking full control over country. With the collapse of old groups and creation of new political elite era of Eduard Shevardnadze was coming close to an end, thus country faced new political reality in the form of United National Movement which was strongly pro-Western political party (Voronkov, Khutsishvili, 2011).

As one of the most important internal factor that changed the political course of country and the 1st steps of countries political development was Rose Revolution that happened in 2003. The main body and power of this revolution was Georgian youth movement KMARA (enough), this movement managed to end President Eduard Shevardnadze’s 3-decade governance and brought new political elite in country. The Rose Revolution was one of the first bloodless
reversal of power in the history of Caucasus region. The Revolution created hope in societies that
democracy could triumph in the region and in Georgia, for that period democracy was hardly
imaginable and achievable in this part of the world. The Georgian example showed Western
policymakers that in the former Soviet republics, that the change of regime into democracy was
possible and achievable and would not result or lead to civil war that country already
experienced. On the one hand democratic theorists such as Alfred Stepan and Juan J. Linz
describing the type of regime, namely they declared that broader regime category was post-
totalitarianism. On the other hand, Gia Nodia, Georgian political scientist characterizes
Shevardnadze’s regime as a liberal autocracy or even liberal oligarchy. However, several
fundamental freedoms that define characteristic of the regime such as, freedom of association
and freedom of expression, were allowed, regardless overall authoritarian tendencies of regime.
In 2001, when authorities tried to close the outspoken channel Rustavi 2, the reformers
surrounding president, left the administration and became part of the opposition. From political
culture perspective, Georgian citizens represented typical post-Soviet society. Popular attitude
towards any kind of participation especially political participation, were importantly conditioned
by experiences of the Soviet period and therefore, distrustful and nihilistic (Kandelaki, Meladze,
2015).

By 2002, Shevardnadze’s position in Georgian political elite was problematic. Hopes that
Georgia would restore its broken-up unity, which required Russian active cooperation and
neutrality seemed doubtful. Former proteges and reformist allies of Shevardnadze accused him in
tolerating of corruption. Former Parliament Speaker, Zurab Zhvania, current Parliament Speaker
Nino Burjanadze, and former Minister of Justice Mikhail Saakashvili united against
Shevardnadze and created opposition bloc. Government of Georgia had support of Washington
however, everything has its limits and Shevardnadze’s governance was close to an end. In order
to emphasize the importance of fair and free parliamentary elections President Bush sent
Secretary of State James Baker as his personal envoy to capital of Georgia Tbilisi in 2003. The
primary goal of Baker was to facilitate agreement among opposition and government forces over
the most arguable issues, precisely in composition of the Central Election Commission. Despite
the attempts from side of United States as an external actor and opposition forces together with
its voters as internal actors’ election was falsified. In order to prevent continuity of
Shevardnadze’s governance Zhvania, Saakashvili, and Burjanadze, mobilized their voters in the
street and start to protest election results. As a result, Shevardnadze decided to resign, according to constitutional resignation norms head of the state Speaker Nino Burjanadze became president of Georgia and elections were rescheduled for January 4th, 2004 (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2004).

4.3 Interviewer 3 Beka Makaridze (Consul of Georgia in Hungary)

Beka Makaridze starts his interview with internal factors that began from 1950’s with national movement, it was first protest in Georgia when Nikita Khrushchev tried to decline Stalin’s cult and go against his policy. Georgian people protested Nikita Khrushchev’s de-Stalinization policy in 1956. It was first protest by Georgia in the Soviet Union that resulted several deaths of Georgian citizens. Second wave of protest that took place in 1978 was concerning constitutional status of language in Georgia. USSR decided to change the status of Georgian language and avoid declaring it as a sole state language. After the wave of protests took place, Eduard Shevardnadze who was the chief of Georgian communist party, persuaded Moscow to withdraw the decision and maintain previous status of the Georgian language. Step by step these protests created national movement which faced serious problems in 1989 April 9 fighting against Russian soldiers in the center of capital which resulted several deaths of Georgian citizens and reached result of disintegration of Soviet Union in 1991. In the end of Soviet era Mikhail Gorbachev insisted that Georgia should become a member of Common Wealth of Independent States (CIS), however 1st president of Georgia Zviad Gamsakhurdia refused to join the CIS. As a result, Russia increased tension among Abkhazians, Ossetians and Georgians and rooted the fear in Abkhazian and Ossetian people that Georgia would start to use force in order to destroy this ethnic groups. Civil war broke up in Georgia in among internal ethnic groups and ended with the occupation of Georgian territories. Eduard Shevardnadze 2nd president of Georgia could not refuse to enter in CIS because of the extreme poverty, political and economic crisis. Therefore, in 1993 Georgia became member of CIS and left the organization in 2009. It is very important to consider the regional conditions itself when we are talking about internal and external factors. Transcaucasia consists of 3 countries Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, it is very important to emphasize that all 3 of them have different political interests. When we mention these 3 countries out of them only Georgia chose Western political course and results are visible. Armenia can’t make any important foreign policy decision without Russian permission, Azerbaijan is partly dependent on Russia, but because of the oil and gas they will always be
desirable country for Europe despite the regime and situation inside the country, finally Georgia made its decision and choose Western course with its values and principles, today country is one of the most liberal and democratic state in the Transcaucasia and Caucasus region. If course of Georgia, after 2003 Rose Revolution had not have changed, country would have still lived in a same corrupted and criminalized environment as it was before. It is also important to mention that Georgia took an example of Baltic States when Georgia dealt with the political course of the country and despite the various political disagreement and dispute, all parties agree that Western course, together with its principles and values are crucially important for Georgia. In the path of countries political development, the breakpoint was Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, the agreement was signed in 1999 and in 2006 the pipeline building was finished. The increase of economic interest of Turkey and Azerbaijan towards Georgia increased security of country and peacebuilding process inside the Georgia. Energy diversification helped Georgia to start relations with European Union (EU) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). To talk about obstacles and challenges that Georgia faced in its path of political development, I would like to mention Putin’s words in the beginning of 2000’s that disintegration of Soviet Union was geopolitical catastrophe. As an external factors Putin’s words made clear that Russian aggression would prolong and be more active towards post-Soviet states including Georgia. Beka Makaridze emphasized that Russia will never tolerate the new actor’s appearance in the region especially if new actor is entering with the help of Georgia. As an internal challenge for Georgia, Saakashvili’s rough policy was one of the obstacles. To give concrete example imprisonment of people with different political opinion was one of the difficulties inside the country. The Russian aggression will always be challenge for Georgia, for examples when we signed visa free movement agreement with European Union, Russia started process of ‘borderization’ or crawling occupation, meaning putting wires on the so-called borders inside the Georgian territory. Borderization stands for crawling occupation which is happening in Georgia on daily basis. With this behavior Russia is giving warning signal to Georgia that every successful step made by country towards Euro Atlantic integration will have consequences. Because of the effort of international society, Russia can’t fully intervene in Georgia, however Bucharest summit decision in 2008 not giving Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia and Ukraine gave green light to Putin that ended up with further occupation of Georgian territories and annexation of Crimea. The scenario of Crimea was very closely linked to Georgian scenario because it started
in a same way, however it was much easier for Russia to provoke conflict in Ukraine because most part of Crimea is inhabited by ethnic Russians, so Russia did not had to give out passports as they did in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Beka Makaridze called copy paste the case of Ukraine and Georgia. It is very clear for Georgian citizens and political elite that integration into the European Union and NATO is long and complicated process, however it is very important for country to use the benefits that these two offers to Georgia. For instance, signing Association Agreement, signing Visa Free Movement of Georgian citizens in EU countries, well trained and organized army, economic and judicial reforms, all these was homework given by EU and NATO that helped country on its path of democratization and political development. Beka Makaridze emphasized that human rights conditions were very poor after the collapse of Soviet Union, but it should also be stated that in 1918 Georgia had democratically elected parliament with number of women representatives and the head of Georgian Social Democratic Party. It should be mentioned that without the deployment of British forces in Tbilisi independence was hardly achievable, even though it was short. Therefore, European values and principles are not new for Georgia, the time has changed environment inside the country, but country is getting back to track and returning into the European space. To talk about the similarities of Ukraine and Georgia both countries mostly faced same challenge in form of Russia, even after the collapse of Soviet Union the Ukrainians supported Georgia in war against Russia in 1992-1993, it was not war against Abkhazia or South Ossetia, because Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GRU) was the organizer, largest supporter and contributor of the operation. Ukrainians knew that very soon they would face same difficulties as Georgia had, so mostly these two countries support each other during hard times. Another important similarity is Rose and Orange revolutions that took place in both countries almost in same period, however Georgia closed its ties to Russia and Ukraine remained open for them. In Georgia ruling party and opposition in 2003 agreed that West had no alternative, but in Ukraine it was hardly agreeable decision, as a result country refused to sign Association Agreement and protests started in Euromaidan. Positive and negative effects of Western influence on Georgia are visible, the narrative that Western values are dangerous are part of Russian propaganda that Georgia faced since Soviet times thus in overall country have positive tendencies and influence of Western civilization. As last part of his interview Beka Makaridze talked about the future of Georgian political development. Firstly, he mentioned 2012 historical elections for Georgia,
because for the first time in countries history transition of power happened through elections. Secondly, cohabitation among new ruling party and previous governing party was clear example of democratic improvement and increase of democracy level in Georgia. Finally, Beka Makaridze declared that country is on the right track and the political development of state is going into good direction. There will always be internal and external challenges and obstacles for Georgia however, country must follow its chosen political course and handle with problems effectively with the help of its strategic partners European Union and NATO. Resolution of 2016 accepted by Georgian government concerning foreign priority and political course are European Union and NATO and it is very important that despite political mindset all parties agree that course should not be changed (Makaridze, 2019).

4.4 2008 Georgia Russian war

In August 2008, Georgia and Russia waged a 5 days war with far-reaching consequences. In September-October, international financial crisis hit Russian economy and caused the decrease in prices of commodities. Russia once more cut off natural gas deliveries to Europe through Ukraine at the end of December, 2008. Georgia according to Russian perception is neither outside nor inside Russia, it belongs to the near abroad and is not considered as a fully sovereign state. The armed conflict between Georgia and Russia did not break out by chance, the years of disagreements among states and desire to keep Georgia on its sphere of influence triggered the 5 days war. Further triggers and results of the war were:

- Firstly, to question the legality of internal borders and claim Moscow’s right to defend a sphere of influence in former republics of Soviet Union.
- Secondly, to discredit the government of Saakashvili and freeze the prospect of European Union and NATO membership.
- Thirdly, to shed doubts on Russia’s neighbors to become developed and democratic countries.

One of the Russia’s goals in 2008, was to show to West that countries squeezed between East and West should stay under Russian influence, by the use of economic force thanks to Russian gas and oil resources, financial capacity of companies to vanquish economies of former republic’s and military force or threat. 2006, embargo on Georgian wines and mineral waters is a clear example for that. Since 1979, invasion of Afghanistan, Russia for the first time sent its
troops in foreign territory in August 2008 to intrude in domestic developments and put pressure on Georgia. Even though, Georgian side committed tragic errors, most competent experts who monitored the region have little doubt concerning Moscow’s desire to involve Georgia into a conflict. Russian propaganda step by step managed to win the propaganda battle and dominate the media space during the first days, to rise the doubt among Western governments and in many countries public opinion. Putin’s team was too self-confident, they hoped that the display of bluff and strength would weaken Western diplomats support. However, European Union took united position and sent French President Nicolas Sarkozy to Moscow and Tbilisi on 12th of August. With the mediation of European Union a six-point plan could be agreed, which helped to stop armed conflict, but was never implemented fully (Mendras, 2012).

The six point plan:

- No recourse to use the violence between major actors. Sarkozy: This applies to everyone: Georgia in its entirety, Ossetians, Russians and Abkhazians.
- The return of Georgian military forces to their usual quarters.
- Granting access to humanitarian aid.
- The cease of hostilities.
- The opening of international talks on the modalities of stability and security of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
- Withdrawal of Russian armed forces to the positions held before hostilities took place in South Ossetia. Russian peacekeepers should implement additional security measures until an international supervisory body or monitoring mechanism is present. Sarkozy: These measures only affect the immediate vicinity of the South Ossetia and in not entire territory of Georgia. (Deutsche Presse Agentur, 2008).

4.5 Georgian relations with European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization

EU Georgian relations began in 1992, when the country faced deep crisis after the disintegration of Soviet Union and the collapse of economic links. Georgia faced problems such as, internal conflicts, loss of economic markets, social destitution, political instability and many other negative internal factors that had impact on countries political development. Through various projects and programs, the EU played enormous role in the process of transforming Georgia as a modern state, with the establishment of democratic principles and improvement of
countries' market economy, Georgian values and perception of state building changed drastically. From 1999 to 2004, the European Union supported country in three main areas, these were: technical, humanitarian, and financial fields. By 2004, the economic situation of country and consequently its social stability had improved significantly. The EU’s humanitarian support aiming at vulnerable groups’ access to medicine, food, and other necessities was presumed to have fulfilled its mission. As a second phase of support, EU continues to fund multilateral and bilateral projects providing technical and financial support. Second phase of support also contains contributions to various international organizations for example, International Monetary Fund (IMF), UN organizations, World Bank (WB), as well as grants and credits which is provided for Georgia from different EU-founded financial institutions. The EU provides international assistance to its partners, including Georgia, through the four main instruments:

- **Geographical programs** target countries in specific regions. Georgia is one of the beneficiaries of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) tool, which intend to support all ENP countries. Single Support Framework (SSF) is another mechanism for bilateral EU support. Framework defines three year cycles of assistance with specific priority areas for funding: Georgia receives 300-400 million of technical and financial support in every three years. Thanks to stated principle of Eastern Partnership ‘more for more’, the financial assistance amount provided for Georgia will most likely increase over the upcoming years.

- **Thematic programs** intend to finance specific areas of development. Georgia is an active beneficiary of the Instrument contribution to Stability and Peace (IcSP) and of the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR).

- **European financial institutions** such as, European Investment Bank (EIB) and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) provides grants and investment projects.

- **Other EU programs** for example Horizon 2020, Erasmus and agencies. (Gogolashvili, 2017).

In 1994, EU and Georgia began to negotiate and arrange the terms of a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement (PCA). In 1996, negotiations were completed with the trade regulations, the agreement fully came into force in 1999. This enabled EU and Georgia to found a trade
relationship in accordance with the World Trade Organization requirements. PCA provisions obliged country to a series of soft commitments such as, adoption of a sectoral policy, creation and development of democratic institutions, and the adoption of good government principles. In exchange for accomplishing these goals, the EU promised its support to Georgia in every sector of economy. Between 2003 and 2008, the European Neighborhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) was essentially carried out within the neighborhood policy framework, merging almost all the EU’s support programs except multinational and global projects and programs, in the Southern Mediterranean and former Soviet Union. Unlike Moldova and Ukraine, Georgia’s five year European Neighborhood and Partnership action plan included eight priority areas. Action plan called for carrying out important reforms between, 2006 and 2011, together with the establishment of close relations with the European Union in areas such as: justice system, development of democratic institutions, elimination of poverty, culture, science and education, introduce principles of good governance and stability, refining social policy, foreign policy and security, fight against cross-border crime. Unlike the earlier Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), Georgia’s ENP action plan was not legally binding contract under international law. It called for a very peculiar list of reforms to be carried out under the supervision of European Commission annually. Correspondingly, the ENP action plan of Georgian government was modified form year to year. Countries commitment to implement the action plan was dictated according to following:

- The desire of country to further get close with EU, which would not take place unless Georgia would carry out reforms indicated in the action plan.
- Georgia’s understanding and experience of the fact that given reforms would fully correspond with its long-term aims of development and benefit country.

The presence of healthy competitiveness levels with the other countries of ENP. All EU reports were accessible and open, various governments including Georgian, were worried and cautious that given reports notably negative ones, would damage countries reputation on world stage or have a negative impact on their internal state policy (Gogolashvili, 2017).

In 2009, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was launched, the aim of EAP was to establish multilateral political dialogue (Summits take place in every two years, annual meetings of
foreign ministers) between the EU and its six Eastern associates. This initiative offered opportunities for partner countries greater involvement of their institutions in bilateral relations with the European Union, which later took form of a visa dialogue and association agreement. All these resulted in visa-free travel to the Schengen area for Ukrainian and Georgian citizens. The Eastern Partnership was established to serve as a thematic platform for collaboration and versatile tool in four main areas:

- Stability and good governance, democracy.
- Convergence with EU policies and economic integration.
- Environmental protection, transport, energy.
- People-to-people contacts and mobility.

The versatility of the Eastern Partnership dimensions also provide cooperation forms such as, flagship initiatives and thematic panels. As a general rule, thematic platforms bring together high and medium ranking officials to discuss institutional development, legislative harmonization, developing projects or infrastructure for economic cooperation as well as collective activities, deepening links between countries. Panels then study the most considerable topics discussed during thematic platforms, and provide a series of recommendation for partner countries. As for the primary function of flagship initiatives, it is to unite efforts in order to carry out large-scale and important joint projects (Gogolashvili, 2017).

The Association Agreement (AA) signed in July 2014, is one of the most important external factors that had an impact on political development of Georgia. Earlier agreements on cooperation and partnership prepared fertile soil to sign the AA, since the advanced forms of partnership was already present basically in every sphere the agreement considered. Georgia’s AA established a deep and comprehensive free trade area and liberated most of the goods or services from tariff or non-tariff barriers. Concurrently, the AA obliges Georgia to harmonize regulatory and legislative framework with the EU’s acquis. The political cooperation level between Brussels and Tbilisi is at a very high standard. Direct result of this cooperation is the deployment of Georgian military forces throughout the EU-led operations. Furthermore, Georgia has joined Europe’s energy union, membership of union is another precondition for aspirant countries. According to paragraph 16.2 of AA, signatory country is obliged to work on the issue of the free movement of its people and work in the direction of gradual introduction of a visa-
free regime. The EU granted action plan for visa liberalization to Georgia in the beginning of 2013. The four elements of action plan are:

- Document protection and security, including biometrics.
- Migration management, asylum management, integrated border management.
- Ensuring public order and security of individuals.
- Fundamental rights and external relations.

In March 2017, once all obligatory procedures have been carried out, Georgian citizens got the right to pay short term visa free visits to Schengen area countries. Implementing EU programs and establishing relations with EU increased support for country’s integration process according to 2016 survey (Gogolashvili, 2017).

Georgia and NATO relations are crucially important in the context of Georgia’s political development and are one of the most important external as well as internal factors that helps country to increase its level of protection. Georgia joined Partnership for Peace (PFP) program in 1994, which allowed aspirant or partner countries to establish an individual relationship with NATO, clarifying priority cooperation areas. Since 1999, Georgia’s participation and involvement in the Planning and Review Process (PARP) has developed ability of Georgia’s military forces to work with NATO and conduct key security reforms. Georgia as an aspirant country for NATO membership actively participates in NATO-led operations and collaborates with the Allies and other associates in various areas. In April 2008, at the Bucharest Summit, Allied Heads of Government and State agreed about future membership of Georgia. At NATO successive summits in 2009, 2010, 2012, this decision was reconfirmed. In September 2008, NATO-Georgian Commission (NGC) was created, aim was to increase level of cooperation between two sides. NGC targets both, practical cooperation and political consultations to support Georgia on its path of Euro-Atlantic integration. In order to further enhance NGC, NATO foreign ministers in 2008, decided to launch an Annual National Program (ANP). Additionally, Georgia’s contributions to Euro-Atlantic stability and peace, under the ANP key cooperation areas include political, security and military sector reforms. In the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, Georgia is a largest non-member troop contributor. In order to assist and support Georgia’s reform efforts, NATO Liaison Office was established in 2010. Moreover, Georgia expressed willingness to engage in the pos-2014 follow on mission to
advice, assist and train Afghan security forces, only after the ISAF’s mission will end and transition process to Afghani National Security Forces will be completed. Furthermore, Georgian government promised financial support for the forthcoming development of the Afghan National Security Forces. Also, Georgia supports NATO’s counter-terrorism reconnaissance operation in the Mediterranean. Georgia cooperates with NATO and partner countries in number of areas through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) and Partnership for Peace (PFP) program. Together with the creation of NATO-Georgian Commission the Military Committee with Georgia was created for meetings focused on military collaboration. The aim of the NATO-Georgian military collaboration is to support Georgia with defense reforms, strategic planning and with the implementation of defense-related and military issues of the Annual National Program (ANP) (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 2013).

4.6 Interviewer 2 Zaza Gogsadze (Ambassador of Georgia in Hungary)

As an internal and external factor that had an influence on political development of Georgia and Ukraine, it will always closely be linked to Russia as aggressive neighbor of Georgia, which shows willingness to have country under its influence. However, the desire of people to integrate into European Union and NATO is not new, it counts decades it started at the very beginning of Soviet Union collapse. Words of our former Prime Minister Zurab Zhvania, in meeting of European Council in 1999, ‘I am Georgian and therefore I am European’ clearly show the will of Georgian society. For Georgia only solution to come out from the political and economic crisis was to orient on West, if country had not had chosen that path it would still be in the same crisis as it was in the beginning of 1990’s and 2000’s. Some people question the reasons why Georgia is not neutral country, why do state have to be on either side? The answer to that is simple, it is because of Georgia’s geographical location and geopolitics, historically country spend most of its time in war and fight for freedom and independence. Contemporary world is more peaceful however, still Georgians are fighting with its neighbor for DE occupation and full independence, that’s why Georgian neutrality is almost impossible if country wants to stay free. It should be mentioned that political transition and political development of Georgia took place in a very short period. Zaza Gogsadze declared that he was supporter of revolution that took place in 2003 and presidency of Mikhail Saakashvili who was 3rd president of Georgia, fight against corruption was very successful and criminalized society in few years converted into law-abiding society. However, after some period of Saakashvili governance, Georgia became symbol of
democracy for foreigners and not desirable place to live for the Georgians, simply because government controlled every part of society and itself the government became most corrupted. Thus, in 2012 people voted against party of United National Movement with the head of Mikhail Saakashvili. As of main challenges of the country, the most important issue was loss of territorial integrity and internally displaced people who were forced to leave their houses and lands and move to facilities which was provided by government. Another crucially important issue is systematic abuse of human rights in occupied territories, controlled by Russian Federation. Georgia is using every international platform to provide monitoring mission in occupied territories however, Russia is not allowing presence of any supervisory body. To mention few of human rights abuse and Illegal deprivation of freedom, Giga Otkhozoria was killed with pistol in the border of occupied territories Georgian officials even have video how he was shot, however no person was arrested for the crime. Archil Tatunashvili was kidnapped and tortured in the occupied part of Georgia again responsible person for the crime was not punished, even though expertise of both sides showed that he was tortured. European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia is the only unarmed peacekeeping mission that is operating in occupied territories however, they can’t fully enter the occupied territories they can only control the border lines to avoid further increase of tension. It should be emphasized that Gali which is one of the Abkhazian districts is very problematic place for ethnic Georgians, even though most inhabitants are Georgians nearly 35000, Russian soldiers are putting pressure on them on daily basis. Also, same can be declared about Tskhinvali, which is city in South Ossetia, it can be stated that it is agricultural center of South Ossetia, however most agricultural work is done by Georgians. Partially they do benefit from these lands however cost is very high, because they are always facing the risk of arrest and imprisonment or kidnap. For example, Tskhinvali and Gali inhabitants are not allowed to have Georgian passports and learn in Georgian even though these people do want to educate themselves in Georgian. Another important problem is that people can’t go to graveyards of their relatives because they are not allowed to do so. It is important to mention Geneva International Talks co-chaired by Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), is playing very important mediatory role when tension increases however it’s not enough because there is no actual result or political agreement achieved during Geneva talks. Even though, Russia took responsibility and signed the document of deployment troops in the position where it was till 2008 Russia-Georgian war, they still do not fulfill the commitment and
continue process of crawling occupation, meaning they move so called border fences on weekly basis thus further occupy the Georgian territories. It also should be mentioned that Georgia is one of the first biggest contributors in NATO’s Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan. Also, in 2019 Secretary General of NATO Jens Stoltenberg will visit Georgia to attend NATO Georgia trainings taking place in Tbilisi and show full support to country and its path to integration. In concern to NATO Ambassador declared that Georgia doesn’t need them for offensive aim, the main goal for Georgia is to have peaceful development and live in stable and calm environment. NATO will not be used against any other nation or state Georgia only needs integration for peaceful coexistence. Georgia is willing to normalize relations with Russia however one-sided desire is not enough it has to be mutual to solve conflict peacefully (Gogsadze, 2019).
The role of Russia is crucial when talking about internal and external factors of political development of Ukraine and Georgia. Russia was always interested in having Georgia and Ukraine as a part of its sphere of interest and under its influence. Both countries seek in Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO. However, Russia can’t let expansion of NATO especially when it concerns to neighboring countries, as a result in 2008 Russia intervened in Georgia and in 2014 annexation of Crimea took place. Both countries declared that European and Euro Atlantic integration is their aim, when states have clear goal it means that they intend to adopt European values and principles. Key roles to the transition process where: Orange revolution and Euromaidan processes that expressed people’s desire and willingness to protect their European future and to be part of the European civilization and community. It was the free choice of government and leaders of Ukraine together with population. Obstacles in the way of democratization and integration were strong Russian influence, intervention in domestic politics, and pro-Russian politicians who had pro-Russian attitude and were against integration. Viktor Yanukovych, the fourth president of Ukraine refused to sign Association Agreement with European Union, as a result Euromaidan protests started in 2014. Today Ukraine still have pro-Russian politicians and strong Russian propaganda working inside the country using freedom of expression with the help of Russian TV channels. But war of fake news is challenge not only for Ukraine but also for the Europe and rest of the world. But Ukraine is in more dangerous position because together with Russian propaganda military aggression is further complicating internal affairs of Ukraine. Situation concerning human rights in Ukraine: Ukraine could implement principle of freedom and create anti-corruption bodies necessary to fight and prevent corruption. Ukraine also could go on the agenda of economic reforms. Furthermore, it is very important that support of population is much higher towards European and Euro Atlantic integration after 5 years of war than it was in 2014. Orange revolution was people’s desire to give power and choose the party which they want, so basically governing party that was present for that time was not legitimate enough, it did not fully express people’s aspiration. People who were standing in the street were defending European values such as, freedom of speech and expression. Ukrainian People realized that civil society has crucial role in decision making process. One part of Association agreement signed and ratified in 2017 is free trade zone that closely tied Ukraine and EU with each other, current Ukrainian economy is oriented to the West more than it was ever
before. To talk about internal similarities between Ukraine and Georgia we can mention Russian aggression that is present in both countries and fight against occupation. In both situations in dialogue with the West, Russia is trying to emphasize that first we should be under Russian influence and then have other partners. Sanctions, which are imposed to Russia because of the military aggression in Ukraine and Georgia can be mentioned as one of the external factors that has positive impact on relations of two countries with Europe. It is very important to mention that both countries are oriented on European and Euro Atlantic integration and population of Ukraine and Georgia are ready to defend their choices and express full support in the integration process. Western influence on Georgia and Ukraine is positive in overall, however it was big mistake that Ukraine and Georgia in 2008 Bucharest summit did not received Membership Action Plan (MAP). Also, it is very important to understand that Ukraine and Georgia are not problem but solution, and if West would like to have a strong European Union, strong alliance, they should include Georgia and Ukraine in EU and NATO. Furthermore, it has very positive effect on countries, that there are more and more politicians in the West who understand that these two countries are solutions and can influence the peacekeeping and peacebuilding process in the world. The future of Georgian and Ukrainian integration depends on MAP, which is implemented through National Annual Programs that countries are already implementing from 2008, therefore countries are already going on the path of preparation. Lot of discussions were taking place concerning necessity of MAP for Georgia and Ukraine, because it is a fact that countries are already implementing these programs. As a result, it can be a formal decision to give MAP, because partially programs are implemented. The thought that Russian aggression will increase in case of granting MAP to these 2 countries is the reason why in 2008 Bucharest summit countries got rejected from Membership Action Plan. It is in the interest of Russia to maintain the conflict in the countries just to say that these two countries can’t become members of NATO. But taking Russian threat into consideration and not acting because of that is wrong, because Russia won’t go in open conflict with NATO and vice versa, it will be very similar to situation with Cyprus in the European Union, meaning until Ukraine and Georgia won’t regain control over occupied territories these territories will stay out of membership. Occupied territories are under strong influence of Russian propaganda so if true information was accessible in occupied territories it would help to defuse tension among people, but of course it is very hard and long process to explain that they are victims of propaganda (Nepov, 2019).
5.1 Orange Revolution

Most important internal factors that changed political course of Ukraine and started the transition process of country was Orange Revolution. Leonid Kuchma, the 2nd president of independent Ukraine in 2000’s tried to curb the independence of Rada (Ukrainian parliament) by offering a referendum, the aim was to split the legislative body into two chambers. Rada blocked the implementation even though, majority of Ukrainians voted for Kuchma’s reform. The Orange Revolution of 2004 was a result of readjusting balance and making Ukraine parliamentary-presidential republic. While the president maintained significant influence and power, especially in diplomatic and security spheres, the leading coalition in the Rada had control over the Cabinet of Ministers and thus a bulk of executive branch competencies (Minakov, Rojansky, 2018).

In 2004, Ukraine stood at crossroads between authoritarianism and democracy after 10 years of transition. Key factor for democratic development of Ukraine was presidential elections. The Key presidential candidates were, Viktor Yushchenko, self-nominated, Viktor Yanukovych, Party of Regions, Oleksandr Moroz, Socialist Party of Ukraine, and Leonid Kuchma, Communist party. Foreign observers predicted that 2004, Ukrainian elections would be dirtiest and hardest in the country’s independent history. President Leonid Kuchma, in 2000 tried to extend his power, but he was stopped by Ukrainian parliament (Verkhovna Rada). In 2003, he tried to prolong his 2nd presidential term to 2006, however due to growing internal tension and criticism he could not lengthen his presidency. Kuchma introduced new election law in 2004, and later proposed constitutional reform package that would have changed country from presidential to parliamentary governing system, parliamentary democracy. Under Kuchma administration democratic development and fair elections were under threat, however after manipulated 2nd ballot on November 21, 2004, population started to protest election results in the streets, because of sudden leading of Leonid Kuchma. Number of observers reported systematic and massive irregularities, clearly indicating that elections were falsified. As a result, street demonstrations took place all around Ukraine. The attempt of poisoning 3rd president of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko was luckily unsuccessful, on a contrary he became charismatic, fearless leader. President Yushchenko was the representor of Western values and principles, he supported the renewal of free market structures and liberal democracy in Ukraine. On the 2nd ballot of 2004 elections Viktor Yushchenko became 3rd president of Ukraine, shortly after his presidency with
majority support of parliament, he appointed radical reformer Yuliya Timoshenko as Prime Minister of Ukraine (Kurth, Kempe, 2005).

5.2 Ukrainian relations with European Union and North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Ukrainian integration in the European Union is one of the most important external factors that influence political development of Ukraine. On July 2, 1993, in Decree of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine showed its political and social will and emphasized the main foreign policy directions of Ukraine. The document noted that in the long run foreign policy aim of the Ukraine is its membership in the European Community, if integration does not harm national interests of Ukraine. First legal document Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between Ukraine and EU was signed on 1994 and entered into force in 1998. The agreement was for the beginning of bilateral dialogue between EU and Ukraine on sectoral and political levels, simplified trade regime and relations between two sides based on the World Trade Organization (WTO) and General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade principles. Furthermore, agreement defined the adaptation priorities of Ukrainian legislation to the standards and norms of the European Community in some sectors of the Ukrainian economy. Within the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement framework the following cooperation priorities were identified between two sides: Justice and home affairs, environmental protection, the approximation of Ukrainian legislation to the legislation of the European Union, trade and investment, energy, space and technology, cooperation in science, cross-border cooperation and transport sphere. Later course of Ukraine on its path to European integration was developed and confirmed in the Strategy of Ukraine’s integration in the EU, which was officially adopted by the Decree of the President of Ukraine in June 1998. Also, Decree identified main priorities and preferences of executive authorities until 2007, during which the mandatory preconditions have been formed for Ukraine’s membership in the European Union. In 2005, during the meeting of Cooperation Council, parties approved and developed the EU-Ukraine Action Plan (bilateral political document). Document gave opportunity to expand significantly, bilateral cooperation between two sides with a view to provide a new impulse to bilateral relations and to take into consideration the new cooperation conditions, notably in the context of the 2004, EU enlargement wave. The Action Plan aimed to set list of precise commitments for Ukraine to reinforce democratic institutions, to develop cooperation, to fight against corruption structural economic reforms with the EU in sectoral areas. Within Action Plan period, key achievements in the development of relations were:
• Within the framework of the anti-dumping EU law status, granting a market economy to Ukraine.
• Granting the right to adhere to EU positions and foreign policy statements.
• Increase of European Investment Bank’s financing.
• Agreement on readmission of individuals.
• Conclusion of the Agreement on the simplification of the issuance of visas.

(Poshedin, Chulaievska, 2017).

In 2008, September, at Paris Summit, EU and Ukraine attained political agreement on the conclusion of a forthcoming agreement in the framework of the Association Agreement, to be built on the principles of economic integration and political association. On December 15, 2011, during Ukraine-EU 15th Summit in Kyiv, the finalization of negotiations on the future Association Agreement was declared. On March 30th, 2012 the head of the negotiating teams of EU and the Ukraine initialized the text of the future Agreement. Association Agreement was signed in 2014. The economic part was signed on 27th of June and political part was signed on 21st of March 2014. Before signing the Association Agreement 2013-2014, tragic events took place which were known as Euromaidan, during which the Ukrainian people defended their will and European aspirations. Cooperation in the economic sphere, provided by Association Agreement, is not confined to certain sectors or industries of the economy, it is associated with various spheres of public life. Experts believe that it will attract best regulation reforms and practices in such areas as, education, healthcare, society information, culture, development of physical culture and sports, together with the direct development of the relevant sectors and industries of the economy. Without different types of financial aid provided by EU, it would be impossible to recover from the economic crisis and properly implement the Association Agreement. European Commission in 2014, proposed a series of measures aimed at stabilizing financial and economic situation in Ukraine and to encourage economic and political reform. In 2015, financial aid package amounting 1.8 billion Euro was given to country (Poshedin, Chulaievska, 2017).

Relations between North Atlantic Alliance and Kiev have been lacking dynamism and substance in recent years. Responsibility for the lack of relation are shared by both sides. Even though, in Bucharest summit of April, 2008, NATO continued its policy of open door, it
abstained from following that option because of the individual members demand, especially
germany and France and because of considering Russian political interests. On the one hand, in
2008 summit NATO refrained to make any step forward towards Ukraine and refused to give
Membership Action Plan (MAP). On the other hand, in 2010, after Viktor Yanukovych took
office, officially renounced accession plans of Ukraine and replaced them with non-alignment
policy. Since then, relationship among two sides have been downgraded to a technical level,
based on the Charter signed by Kiev and NATO in 1997, concerning Distinctive Partnership. In
the Ukraine-NATO commission the Charter forms the foundation for concrete cooperation and
collaboration. In recent years partnership involved two major areas: Firstly, Ukrainian
participation to crisis management operations of NATO, in Kosovo and Afghanistan, which
aimed to expand and deepen interoperability among NATO and Ukrainian forces. Secondly,
reform security sector of Ukraine to raise it up to Western standards. On April 1, 2014, NATO
foreign ministers agreed to continue the technical cooperation policy, below the membership
level. They reiterated their obligation to Ukraine and announced long-term and immediate
measures in order to reinforce Ukrainian security and ability of self-protection. Even though,
existing partnership program was cited by foreign ministers, they failed to mention the open door
policy established in 2008. The measures agreed on meeting are also rather uncertain: NATO
plans to provide support to the reform of the Ukrainian armed forces, and experts of NATO
traveled to Kiev in April in order to assess critical infrastructure and tactical military equipment.
However, despite Kiev expectations, NATO excluded direct military support such as, arms
delivery. Through this cautious way of relations, members of NATO hope to support and
demonstrate prompt solidarity to Ukraine without further Russian aggression and pretext for
escalation, in order to evade disrupting diplomatic efforts, to resolve or suspend the crisis. Two
central tenets that have guided Western security policy with respect to Russia and Ukraine have
been negated or challenged by the Russian annexation of Crimea, particularly: firstly, the
anchoring of neutrality in Ukrainian law in 2010 suffice to assure country’s territorial integrity
and political sovereignty and the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. Secondly, abstaining from
pursuing Ukrainian membership, NATO safeguard’s Russia’s cooperation in questions of Euro-
Atlantic space in particular and international security in general. The question concerning pillars
of NATO’s future Ukraine policy will be built upon still remains open. There are four thoughts
that should guide decision-making process of Ukrainian integration in NATO:
The primacy of self-determination – Ukrainian population have right to freely choose its security orientation and political course. Western governments work to come to an agreement with Russia concerning territorial and ethnic conflict in Eastern Ukraine, this must not be accepted or permitted to establish a situation where a great powers exclude or agree alliance options and as a result have Ukrainians on its sphere of influence.

Finnish model – Some US academics have formed the idea to make Ukraine neutral as Finland is. Neutrality can be anchored in constitution or by treaty (depends on a proposal). Given status, would take account Russian interests and concerns and might have stabilising and deescalating effect.

Full NATO membership: conserve status quo – While it might be alluring to respond to Russia’s behavior in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine by forcing or reviving the option of full membership for Ukraine, there can be doubts as to whether the NATO member states possess the military capacity and political will to honor the mutual defence clause.

Export stability – There is a threat of Ukraine losing more territory to Russia through annexation or secession, the state monopoly of armed force disbanding even further, or the country might face civil war. Similar scenarios would have direct security implications for four NATO members (Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Poland). Thus, the main task of the alliance will be to reassure the Eastern members that the NATO’s security promises remain valid, while exporting security and stability to its Eastern periphery. The short-term objective of Ukraine together with NATO is to seek political and institutional arrangements, to contain intra-Ukrainian dispute among (Ethnic Russian living in Ukraine and Ukrainians) and defuse tension among Moscow and Kiev as soon as possible. The long-term goal in NATO-Ukraine relations should be, to offer Ukraine a steady security anchoring (Kaim, 2014).

5.3 Euromaidan and Annexation of Crimean Peninsula

Euromaidan was one of the most important internal factors that influenced political development and transition of Ukraine from authoritarian regime to democracy. Increased self-identification as Ukrainian, enhanced solidarity with compatriots, increased people’s confidence and desire to change the country for better, increased readiness to work or defend Ukraine, these changes and willingness of Ukrainian people for better life are the results of Euromaidan protests of Ukraine that took place in 2013. Lately protests resulted the escape of former Viktor
Yanukovich, annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the war in Donbas. Some claim that primary result of war and Euromaidan was consolidation of national identity, while others argue that desire for democratic change and social mobilization against authoritarian regime was the cause of Euromaidan and subsequently Russian aggression and annexation of Crimea. For instance, former journalist and current politician Mustafa Nayyem, claimed that the most important result of the Euromaidan was the fear of society coming from political class, while the result of war was a conscious national identification, unprecedented rise of patriotic feelings together with other positive changes. While opinion of Euromaidan participants are that consolidation and national transformation started on the Euromaidan itself, in readiness to protect common cause and defend other people fighting for it (Kulyk, 2016).

Some claim that Yanukovych’s refusal to sign Association Agreement with European Union in 2013, was the result of Euromaidan. Euromaidan process had significant importance in context of Ukrainian political transition. Size of the protest movement, support of public for European integration, continued police brutality are not the only reasons for the Yanukovych’s presidency implosion. Inadequate government response, together with political decision of refusing signing of Association Agreement, caused the protest movement and mass unrest. Inner circle of Ukrainian president raised an environment of Soviet authoritarianism, protestors went against and challenged the regime. Institutional structure of Yanukovych’s regime was like countries transitioning from authoritarian regime. Informal advisors small circle competing among each other for president’s favor. Given structure limited president’s ability to appropriately assess information and weakened the link between senior decision makers and mid-level government personnel. Yanukovych’s regime failed to make necessary concessions and properly evaluate the nature of protests and set the priorities in favor of country (Peisakhin, 2015).

5.4 Conclusion

To sum up the main aim of the paper is to discuss internal and external factors on the path of political development of Georgia and Ukraine. Based on the research question, hypothesis: The core values of Western countries are crucially important for political development of Ukraine and Georgia, argue that without Western values and principles countries would have same economic and political conditions. The increase of economic interest in 1999, Baku-Tbilisi-
Ceyhan pipeline, raised security level and promoted stability in the country. Georgia and Ukraine, face similar challenges, meaning Russian aggression. Both countries made important step forward towards democratization and Westernization in 2003, Georgia, Rose Revolution and 2004, Ukraine, Orange Revolution. It should be mentioned that even though, after the Rose revolution government of Saakashvili had very good results in fighting against corruption and strengthening institutions, after couple of years United National Movement with the head of Saakashvili, transformed into leaders who were using power and terrorizing their own citizens. In case of Georgia it was easier to transform and orient country on Western values and principles because size of Georgia is relatively small. Because of Saakashvili’s aggressive governance and behavior, citizens of Georgia start to protest, against United National Movement, as a result country faced historical event, 2012 elections. 2012 elections were 1st event when government change took place with elections. Relations with NATO and EU showed its positive results and country signed Association Agreement with EU in 2014. Association Agreement set up deep and comprehensive free trade area, which promoted economic development of Georgia and opened new market for country.

Ukrainian path towards West is longer because of its relatively bigger size, the turning point was 2013 Euromaidan processes. Till present days Ukraine is facing serious problems in fighting against corruption, however the people’s choice and will to get close to European values and principles are promising and will have positive influence on country. Unfortunately, both countries have faced Russian aggression, for Georgia it was 2008, for Ukraine it was 2014. Ambassadors of Georgia and Ukraine in their interview clearly state that, 2008 Bucharest Summit decision, to refuse to give Membership Action Plan to Ukraine and Georgia was green light for Putin’s aggression and result of 2014 Ukrainian war. On its path towards European integration Ukraine also signed Association Agreement in 2014 and got one step closer towards Europe. The most important internal factor on its path to political development for Ukraine was the Euromaidan processes, when society clearly showed its desire to get close to Europe and follow European values and principles. As most important external factor that had influence on countries political development was the decision to get close to West and become strategic partner of Western countries. As it was mentioned in interview of Ukrainian Ambassador, Ukraine and Georgia are solutions for establishing peace in Caucasus region and promoting Western values in the region. To conclude I would like to mention that core Western values and
principles promoted countries political and economic development. Unfortunately, countries had no alternative than to distance themselves from Russia, because for decades both states were under political and economic influence of Russia that caused demolition of institutions and extreme poverty in the countries. Furthermore, after economic diversification, Georgia could decrease corruption level and poverty importantly from 2003, till 2016. In case of Ukraine country still hardly controls corruption and face serious economic problems because of Crimean annexation of 2014 and increased level of criminal activities and corruption.
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