HUNGARIAN MIGRANTS

IN THE

UNITED KINGDOM

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A2 - Accession 2 countries: the countries which joined the EU in 2007, exactly Bulgaria and Romania.

A8 – Accession 8 countries: the countries which joined the EU in 2004, exactly Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and, Slovenia.

EEA – European Economic Area.

Introduction

While we are not alone with the phenomenon in Central and Eastern Europe, the news about Hungarian emigration rates are alarming, it is possible that our country lives out one of the greatest emigration waves in its history. The data of emigrated Hungarians are between 200,000 and 500,000 – the highest number is from the economic ministry, although a smaller amount is more feasible according to the EU data.¹ It is told, also, that London has become the second largest Hungarian city. The 2011 British data don’t back this statement, mentioning only about 50,000 Hungarians living in the UK,² however, we cannot rule out the possibility that the process speeds up and remains permanent. On the other hand, it is further a frequently told claim that the British society is tired of the exodus inflowing Britain, and Her Majesty’s government is about to stop or at least strictly limit it. Therefore, the first research question I searched the answer for is whether the emigrant Hungarians in the United Kingdom probably return to Hungary or not. The question is so recent that the Hungarian Academy of Sciences itself started a survey in April 2014 to analyse the motivations behind the outflow toward the UK.³ My second question is if the British government is really intending to and has effective policy assets to limit Central Eastern European migration.

My thesis consists of six parts. In the first one, I examine the theory of international migration to get a general picture about the working of migration, and its impacts on the host country, and the policy toolkit of governments to influence or even stop it. The second part contains the changing immigration and integration policy of the 20th and 21st century UK and tries to put it into historical context to let the greater policy framework of treating the issue show itself, both the sides of border control and integration. The following chapters try to promote

¹ Szigel Gábor (2013)
² Kádár Piroska (2013)
³ HVG.hu (2014)
the understanding of what immigration means for the British society. The third part shows the characteristics of the current immigrant population, preferably focusing on Central Eastern European migrants, when particular data are available. In this chapter I don’t specify the Hungarian data, because in the eyes of Britons our migrants are just one little spring of the European exodus, not being even in the top ten nationals in numbers. In the fourth part, I exhibit the British public opinion on immigration issue and try to look behind the surface of general resentment. The fifth part is about the empirically underpinned opinion of the British scientific community, on which basis the policy of present government rests on, at least, in theory. The last part, coming before the conclusion, contains the results of my modest home survey, analysing the motivations behind staying or returning.

1. The Theory of International Migration

This chapter serves as the summary of the most important theories of international migration. The presentation of the authors in subchapters 1.2. and 1.3. is based on Endre Sík’s handbook ’A migráció szociológiája’ (2012).

1.1. Forms of International Migration

In the followings the five fundamental forms of international migration will be listed. Of course, in the reality the different kinds overlap one another, combinations exist.

1. International migration of the highly qualified, trained and most creative intellectual manpower. It is called frequently “brain-drain”.
2. Usually permanent resettlement of untrained, undereducated or low skilled workers and their families into a new country.
3. “Butterfly” migration: intermittently entering employment in foreign countries with temporary permission and returning after the date of completion of contract.
4. Illegal settle and employment. It depends on the immigration law of the host country and the steps (and the effectiveness of steps) of authorities to detect and handle illegal migration.
5. Asylum-seeking people who leave their home country temporarily or permanently.

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4 Szentes Tamás (1999)
1.2. The Initiation of International Migration

As there are different forms, the springs also differ from one another. Economical reasons are sightly strong, even if one sees the flow of guest workers, legal or illegal permanent migrants or the phenomenon of “brain-drain”, but both the most successful and the most prostrate social layers can have non-economic reasons to migrate. Just a few examples, maybe the most common ones:

1. Seeking for physical security: fleeing from political, ethnic, ideological or religious persecution, from extortion of the mafia or for fear of falling prey of local criminals, from plagues, famine, natural disasters, terrorism, war or civil war.
2. Seeking for better life: more affable climate, less pollution, better schools for children, better health care system, less crime, more political and civil rights.
3. Search for identity: self-realization and finding a career fitting more to personal abilities, for example, some cultures oppose emancipation of women, or it is simple almost impossible to research biology of the Amasonas outside the Amasonas-area.
4. Reunion or even getting far from the original family.
5. Adventure-seeking: travelling landscapes, experiencing other societies and cultures.

1.2.1. Push and Pull Forces

From the economical perspective of migration reasons literature shares the idea first described by E. G. Ravenstein, a German cartographer and statistician, which suggests migration can be explained by the combination and impacts of “pushing” forces of home territory and “pulling” forces of host territory. Differences between the circumstances of sending country and the host country have a motivating effect on people being on the point of emigration. According to Ravenstein, the economic reasons are primary over all other ones: better wages and more working opportunities attract immigrants, and migration is a natural consequence of the development of industry, trade and transportation. He claimed, also, that migration between two points is inversely proportional to the distance of the two points, and he expected migrants to prefer big cities with industrial or trade centers. He imagined the migration like a flow of a liquid: an outflow of manpower from an area would induce inflow of workers from a less developed area.

Of course we should adapt the ideas of Ravenstein to the current circumstances. For example, geographical gradation of moving which he also claimed, is valid only with strong bonds: if one has the possibility to travel by car (even by hitchhiking) or airplane, the world is almost

5 Ibid.
open for him or her. Because of this fact, distance between two points imply less the physical distance but the hardness of moving – language and cultural differences, strictness of immigration law, etc.\textsuperscript{6}

\textbf{1.2.2. Neoclassical Macroeconomic Migration Theory\textsuperscript{7}}

(Todaro, 1976)

It was built also on Ravenstein’s theory as it claims migration to depend on the differences of labour demand and supply in different areas. In a territory where the supply of capital is relatively high compared to supply of labour, wages should be higher than in another territory where manpower is plenty, but workplaces are rare due to relatively low supply of capital. Due to the wage differences, labourers of a capital-poor area migrate to a capital-rich one until the increase of later one’s labour supply reaches a level when real wages of the two areas become equal. I have collected the main arguments and consequences into bullet points to let the gentle reader compare easier the differences of economic based theories:

1. Income-differences are behind the migration movement.
2. If there are no differences in incomes, migration disappears.
3. Migration primarily affects labour market, another kind of markets sense only minor effects.
4. Migration of highly educated manpower is a special form of migration because it can even move in reverse to the low educated workforce, for instance if foreign investment requires trained management or technical specialists who are rare in the host country.

\textbf{1.2.3. Microeconomic Theory}

(Sjaastad, 1962; Todaro, 1969, 1976; Todaro and Maruszko, 1987)

The Micro theory sees individual migrants as “human capital investors”. People seek the best return of their skills and abilities, so they choose places to live and work where their expected wage and living standard are the highest – and it is a shared idea together with the Macro theory. The difference is that, in the world of Micro theory, people do calculations on the costs of moving (language learning, loss of original social relationships, living costs during initial period, etc.), compare this with expected gains, and correct their calculations with the potential risks (not finding proper job, falling back in career ladder). Illegal migrants have an

\textsuperscript{6} Hárs Ágnes (2002)
\textsuperscript{7} Sik Endre (2012)
added risk of being unveiled in front of the authority and being expelled. The consequence of this difference in complexity is serious:

1. Migration depends also on differences of unemployment rates, not solely on income differences.
2. Those human qualities that can be better utilized in the destination area than in the sending one increase the chance of migration.
3. Technologies like airplane, unique attributes like tolerance of loneliness or cultural shock decrease the cost of moving and/or increase the revenue of migration.
4. Because of the second and third points, individuals living in the same country may have absolutely different migration potential.
5. The aggregated migration movement is equal to the sum of individual migration decisions, based on individual cost-benefit calculations.

1.2.4. The “New Economics of Migration”
(Taylor, 1986 and Stark, 1991)

It declares migration, primarily, is not an individual, but a family or household decision, who are interested not only in maximizing income but decreasing risks to the family budget. If family members working at home territory lose their jobs, or their income suffers from a local recession, the family can expect emigrant members’ financial support due to their higher income or their independence from home economic conditions.

This theory draws attention to the difference, too, that one unit of increase in income counts for people with different socioeconomic background. Households have reference groups whose living standard is the base of comparison to their own, so not only changes in their own living standard would impact their sense of satisfaction, but, for example a rise in the reference households’ average bench can cause feeling of deprivation and fear of societal slip down. However, even a reference group can be replaced: after the system changing there was a shift in common thought of the economic position of Hungary as we became citizens of an “underdeveloped Western country” instead of a “developed Eastern country”. Spread of radio and television had also an invaluable effect on what people count as references. So:

1. Migration is generally based on group decision.
2. Migration is not necessary in the case of existing income differences, but can happen even without them.
3. Since migration can be the consequence of a group’s desire of standing on multiple feet, even economic development of home region may encourage migration activity to seek for opportunities to get over tight home supply of capital or share risks.

4. The same difference in current and possible incomes impact differently the migration potential of people with different socioeconomic background.

1.2.5. Dual Labour Market Theory
(Piore, 1979)

Theories above studied the issue from the side of migrants, however, one can find interesting reasons on the side of host countries. M. J. Piore’s dual labour market theory suggests that migration deeply depends on the nature of labour-demand of developed industrial societies, which essentially need immigrant workforce, and this fact is more important in its effects than the pushing forces of home countries. The theory draws attention to three features of labour markets of the core capitalist countries:

Structural inflation. The distribution of incomes can’t be derived from the supply and demand of labour solely as they represent societal status (think of reference groups mentioned above). Because of this, rising wage levels in a kind of job of low prestige to attract unskilled workers would induce a demand for wage rising among higher prestige employees. Since a whole set of informal social expectations, unwritten rules, and institutional mechanisms defend this interest, an employer can’t change the wage-hierarchy without coming up against the resistance of trade union or even the own rules of the firm/institution. For example, if the wage of factory hands in a plant starts rising and it reaches the level of skilled workmen, their wage should be risen also, however it endangers the position of brigade leader, so he may press for a rise – and so on. Since attracting low skilled workers from the home market by higher wages may result so big increase in the overall wage which wouldn’t worth, employing cheap immigrant workers is a prudent solution.

Motivational aspects. Most of people don’t work for income only, but they require prestige, appreciation, and frequently opportunity to step forward in societal hierarchy. However every pyramid of hierarchy has a bottom, and since there must be always a bottom, a lot of people live without the hope of stepping ahead. For them preserving status is not enough motivation to do for the best interest of the company, hence the management have to use special incentives to achieve better performance. However the immigrants, especially in their early residence in the host country, are more modest than natives. They usually come to the developed countries to earn money for their home life (feeding a family, building a house,
paying tuition fee or just increase home living standard) and a wage which is counted low in a developed country, in absolute value, can be counted generous in a less developed one. It is usual that, from their perspective, occupying a low prestige job abroad is a big footstep, and they win the appreciation of their original environment. Even if they are permanent migrants, in the first years their reference group is tied to the home conditions, and their living standard increased due to the country shifts.

**Dual economy.** The economy can be divided into capital- and labour-intensive sectors. In the capital-intensive one, employees are usually specially trained experts who are costly to replace (technology-specific human capital investment) and, thus, even to fire, because their strong labour market position let them to be well-organized, and maintain privileges like getting a golden handshake and unemployment benefit from the corporation. The labour-intensive sector use low skilled workers, who are just variable costs for the company. Since their number on the market is high, their bargain position is weak, consequently they have no special rights after being fired. However, if native citizens are employed in this sector, the politicians sometimes give them a helping hand by enstrenghtening the rights of employees. On the other hand guest workers have no voting right, so employers are more able to maintain their advantage over them.

Although the dual labour market theory is not in conflict with the neoclassical ones, its consequences are very different:

1. In the core capitalist countries, immigration is generated primarily by the labour demand: it is induced by recruitment on the part of employers or on the part of government in reaction to the require of the employers.
2. Since the immigration depends on the structural needs of economy, international wage differences are neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for labor migration to occur.
3. Low-level wages in host countries do not necessarily arise if the supply of immigrant workers decreases, because they are held down by social conventions and are not free to respond to changes in labour supply and demand.
4. On the other hand low-level wages may fall as a result of an increase in the supply of immigrant workers, since immigrants are counted outsiders, and the social and institutional mechanisms that prevent low-level wages from rising do not prevent them from falling.
1.2.6. Empirical Responses to Neoclassical and Dual Labour Market Theories

Of course, the real world of labour market is far more complex than neoclassical or alternative models: the immigration effect on wages and employment depends on the concrete structure of the industry, the bargaining position of employees and employers, the laws, and so on. For an illustration, let me quote here two citations from a study examining the effect of the flow of Eastern European migrants on Austrian and German markets after the system changing. Underlinings mine.

Austria:

“A 1% increase in the foreigner share in industry employment reduces domestic employment by 0.13%. This means that increasing immigration led almost to a complete displacement of native workers in the concerned industries, with the highest effects in high immigration industries. (…) Wages react negatively to increased immigration with an elasticity of 0.16. The wagedepressing effects are lower in already low-wage industries and insignificant in industries with high-import as well as immigration shares. This might be explained by a higher tendency for binding minimum wages in low-wage industries. Other explanations would refer to a higher potential of rent-reductions in high-wage and often more unionized industries.”

Germany:

“The simple labour market model would suggest that more foreigners should depress wages (if migrants are substitutes to natives), and increase total employment while native employment should remain constant (if markets are flexible). In the findings reported here, wages do not decline, at best they are increasing (especially if related to the inflow of East Europeans). Total employment is increasing, although mainly due to East Europeans. Native employment is somewhat (and negatively) affected by foreigners in general, but positively by East Europeans. This all suggests that East Europeans and German workers are complements, and that the overall effect of migrants on the German labor market is unproblematic.”

As we see, neither Austria nor Germany did behave to fit exactly the mentioned theories. At least in Austria wages were decreasing, as expected by both theories, excluding the industries with highest share of immigrants, however Germany is an absolute counterexample. What I

would like to point at is that theories show us different worlds, wider our scope of view, but we should examine whether our subject of examination suits to the model or not: we shouldn’t expect “developed world”, on general, behaving like this or that.

1.2.7. World System Theory
(Wallenstein, 1974)

Finally, let me introduce a relevant part of a sociological economic theory built on the work of Wallenstein, who studied the structure of world markets as the main source of migration. According to the world system theory, there are material and ideological links between the core capitalist and peripheral countries. On one hand material links represent logistical and organizational connections which are aimed to facilitate the movement of goods, information and capital, but also promote the movement of people by reducing the costs of movement along international pathways. On the other hand the process of economic globalization creates cultural links between developed countries and the periphery (cultural globalization), as cultural bonds are reinforced by mass communication and advertising campaigns directed from the core countries – this is called ideological linkage. Movies, television programs and the Internet transmit information about lifestyles and living standard of the developed world, and commercials spread their consumer habits within peripheral peoples. Ideological and material links interact with one another to channel international migration to particular core countries.

1.3. The Perpetuation of International Movement

The conditions that initiate international migration may be quite different from those that perpetuate or even speed it up.

1.3.1. Network Theory
(Hugo, 1981; Taylor, 1986; Massey and Garcia Espafia, 1987; Massey, 1990a, 1990b; Gurak and Caces, 1992)

Newcomer migrants, naturalized migrants, and natives in origin and host countries constitute an interpersonal network through ties of kinship, friendship, and fellowship of shared language and culture – this is called migrant network. The first migrants, travelling toward a particular country, have no social ties in the destination area, and they have to fight their way. However, after the first pioneers have succeeded, the potential risk and cost of migration are notably lower for friends and relatives left behind, because newcomers can utilize social ties to gain crucial information and help to find residence and employment. Once the number of
migrants reaches a level, the network becomes wide enough to reduce the cost and risk of movement and to increase the expected returns, which rises the likelihood of migration causing additional movement, and by the process the network further expands, and so on.

This theory argues that migration step by step alter the circumstances within the future migration decisions are made, increasing the likelihood that later decision makers will choose to migrate and, also, to choose that specific destination where a migration network of their fellowship once evolved. The main arguments in bullet points:

1. Once begun, international migration tends to expand step by step until migrant networks involved in the sending region all the people who wished to emigrate – then pool of potential migrants exhausts, and migration begins to slow.
2. The volume of migration flow between two countries is less strongly correlated to wage differences or employment rates than neoclassical theories expects, because the cost and risk of movement and, also, the potential reward is influenced by migrant networks.
3. Since international migration became institutionalized through the evolution of networks, it may become independent of the factors that originally incited the first migrants leave for.
4. As networks expand, the flow becomes less selective in socioeconomic terms (less special traits and skills are required to succeed) and more representative of the sending society, due to the fall of movement costs and risks.

1.3.2. Cumulative Causation

Migrational culture. (Piore, 1979; Massey, 1986; Reichert, 1982) Experiences in an advanced industrial society change the taste and motivations of migrants. Although migrants may begin their trip to earn money for some purposes, after living abroad, they learn new dimensions of social mobility, and taste of consumer goods, and a lifestyle that is difficult to attain at home, so once somebody has migrated, the odds of taking another trip will rise with every trip that has already taken. As the number of migrated members grow within a community, it may change the values and cultural perceptions in a way that increases the likelihood of future migration: we can say it creates the culture of international movement. At community level, migration becomes normal or even valued. For young adults, migration
becomes a rite of passage, a status symbol, and those who do not want to live abroad for a period of time are considered lazy or lacking enterprising spirit.\textsuperscript{10}

**The regional distribution of human capital.** (Myrdal, 1957; Greenwood, 1981, 1985; Greenwood, Hunt, and McDowell, 1987.) Initially the relatively well-educated, craftful, productive, and highly motivated people leave for (as pointed out a little bit earlier, migration later tends to become less selective), thus continuous emigration leads to the exhaustion of high added value human capital in sending region and its accumulation in host countries, enhancing the productivity advantage of more developed one at the expense of the less developed. This process leads to the expanded reproduction of the causes of migration, since over time the economic gap between the sending and receiving country becomes not tighter but wider. Even extensive educational programs in the sending areas reinforce this process of cumulative migration because raising the educational level of potential migrants increases potential returns of migration and gives people better tools to overcome the early hardships (eg. improving the language skills of the population, which constitute an essential part of competitiveness in international economy, ease people to join the most competitive regions but with leaving their sending country behind).

**Social labeling of jobs.** (Böhning, 1972; Piore, 1979) Once immigrants occupied particular jobs in significant number, those jobs become conventionally labeled as “immigrant jobs” and for native workers feel derogatory to fill them, reinforcing the structural demand for immigrants. Thus immigration may change the social status of certain jobs, but the difference comes from the presence of immigrants, not from the characteristics of the job.

Viewing international migration as a dynamically changing and cumulative process yields outcomes broadly consistent with those which were derived from the network theory:

1. International migration brought about changes in the sending and host countries, resulting a feedback mechanism of cumulative causation.
2. Once immigrants have entered a job in significant number, in many cases it will be difficult to recruit native workers into that type of occupation, because of social labeling of the job as “immigrant work”.

\textsuperscript{10} The author also experienced this pressure of family expectation as both of my parents spent their university years in Moscow.
1.3.3. Migration Systems Theory
(Fawcett, 1989; Zlotnik, 1992)

Although it is not a separate theory, as a generalization following from the foregoing theories (world systems, migrant networks, dual labour markets, and cumulative causation) there must be more or less stable and structured migration systems. These systems generally include one or a group of a core capitalist receiving countries, and a set of sending countries linked to one another by large flows of migrants. Countries within a system needn’t be geographically close since cultural, political and economic relationships are more important than physical ones, but as conditions change, new countries may join or older ones drop out, so that stability does not imply an absolute fix structure.

1.3.4. Social Capitals and its Types¹¹, ¹²

As it was mentioned, migration flows are organized into networks of which foundation is solidarity and which serve as social capital.

Social capital, according to Portes and Sensenbrenner, means “expectations for action within a collectivity that affect the economic goals and goal-seeking behavior of its members, even if these expectations are not oriented toward the economic sphere”.¹³ It is a very broad category, so it must be specified what those collective expectations are, what their sources are, and how do they affect economic behaviour. We distinguish four types of source of social capital regarding to the expectations:

**Reciprocal transactions.** (Georg Simmel, 1955 [1908]) Exchange theory represents social life and relationships of people as a set of transactions where favours, informations, appreciation, sexual satisfaction and other valued things are exchanged. Individuals are not expected to act for a higher sake of the community, but rather to follow strictly conceived self-interest, however, if the transactions are extraordinary fruitful compared to their other relationships, the participants become interested in deepening and preserving their tie. In line with this development the set of possible exchangeable values and the time elapsed between giving and receiving broaden, because each side banks upon that the other one fits to the rule of reciprocity, thus monitoring disappears, and taking care of the other’s interest becomes

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interior need. The difference between regular market transactions and these informal ones is that the currency of reciprocity is an “unwritten bill” backed by shared norms.

**Bounded solidarity.** “With the development of industry the proletariat not only increases in number; it becomes concentrated in greater masses, its strength grows, and it feels that strength more. The various interests and conditions of life within the ranks of the proletariat are more and more equalized. . . . The collisions between individual workmen and individual bourgeois take more and more the character of collisions between two classes” (Marx and Engels [1848] 1948, pp. 17-18). The Communist Manifesto shows a pure form how does, in theory, bounded solidarity evolve in a group of which members realize their common fate and sake. Unskilled workers had been in a desperately disadvantaged bargain situation in front of the capitalists due to their great number on labour market, however, when they started to organize, the individual market encounters between employer and employee became a group affair, leading to the advantage of subordinates due to their numbers. As Marx said the weapon of the working class is its internal solidarity based on common awareness of capitalist exploitation. As a source of social capital, bounded solidarity is a situational reaction of a group of people faced with common challenges, which, if strong enough, leads to observed norms of mutual support.

In the case of immigrants the writers claim a simple equation: the more strikingly contrasts a group in look or in cultural characteristics with the receiving population, the deeper the prejudice associated with these traits. The harder to exit from this situation, the stronger the sentiments of solidarity among group members, and, thus, the higher the value of social capital created by solidarity. Usually, if host society rejects efforts of immigrants to assimilate, the most plausible answer is the resuscitation of extant cultural norms and traditions and constitution of a micro-society, a cultural enclave. Lacking traditions may incite invention of new ones or adoption of habits of cultures considered fellow sufferer – a Hungarian example is the popularity of “American black ghetto culture” and especially “gangsta rap” among young urban Roma people. Romas feel community with the similarly musical and socially degraded black people of the USA. The need for belonging to somewhere is so strong that immigrants having no better option even adopt the stereotypes of the host society. Of course, the concrete content of solidarity and the form of answer to discrimination is vital, and two groups in the same situation but having different cultural backgrounds behave differently. The evolution of American Chinese community was a success story thanks to their cultural heritage: the society in San Francisco's Chinatown was organized similarly like in Guangdong Province, from where most immigrants came from.
Social organization was based on kinship groups that incorporated males who descended themselves from a common ancestor. Breadwinning and business were managed within this clan system in which shared collective responsibility and mutual loyalty were central values. As the opening chapter of Amy Tan's (1989) autobiographical novel tells, immigrant women organized a weekly club, the Joy Luck Club to ease the suffer from poverty and provide an atmosphere of community through delicious food and games. A generation later the club still ran, but its members discussed joint investments in the stock market while sitting around the mahjong table.

**Enforceable trust** is the trust we place in somebody of whom we do not necessarily believe to act on our behalf (intrinsic trust) but who we know is interested to live up to the trust we place in him or her, or even forced to do so. Referring to Lenin’s famous sentence “trust is good, but control is better”, enforceable trust is when members of a community can be sure about the observance of certain rules because the violation is revealed and sufficiently punished and/or rule-following is appreciated, even rewarded. The mechanism is similar to reciprocal transaction in the sense of following the strictly conceived self-interest, however, the force in front of the individual is not another individual but a more powerful system, so conformity is usually unilateral. Both intrinsic and enforceable trust makes it easier for people to work together, but only the former can create a sense of community and makes control unneeded.\(^{14}\)

As bounded solidarity, enforceable trust depends on the level of members being thrown back to the community. As a source of social capital, enforceable trust is directly proportional to the opportunities within the community for achieving social appreciation and economic success and inversely proportional to their accessibility outside the community. So, it is possible for a collective to maintain their norms due to the high level of enforceable trust based on solely threat of social exclusion (and not on the toolkit of mafia, for example), if being a member is enticing enough. On the other hand, the norms of a socially degraded and discriminated group can be easily broken if the group has few inner resources compared to what the outside world is able to sustain. A study of second-generation Haitian students in Miami high schools from the early nineties illustrates the latter statement:

“Like other immigrant groups before them, Haitian parents want their children to preserve their culture and language as they adapt to the American environment. However, Haitian parents lack the means to send their children to private schools, and, in any case, there is none

\(^{14}\) Hofstede, G. J. (2006)
in Miami that teach in French or foster Haitian culture. As a result, many Haitian-American students must attend the same high school that serves the inner-city area known as Liberty City [poor district – from the author]. There Haitian students are socialized in a different set of values, including the futility of trying to advance in life through education. They find their culture denigrated by native-born minority students who often poke fun at Haitians' accents and docility. Since immigrant parents have very little to show for their efforts, and the Haitian community as a whole is poor and politically weak, second-generation students have few incentives to stay within it, and many opt to melt into the mainstream. In this instance, “mainstream” does not mean the white society, but the impoverished black community of Liberty City. As this happens, social capital based on immigrant community networks is dissipated.  


**Value introjection** means the individual’s own conception on the expectations and evaluation of the community to him or her. It prompts individuals to give up personal interest and act on behalf of the community which behaviour will be a resource rewarded and appropriated by others. All of the previous mechanisms can be the foundation of value introjection, if the a community member ascertains of the utility of the community norms and these rules become interior for him or her.

1. **Tabulation: Types of social capital**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sources of social capital</th>
<th>Operating principle</th>
<th>Individual motivation for compliance</th>
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<td><strong>Enforceable trust</strong></td>
<td>Rewards and sanctions linked to group membership</td>
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<td><strong>Reciprocal transactions</strong></td>
<td>Norm of reciprocity in interactions</td>
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<td><strong>Bounded solidarity</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Value introjection</strong></td>
<td>Socialization into consensually established beliefs</td>
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</table>


15 Just not to speak of capo system of concentration camps, where even the possibility of higher chance to survive convinced Jewish captives to betray and torture their fellow-sufferers.
1.3.5. **Negative Effects of Social Capital**\(^{16}\)

Until this point social capital was something providing economic opportunities to particular people, and in this context, it functioned as a kind of capital: a factor of production used to help in producing income. However the term social capital refers to relations, norms and the enforceability of norms, and hereby it is able to serve redistribution instead of production, or even it can be a blocking factor of income generation.

The study on San Francisco’s Chinatown touches upon that the benedictions of the powerful association of the clans were at the cost of maintaining extremely rigid and conservative social norms and opposing any change. The clans controlled land and business opportunities in the Chinese enclave and they were willing to exclude anybody who adopted “progressive” stances. “They hold on to everything the way it was in China, in Kwangtung. Even though we're in a different society, a different era.” [Nee and Nee 1973, p. 190]

Social capital is able to demand more matter-of-fact things, also, than fitting to uplifted moral rules. Many societies hold the ancient model of long family, and thus the norms prescribe successful family members to take care of their kinsfolk. Supposedly this model worked fairly as a kind of social insurance when the base of the economy was primitive agriculture, because the yield depended on the weather and quality of land, however, in contrast with the land, human produced physical capital can be multiplied by investment, and feeding poor relatives consumes the economic surplus needed to do that.

And finally, social norms are able to affect directly against the efforts toward social elevation by exerting pressure to keep members of disadvantaged groups in the same situation as their fellow-sufferers. The root of this reaction is the fear that members succeeding to come up with a social outbreak would leave the community, and thus solidarity originating from common adversity would be undermined. If the morale of the community is built on the sense of oppression by current social order, solidarity also evaporates with the cease of this feeling.

Communities holding these attitudes may have their reasons of their own, but they can misfire if social pressure incite members to exit and cut ties to their withdrawing origin. According to a Hungarian joke, the Hell doesn’t need black bogies to restrain Hungarians due to their mutual efforts to pull back to the boiling kettle any who wants to crawl out. It can be a cause of emigration, too.

\(^{16}\) Massey, D. S. (1993)
1.4. Immigration Policy Aspects of the Migration Theories\textsuperscript{17}

Neoclassical Macro theory: the way to control the migration flow is influencing the labour market through policies that affect expected earnings in sending or receiving countries – eg. changing the likelihood of employment by promoting or sanctioning employment of immigrants, or increasing the income prospects through long-term development programs in the origin area.

Neoclassical Micro theory: migration is affected by the international differences of expected earnings and the costs of moving – compared to Macro theory, the government is able to control the costs, both psychological and material ones.

New economics: distribution of income influences international migration independently of the mean income, however, increasing mean income in migrant-sending areas may incite migration if relatively poor households do not share in the income gain.

Dual labour market: policies which introduce small changes in wages or employment rates do not certainly influence international migration, because immigrants satisfy a demand for manpower having dissimilar expectations and lacking the privileges of home employees. Influencing this demand requires reforms which generate changes in economic structure by eg. limiting the rights of trade unions or extending minimal wage to guest workers.

World system theory: international migration follows the “lines” of the global economic network, so from this perspective, it is seemingly a hard nut to control without limiting international trade.

Migrant networks: blocking network formation once migration flow have begun is difficult as networks lie basically outside government control, but it is easier to reinforce networks if needed by giving members of kin networks special rights of residence (like promoting family reunification), and government is also able to do it selectively.

Cumulative causation: if preconceptions have spread among native workers toward a certain kind of job because it is usually exercised by immigrants, then natives feel derogatory to do it, making it necessary to recruit more immigrants.

\textsuperscript{17} Massey, D. S. (1993)
1.5. Economic Impacts of Immigrants on the Host Society

Economic effects of immigration depend on and vary with:

- The migrants’ skills compared to the native population’s
- The capital structure of the host economy
- Whether and how the economy does adapt to immigration through change in capital, technology, the output mix, etc.
- The time factor, so what “long-run” does mean, what the speed of adaption is.

For the sake of simplicity, we distinguish between the impacts of low-skilled and high-skilled immigration, and between short-run and long-run effects.

Using a simple economic model, with classical macroeconomic assumptions, immigrants increase the labour supply and participate in the production of new goods and services. However, since they are paid less than the total value of these new products and services, domestic residents as a whole must gain. The source of these gains, on the production side, is that immigration allows domestic workers to be used more specialized and thus relatively more efficient way in division of labour, and on the consumption side, specialization (due to the increase of the size of the market) also yields a gain.

The effects of immigration, breaking the tie between domestic production and consumption with foreign elements, are analogous to those of external trade. This similarity suggests that, when trade across borders is relatively free, any immigration will affect the earnings of domestic workers less than it would do without trade.

Even if the economy as a whole benefits, however, there may be disadvantaged as well as advantaged ones among certain groups of domestic residents. The immigrants themselves certainly gain, otherwise they wouldn’t come, and along with them, the advantaged groups are the owners of productive factors that are complementary with the labor of immigrants: high-skilled domestic workers and capital owners. Consumers who buy goods and services produced by immigrants also benefit. The losers may be the less skilled domestic workers, but only those who compete with immigrant labour. In the short term, their wages will fall, or at least won’t rise in that extent without migration.

However, as immigration increases the returns to capital in the short run, investments are also likely to increase in the long run. The more investment in production assets increases the

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demand for manpower to operate the equipment, thus raises wages back and cutting back profit margins towards their original, pre-immigration rates. When the economy does this adjustment, immigration will have only marginal if any impact on the income of the domestic residents.

If full international capital mobility is assumed, to the degree that immigrants increase the specialization of domestic economy, creating industries and trades which wouldn’t exist without them, immigration can be beneficial for all domestic residents. So in the long run, aside from whether returns to scale rise or not, immigrants can affect rates of economic growth only to the extent that they differ from the native workforce. To have a positive effect on growth rates, the forthcoming groups of immigrants must persist their ability to further specialize the division of labour over each new generation, otherwise all that immigration does is augment the population and the scale of the economy, but it does not change the rate of growth of GDP per capita.

From the opposite point of view, the more extensive and structurally complex is an economy, the less effect immigration is likely to have on relative earnings or even on GDP per capita.

Monetary policy plays an important role in answering to any short-term shock of immigration on wages and/or unemployment.\(^\text{19}\) If we assume a scenario of a homogenous economy where there is a foreign-labour inflow, at the beginning unemployment rises, downward pressure on wages, downward pressure also on inflation. Then the bank of issue emits monetary assets into the economy, which starts to expand, absorbing the extra workforce, and at the end the original balance will be restored, except there are more people.

The conclusion of the theory and the simple model underpinning it, have, however, been criticized because it ignores the possibility of dynamic effects and spill-over effects that may arise from having a bigger economy and a more diverse society as a source of creativity and inspiration. Economists are divided about the likely existence, direction, and degree of such effects.

\(^\text{19}\) House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2008)
2. Migration and Migration Policy Changes in the 20th and 21st centuries

2.1. Migration Trends and Migration Policy
After the Second World War, The United Kingdom became a positive net migration country, due to the large-scale immigration from its former colonies to fill labour shortages generated by Britain’s postwar economic comeback. Since the imperial citizenship regime treated Commonwealth citizens as subjects of the British Crown, privileged immigration channels were reserved for colonial workers until 1962. In the 1950s about half a million migrants, primarily young, single men, travelled to the UK. Until the middle of the 1960s, migration was a market-driven phenomenon, that was followed by, from the early 1970s until the 1990s, waves of family reunifications.

The first regulation of immigration was enacted in 1962 by the Conservatives, which the Labour opposition criticized harshly as being populist and racist. Only two years later, when the Labour government got into power, they quickly realized that increasingly spawning family reunification meant that every naturalized immigrant would bring two to four subsequent migrants being (declared to be) his/her family members. They abandoned their ideological commitment to open border policy and moreover extended immigration controls in 1965. Through the following decades, both Labour and Conservative governments continued restrictive policy with a stepwise shift of the target of restrictions from immigrants in general to asylum seekers in particular.20

Starting in the mid-1990s, transformations have occurred linked in part to policy change. With the forthcoming millennium skilled immigration began increasing, and by the end of 2002 the UK was issuing record numbers of some 130,000 work permits. Applications for asylum due to humanitarian catastrophes like the Yugoslavian War, Afghan civil war, Turkish and Iraqi oppression of Kurdish people21 also skyrocketed in the late 1990s. Compared to some 4000 refugees in the year of 1987 their number peaked at 82,000 in 2002. Restrictive measures have contributed to a sharp, steady deflation of asylum inflow per year to 22,000 until 2005, which remained stable since that.22

21 Whittaker, D. J. (2006)
22 Blinder, S. (2013)
In 2002, a break occurred with previous immigration policy with the issuing of a White Paper envisaging a comprehensive plan for “managed migration”, continually in support for high-skilled “economic” migration. The shift resulted in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act and the introduction of the Highly Skilled Migrant Program (HSMP), scheme based on a quite complicated points system with more than 80 separate routes of entry for immigrants from outside the EU, European Economic Area (EEA), or Switzerland.

In 2004, the government granted free access to the British labour market to citizens of Accession 8 countries, which was followed by a dramatic, unprecedented and unexpected increase in immigration. Falsifying the original governmental forecast, which had put an estimation of 25% increase in the annual immigration from EEA countries above the previous some 60,000, the number of EEA migrants doubled in the first year, and tripled until 2008, when it started decreasing slowly.\(^\text{23}\) (Just in brackets, but that opening labour market led to much larger immigration than expected is a good example of the difficulties in predicting and measuring migration movements.)

Currently, the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, which is based on Directive 2004/38/EC, amended two times, and is called EEA Regulations for short, preserve the privileges of EEA citizens due to the acquis communautaire of the European Union (see more later).

The HSMP has seen a series of changes after its introduction. The elaboration of its points system was, along with a commitment to reduce illegal residence, at the center of the five-year departmental plan issued by the government in 2005. Finally, in 2006, following public consultation, the HSMP was converted into a far simpler five-tiered Point Based System (phased in between 2008-2010), in which points were partitioned based on the correspondence of the applicants’ skills to the labour market needs, but the Points Based System did not contain a concrete limit. Despite the financial crisis and the implementation of the Points Based System, net immigration has remained high.

Following the 2010 election victory of the new coalition government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats, which put an end to the 13 years hegemony of the Labour, the government made it clear that reducing net migration to tens of thousands is a main target. At a joint press conference with Nick Clegg on 20 May 2010 launching the coalition policy document, the Prime Minister said:

\(^{23}\) Vargas-Silva, C. (2014)
“In terms of immigration, what you can see is that there's a cap going to be put in place and, yes, that is with the ambition of getting to levels of net migration that were prevalent in the 80s and 90s, which is tens of thousands not hundreds of thousands.”

The coalition has introduced an annual cap on non-EEA economic migration, set at 20,700 per year who can be sponsored by their employer to come to work in the UK, but with the exclusion of intra company transfers, investors and entrepreneurs. The quota has come into force on April 2011. The almost automatic link between work permits and permanent residence permission has now also been broken: only those non-EEA nationals who earn at least £35,500 are able to apply for unlimited leave to remain. In 2012, the rules on family reunion were also aggravated, involving the installation a minimum income threshold of £18,600 per year to guarantee that family reunion does not encumber the taxpayers.

In the case of Croatia following its 2013 accession, the government has applied its right to enforce up to seven years transitional restrictions on the free movement rights of Croatian workers. The only other noticeable change since 2010 in relation to EEA migration is the growing expression of the demand for further restrictions on the access of EU citizens to welfare benefits within the UK, despite that a “right of abode” code is already employed when deciding whether non-British EU citizens resident in the UK are eligible for various benefits. However, the government has been challenged by the European Commission and the House of Lords European Union Committee to serve any proof of social benefit tourism to underpin the claims about the need for aggravation.

Although the coalition government has managed to cut net migration by a quarter from its peak of 252,000 to 176,000 between 2010 and 2012, yet it is a historically unprecedented phenomenon, and vast majority of voters hardly believe in the potential of the coalition government to keep its pledge to settle the issue.

2.2. Citizenship Policy

In its tightest understanding, citizenship is a legal status of having the right to live and work in a country without being deported or refused to cross the border inward. In the democratic and developed world citizenship also means voting right, rights to enjoy the services of the welfare system, education or public health care, and so on. What is more, besides being a

24 Gov.UK (2010)
26 Migration Watch UK (b2013)
27 Kellner, Peter (2012)
legal status, citizenship may also imply a subjective sense of identity (can be described in words like “fidelity”, “national character”, “belonging” or “mutual culture”) and social relations of solidarity, and responsibility. This also highlights the often questioned similarity between citizenship and belonging to “a nation”. Since 2006, the UK has taken steps to limit her former liberal access to citizenship.  

The root of British nationality right comes from from the *jus soli* principle (citizenship by birth) having its origins in the imperialism and more behind in time, in the feudalism (what’s born within the realm of the Lord belongs to the Lord). Since the early seventieth century, anyone born within the realm of the British Crown was the subject of the monarch enjoying, in theory, full rights within the UK – it was the ground of British nationality right as far as 1981.

Following the decolonization of the former colonies, some thought the existing Imperial status of British subjects as a rather weak offer to negotiate with the liberated Commonwealth countries, in the aspect of maintaining the closest possible economic and diplomatic relation with them. So in 1948, the Commonwealth Heads of Government agreed that each citizen of the member countries would have both a national and a *Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies* (CUKC) citizenship, latter as a continuation of the existing British subject status. Until 1962, CUKCs and British nationals were equal in their rights to enter and live in the UK, and it resulted in that half a million coloured newcomers entered the UK, and did so not as immigrants but as British citizens. As it was mentioned in the “Migration Policy” subchapter, after 1962, as an outcome of anxiety about the increasing inflow of Commonwealth citizens from Asia and Africa, the UK progressively constricted the control of immigration from other Commonwealth countries. The Immigration Act 1971 included the concept of *patriality*, by which only Commonwealth citizens with enough close ties to the British Islands (having a parent with citizenship, being adopted, getting married, etc.) had the right to live and work in the Islands (*right of abode*).

The British Nationality Act 1981 settled the present scheme of multiple categories of British nationality, such as *British citizens*, *British Overseas Territories citizens*, *British Overseas citizens*, *British Nationals* (*Overseas*), *British subjects* and *British protected persons* (explained later in details). Only British and certain Commonwealth citizens have the automatic right of abode in the UK. With this act the UK ceased with pure *jus soli* principle.

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29 Anderson, B. (2011)

30 Ibid.
(which is not present in Europe nowadays), but otherwise there had been a continuity with the
previous policy, for instance, descendants of permanent residents, or recognized refugees born
in the UK are citizens at birth. Others have the possibility to naturalize after five years of
residency or three years of marriage to a UK citizen, and even dual citizenship is allowed.

In 2004, a citizenship ceremony with an oath of allegiance to the Queen and the UK was
introduced. Since 2005 citizenship test checks the prospective citizens’ literacy of British
history and culture, and an English-language test does so with their ability to
communicate. However, if the claimant’s language skill is inappropriate, language and
citizenship course may be offered instead. In 2007 language requirements were extended to
certain groups who are applying for permanent residence or even to enter the UK.

Still in 2007, fees for claiming residence, work permit, or citizenship (along with fees for
visas) were raised noticeably. Naturalization (citizenship), formerly charging £200, was
increased to £575. The expense of a permanent residency was increased from £335 to £750, or
to £950 for the “premium” version, not to mention that the previous waiting period was
extended from four years to five in 2006.

Further aggravating legislation has been passed in 2009 introducing essential changes.
Principally it tore away the tie between length of residence and right to naturalization or
permanent residence/settlement. Eligible applicants after an initial period (which may last for
5 years) are able to claim a new status of ‘probationary citizen’ which could run to an
additional 1-5 years, and only after, they can apply for permanent residence or British
citizenship. While using the terminology of ‘citizenship’ probationary citizenship confers no
citizenship rights. It is a kind of ambulatory and limited citizenship, which does not grant
entitlement for most benefits, family reunion or subventioned tuition for home students. The
new language and knowledge tests were also improved in their strictness. What is more, to
motivate immigrants toward integration, incentives were built into the processes for achieving
these statuses to require British citizenship rather than permanent residence. These changes
were implemented in 2011.

2.3. Present Policy

2.3.1. Immigration Policy for EEA Citizens
The present EEA Regulations constitute the law that implements the right of free movement
of EEA citizens and their family members in the United Kingdom, so to live, work, and to
launch out on an enterprise in the UK without explicit permission or suffering discrimination
on the ground of citizenship but *without becoming an unreasonable burden on public funds*. Family members from outside of the EEA may need a special entry clearance (the EEA family permit) to enter the UK. Although Swiss citizens are covered by a separate bilateral agreement they are treated basically the same as EEA nationals.  

### 2.3.2. Immigration Policy for Non-EEA Citizens

The present scheme of the further elaborated five-tier system are the followings:  

- **Tier one** is intended for high-skilled immigrants, like innovative entrepreneurs graduated in a UK university or having £50,000 initial capital, investors with at least £1000,000, and exceptionally talented graduate students – Tier one is the only group who do not need a job offer to qualify, sponsorship from a licensed sponsor (an employer or educational institution) is required under tiers two through five.

- **Tier two** covers skilled workers needed in specific sectors, such as nurses, teachers and employees of multinational companies who are being transferred to the UK branch. A Tier two applicant has to have a job offer and a certificate of sponsorship from a British employer with valid sponsorship license.

- **Tier three** would have regulated low-skilled workers aimed to fill temporary shortages in the labor market, however, it was never used due to the streaming in of the low-skilled EEA workers, hence low-skilled migration from outside of the EU was restricted severely.

- The fourth tier is for students at UK educational institutions.

- **Tier five** covers working holidaymakers (from Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Monaco or Taiwan) and professional athletes, musicians.

### 2.3.3. Six Types of British Citizenship

These are:  

- **British citizenship**: it is the most ordinary type of British nationality, and the only one that automatically confers a right of abode in the UK.

- **British overseas territories citizen**: almost all of them are now also British citizens as a result of the British Overseas Territories Act 2002.

- **British overseas citizen**: it is quite uncommon category, as most CUKCs lost their status upon the liberation of their country. Exception were those CUKCs from the

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31 UKImmigrationSpecialist.com (2012)  
32 Workpermit.com (2013)  
33 Gov.UK (2014)
former colonies, who wanted to remain British subjects instead of joining the independent nations.

- **British subject:** all citizens of Commonwealth countries were British subjects until January 1983, but since that it is basically an obsolete category. Most derived their status as British subjects in the case of not willing to join the liberated countries born out of British India or Ireland in 1949.

- **British national (overseas):** it was created for Hong Kong citizens who haven’t wanted to join the People’s Republic of China in 1997.

- **British protected person:** some parts of the British Empire were protectorates having formally independent rulers but being under the “protection” of the British Crown. Such a country was Brunei, and her older citizens constitute this category.

All nationalities have the right to hold a British passport and to get consular assistance and protection from UK diplomatic posts.

However, these citizenships are not eligible also to evade immigration controls and don’t have the automatic right to live or work in the UK, neither to be considered a UK national by the EU.

With the exception of the first and second type all classes of British nationality and British protected person status are temporary categories, which means they will extinct with the passage of time, as they can be inherited by children only in exceptional circumstances, such as state of statelessness.

### 2.4. Multiculturalism

After the election victory of the Labour government in 1997, multiculturalism became a fashionable term in the UK politics. Although it was never defined punctually, cabinet members used the term frequently, the Home Office issued reports on and held conferences around the topic, and ministers coming back from Canadian routes praised her immigration and multicultural policy. However, events since the late-1990s have undermined the confidence both in the ability of the country to integrate visible minorities and in the efficacy of multicultural policies to stop the continuing socioeconomic deprivation of some sections of the visible minority population. In 2001, there were street fights between gangs of Asian and White youth in northern England cities. In July 2005, four Islamist suicide bombers detonated themselves in underground stations of London and four others tried to do so. The realization

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34 Hansen, R. (2007)
that three out of four of the bombers were born in Britain within relatively well-off families was a shock to the national psyche. Three months later, in October, riots broke out between members of Black and Asian communities of Birmingham. These were spectacular and events, shown in the media, leading high-profile characters to question even the reason for the existence of multiculturalism. For example, even Trevor Phillips, the Black director of the Commission for Racial Equality, the official voice of visible minority issues in the UK, secured national headlines for himself by claiming “multiculturalism is dead.” By 2007, multiculturalism had almost become a dirty word. A series of articles and editorials of the major newspapers charged multicultural policy depraving UK onto the Balkan. In response the Home Office has placed the emphasis on integration in and loyalty to Britain again. Following the 2001 Asian-White riots, the government aggravated requirements for citizenship aiming to ensure better integration of naturalized immigrants. Later a set of immigration policy changes was designed to reinforce border-security. The 2007 UK Borders bill gives the newly-hired and reassigned immigration officers more scope of authorization, including powers of arrest and to order foreign nationals to provide fingerprints, digital photographs and to carry Biometric Identity Documents. The visa system was updated, taking into account risk of terrorism and criminal activity levels in countries of origin, as well as willingness of these countries to re-engage deported immigrants. Altogether, while there has been a change in policy makers’ attitude, putting a greater emphasis on the need for a loyalty and commitment to Britain on the part of visible minorities, until this moment, there has been no dramatic change in the policy.

2.4.1. Integration Policy

The diversity-accommodation framework of the UK consists of three columns: anti-discrimination legislation, educational policy and policies for the police. All of these are planned to bridge the racial “opportunity gaps” in different ways intending a relatively open citizenship policy. The core was, and is, anti-discrimination legislation supervised by the aforementioned Commission for Racial Equality (CRE).

Anti-Discrimination Policies

UK’s anti-discrimination framework is stepwisely developed by Labour governments since the 1960s. The 1965 Race Relations Act contained some contradictions as it focused mainly on “expressive racism”, the oral or written hate speech, while it abstained from the prohibition of “access racism”, in which members of an ethnic group are hindered in access to public or

private goods on a racist basis. Public places like hotels or pubs were enforced to avoid access to racist practices, but the regulation did not include hidden discrimination in employment, the banking and insurance sectors, or the private housing market.

The original bill has been elaborated several times in the past forty years. Just three years after its implementation a research spotlighted extensive discrimination practices in employment and house renting, hence the 1968 Race Relations Act expanded the regulation of discrimination to the aforementioned sectors. The Race Relations Board was also provided sources for and authorized to self-sufficiently inspect cases of racial discrimination. Later, the 1976 Race Relations Bill extended the definition of discrimination to include direct \(^{36}\) and indirect \(^{37}\) discrimination, and enabled individuals to turn to directly to the civil courts or to the employment ombudsman in disputed cases, and, also, established the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE).

The most significant advance in anti-discrimination policy was the 2000 Race Relations Act. The 1976 regulation was expanded to every public and private institutions operating in public services (e.g., the National Health System, the police, the universities), with the exception of immigration officers, the security services and the Parliament, and declared the “general duty” of state authorities to support with every possible mean the abolition of unlawful discrimination and to support equal opportunities and benevolence between members of different ethnic groups. Thus, it is required from organizations with 150 or more employees, as an “employment duty”, to monitor staff who receives a promotion, vocational training, benefits or suffer harm as an outcome of the performance evaluation process. As earlier policies had aimed access and opportunity, the reforms after 2000 are concerned with the outcome of employment policy. Public bodies are obligated to regard their ethnic composition, and to examine if their share of ethnic minority employment represents discriminative policies or not. However, these actions affect only state sector, but barely touch the private sector, and even less the underpaid, precarious black market of labour in which uneducated immigrants are densely concentrated.

**Policies on Policing**

This is the aspect what affects the least Central and Eastern European citizens, as neither Slavic or Hungarian nationals can be recognitioned by their looks. On the other hand, recent

\(^{36}\) For example an employer has discriminated against an applicant for a job by denying his employment on the basis of one of his non-adequate attribute, like age or colour of skin.

\(^{37}\) It means requirements, practices or conditions that are formally non-discriminatory but disproportionately and not reasonable penalise members of a particular ethnic group.
turmoil on immigration issue may influence the relation of A8 newcomers and the police in the future, so I would rather shortly introduce the case.

The behaviour of the police, especially the London Metropolitan Police, towards coloured ethnic groups has long been the ground of a lot of conflicts, particularly the practice of stopping and identity checking of passers-by without definite reasons, as visible minorities are used to be checked disproportionately frequently. According to 2005–2006 statistics, black people were six times and Asian people were two times more likely to be stopped and searched than White ones.  

Following an inquiry into the police handling of the investigation of a racist murder against a black Londoner, the shocking results of the report led to a set of more or less deep administrative reforms in police policy. Ending the stop and search practice was never on the agenda, but the police accepted a gradual implementation of the recording of reasons, circumstances, outcome, and admitted identity of the checked person, by the police. Much more happened in other areas. The Parliament established the Minority Members Network for coloured police officers, provided race-awareness training, and chastised the use of racist expressions within the police force. In recognition of racist crime, the law now defines a crime racist if it is perceived by the victim or by any other witness as racist, which is a very harsh policy.

**Education Policies**

The quality of education has a definitive effect on integration and life opportunities. Unfortunately the education system of the UK has tended to reproduce rather than abolish societal differences in educational outcomes. According to the PISA survey, “in the United Kingdom, the average difference in results, between the 20% with the highest socioeconomic background and the 20% with the lowest socioeconomic background is 103 points” with a mean of 500 points, which is “higher than the OECD average of 99 points.” (Altogether it is still far better value than the Hungarian 132 points difference around the 496 points average.) The cause behind this phenomenon is that access to good schools is generally linked with living within a particular neighbourhood or paying extraordinary high tuition fees. We are able to express the differences in pecuniary terms, too: in 2003, access to a good state school was estimated to increase by €69,000 the price of an “average” UK house. For certain

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39 OECD Better Life Index (2013): United Kindgom
40 OECD Better Life Index (2013): Hungary
prestigious schools, the figure can be closer to €220,000, tripling the price of an average house.\textsuperscript{41}

Since the forties, the government has been providing ESOL courses (English for Speakers of Other Languages) that offer foreigners the opportunities to undertake supported language learning, aiming also to support their integration. ESOL courses cover, among elementary language skills, situation exercises and special lessons that enable participants to get more out of their social lives, understand the laws and customs of the UK, even to gain the skills necessary to pass the ‘Life in the UK test’ and become a British citizen. By tying literacy, numeracy and language knowledge with social, cultural and normative skills and information the ESOL program was not designed only to be a language course. It is intended to be a complex program to improve the kinds of educational, linguistic, accreditation and cultural knowledge required to meet the criteria essential to enter the labour market, to learn and internalize a whole set of contexts, conventions and schemas that will provide them understanding life in the UK.\textsuperscript{42}

In 1997, following the election victory of Labour Party the term “active citizenship” was brought into focus of integration policy, although the term itself was never defined. The aim being quite ambitious was to convince citizens behaving as “passive recipients of public services” to take part actively in public life (Mayo and Rooke 2006). Following the 2001 riots in Northern England, in 2002, citizenship education was introduced as a mandatory subject in English secondary schools. According to the critiques,\textsuperscript{43} teachers were given no exact guidance or training, hence having no particular knowledge of ethnicities within Britain, the history of multiculturalism, or contemporary politics teachers were unable to teach such a highly sensitive and complex subject. The National Curriculum has also not been reformed to fill this subject with appropriate history or social studies content. An ICM poll of students in 2005 revealed grim results that more than half of students neither knows what citizenship education was, nor could give any example of what they had learned.\textsuperscript{44}

The new coalition government has recognized the importance of citizenship, but settled it within the context of the Big Society, asserting the duty of individuals and communities to solve their problems by improving communities.\textsuperscript{45} In 2011 the government started pilot

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{41} Hansen, R. (2007) Endnotes.
\item \textsuperscript{42} Toalster, R. (2012) Phd Thesis.
\item \textsuperscript{43} Curtis, P. (2005)
\item \textsuperscript{44} Anderson, B. (2011)
\item \textsuperscript{45} Cabinet Office (2010)
\end{itemize}
projects for the National Citizen Service, a non-military, voluntary national service for 16 and 17-year olds. Within its program volunteers create a social action project to promote consciousness of a certain issue to “improve social mixing”, “encourage community involvement” and develop team working and communication skills in the aim of educating “active and responsible citizens”.\textsuperscript{46}

Until 2011 the coalition government has not said what it would do, but it declared that it will cancel the proposal to encourage migrant volunteering or “active citizenship” which it regarded “too complicated, bureaucratic, and in the end ineffective”.\textsuperscript{47}

\textbf{2.4.2. Integration Outcomes}

Ethnic penalty is a concept that means disparities in income and chance of being unemployed that cannot be explained by differences in qualifications and experience. Separate studies from the 2000s have concluded that although Pakistanis and Bangladeshis (and particularly women) pay the highest ethnic penalty on average, they are extremely polarized by social classes: Bangladeshi and Pakistani students are overrepresented both among university entrants and among 16-year-olds with the worst qualifications. Those who pay the lowest penalty are the Indians, and particularly Indian men. The literature is not clear on why are these differences. Scholars have suggested that discrimination in hiring and promotion practices are liable for ethnic penalty, but this explanation cannot answer why some groups of South Asians (Pakistanis) would pay a higher ethnic penalty than another (Indians and well-performing Pakistani students).

The ethnic penalty seems largely to be a language based and thus educational disadvantage: the deficiency to speak the national language fluently piercingly limits career opportunities in a developed economy, which fact suggests that language and education concerns are as important, if not more so, as racism.\textsuperscript{48}

According to a 2007 research,\textsuperscript{49} a quarter of the Central-Eastern European migrants described their spoken English as ‘fluent’, half of those from A8 states and a third of those from the latter A2 countries (Bulgaria and Romania) described it as only ‘adequate’. For the rest (a quarter for the A8s and almost a half for the A2s) it was ‘basic’ or even ‘none’. In spite of the poor results only a third had previously attended or were currently

\textsuperscript{46} NatCen Social Research (2013)
\textsuperscript{47} Immigrationstudio.com (2010)
\textsuperscript{48} Hansen, R. (2007)
\textsuperscript{49} Spencer, S. et al. (May 2007)
attending English classes and even those with the weakest language skills were among those least likely to have done or to be doing so. The research had no definitive answers on why that situation occurred, but it suggests that long working hours were among the factors in not taking classes, while the accessibility of classes associated with employment made the attendance more likely.

2.5. Conclusion of the Policy Part
This relatively short theoretical and historical study of the composite issue of immigration revealed a series of aspects, of which the all-time government of the UK has to take care. It is partly an ideological question – as we have seen, the Labour Party in the early sixties opted for an open borders policy, and also, before the shock of 2004, their migration policy was more indulgent, and it is always less harsh than the Conservatives’ one. (Maybe they have a faith in the general beneficial effects of increasing social plurality, but the question of ideological influence extends beyond the framework of this thesis.) Beyond the ideology, we find more practical issues.

The first thing to pin down, the following description doesn’t regard the highly skilled immigrants as they were never rejected. On the contrary, they are attracted and adored because of economic reasons.

Migration policy of Britain was constrained in the past and further in the present by the great compromise of the Commonwealth and the EU. Both institutions are crucial due to the desire to maintain the diplomatic influence of the country and the blessings of free trade, and this fact has been keeping immigration policy not to be too restrictive. On the other hand, the second force shaping policy is the lack of ability of the British government to adequately integrate migrant people, which sometimes leads to such dramatic and mediatized events like the 2005 riots, raising the importance of the issue in the eyes of the public and inciting government to try to show definiteness.

Therefore, the government has nothing else to do than to introduce moderate restrictions, which impact immigrants different ways, depending on their status. While it has the possibility to slowly totally regress non-EEA immigration by sanctioning their employment and not granting entry permissions, its only tool against EEA citizens is making administration more difficult and restricting the eligibility for social benefits.

Currently, EEA citizens and those non-EEA citizens who have permanent residence status have complete freedom of employment in the UK, while others are permitted to work under
employers having licences. Immigrants under a certain yearly income do not have rights to family reunion, but wealthier ones do. Access to welfare benefits, such as jobseekers’ allowance, varies across different types of status.

3. Present Immigrant Population of the UK

Immigrants are narrowly described here as current residents born outside of the UK, not mentioning second and third generation descendants of former immigrants, although popular thinking uses to count them immigrants, too. In 2012, 7.7 million (11.4%) of the total population of the UK were foreign born (tripling of the foreign-born proportion of the population since 1951), not including a number of 4.9 million of foreign citizens staying temporarily (7.2%). London has the greatest number of immigrants (around 36% of foreign-born people in 2012) among all regions with comparable data in the UK, with foreign born people constituting 40% of the Inner London’s population.50

1. Chart: Share of migrants in the UK


50 Rienzo, C. - Vargas-Silva, C. (2012)
The largest increase in the postwar decades, of nearly 4 million people, occurred in the decades from 1990 to 2012 with 1 million incomers during the pre-, and an additional 3 million in the post-2000 period, but according to some sources, this number should be amended with an about 600,000 surplus. In contrast, the next largest increase happened in the 1960s, when 600,000 people were added to the population through immigration. India, Poland, and Pakistan are the top three countries of birth for the foreign born citizens, and Poland and India remain the top two countries of citizenship of foreign citizens, followed by Ireland. The two-third majority of recent migrants is single, and the proportion of singles shows a positive trend over time. Around 61% of the foreign-born population had been living for at least six years in the UK in 2005 have taken up British citizenship.

2. Tabulation: Top ten countries by origin of migrants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Share of all foreign born</th>
<th>Country of citizenship</th>
<th>Share of all foreign citizens</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>14.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


3.1. Intended Residence in the UK

Among new immigrants in 2005, 44% said they intended to stay for 1-2 years, followed by 19% who said they intended to stay for 3-4 years, and 30% more than 4 years.

Among those Accession 8 workers who registered for employment in the 12 months to March 2009, 53% were in temporary employment and 44% in permanent employment (3% unknown), 67% said they intended to stay for less than one year (including 62% saying

52 Migration Watch UK (a2013)
54 Office for National Statistics (2005)
that they would stay for less than three months). Only 7% said they intended to stay for more than 2 years with 22% saying they did not know.\footnote{Home Office (2009)}

However, intentions may change during the accumulation of consciousness and experience of opportunities in the UK, so these data cannot be considered entirely reliable barometer of immigrants' likely length of stay. First of all, there is a diversity in return tendencies across immigrants from different countries of origin. In general, return chances of immigrants from the EU, the Americas, Australia and New Zealand, in brief from the developed world are higher than, in contrast, of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent and from Africa.\footnote{Dustmann et al. (2007)} On the other hand, recent research on Eastern Europeans points at that a significant portion of immigrants change their intentions over time from a short-term to a long-term or even permanent stay.\footnote{House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2008)} According to the MigrationWatch UK, this was supported by a survey carried out by a Warsaw based market research firm, which found that only 45% of Poles surveyed planned to go home within 4 years, a further 45% said that they would stay at least 5 years and the remaining 10% said they would settle in Britain.\footnote{MigrationWatch UK (2008)}

Another report served empirical evidence showing the effect of changing economic motivations behind migration. A8 return migration was found to be driven by individuals losing their jobs in the UK. As Chart 4 shows emigration of Central-Eastern European citizens peaked in the same year that UK unemployment was at its highest compared to the A8 economies. The relationship appears to be strong, not surprisingly, considering the high share of these people who came to the UK to work.\footnote{Murray et al. (2012)}
2. Chart: A8 emigration from the UK and relative unemployment rates, 2003 to 2010

![Chart: A8 emigration from the UK and relative unemployment rates, 2003 to 2010](source: International Passenger Survey (IPS) - Office for National Statistics and Eurostat (unemployment rates))


### 3.2. Occupation of Immigrants

2006 Labour Force Survey\(^6\) implies that the overall employment rate of immigrants is lower than that of UK-born persons (68% vs 75%). However, there are sightly big differences between certain ethnic groups: the employment rate of A8 migrants is over 80%, while that of immigrants from Bangladesh is only around 50%, and Bangladeshi women even have an employment rate of about 19%.

The decisive factors of immigrants' occupation and earning include proficiency in English, work experience, education, ethnicity, and length of time spent in the UK. Immigration status (5 Tiers system) does likely matter, but, in itself, illegal working does not necessarily means lower wages.

The three most popular sectors for foreign-born workers are in public administration, education and health (32%), distribution, hotels and restaurants (21%) and banking, finance and insurance (20%). Among A8 immigrants, the top sectors are distribution, hotels and restaurants (24%), manufacturing (21%) and construction (14%) – of course, depending on regions, the share of immigrants can be higher or lower.

Basically, immigrants are concentrated at the high and low skill end of the occupation distribution: for instance, a lot of immigrants can be found among the staff of the restaurants in the City of London serving financial experts and managers, many of whom are also immigrants. In the general statistics, proportionally, somewhat more foreign-born workers than native ones have highly-skilled jobs (49% vs 42%), the share of elementary occupations

\(^6\) House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2008)
is similar (12% vs 11%). However A8 immigrants are far more concentrated in low-skilled jobs, with 38% in elementary and only 13% in high-skilled occupations.

Measuring skills and educational qualifications, Labour Force Survey data show that among post-2004 immigrants, the share of university graduate persons is especially high (46%) and the proportion of persons having only secondary education is particularly low (48%), compared to the UK-born population (66% of the natives have completed secondary school, 17% have also a degree). The most educated migrant groups appear to be the Polish. Despite this fact, the average wages of Eastern Europeans have been extraordinarily low, with the Poles working for an average of £6 wage per hour during 2003-2006, and the vast majority of recent A8 immigrants have been employed in jobs at around the minimum wage. There is a spectacular mismatch between their level of education and employment in the UK.

4. Public Opinion on Immigration in Britain

If one examines the polls, a repugnance can be perceived toward immigration, although the picture is complex, especially if one would like to draw the conclusions on the public sense toward the different kinds of Eastern European migrants. This public sense affects both migration policy changes and also the opportunities of individual migrants to integrate into the British society. Let us see it in details:

The relation to immigration varies upon the image that a concrete question awakens in the respondent’s mind. For example the average British people are fed up with seeing immigrants sleeping in the street or begging for a pittance in the public transportation, and it is such a form of immigrant life which is although not common but very spectacular. Thus the tag “immigrant”, in the mind of average British people, seems to be more connected with a beggar, than with a middle-class man being fluent in English. Although both characters represents immigrants, when British people speak about immigrant problems, they usually think of the former one, not the latter. In the followings I will show the results of some surveys, which ones show in what circumstances do or do not British accept immigration.

According to the YouGov institute, 53% of respondents thought that a variety of cultures and backgrounds had strengthened the UK and 55% believe that international students have a

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61 YouGov (April 2013)
positive effect on Britain,\textsuperscript{62} which means most of the voters in 2013 accepted that meeting of cultures is generally a positive thing.

Also, in some specific fields the contribution of immigrants is widely appreciated, for example, 68\% believe that immigration has had a positive effect on cuisine and restaurants; 47\% believe that immigration has had a positive effect on entrepreneurship, start up firms (11\% think the opposite),\textsuperscript{63} but neither of these territories request large scale immigration (2011).

On the other hand, only a minority 22\% of the British believe that most of immigrants contribute positively to Britain, 21\% think that around half of them do and 42\% think only a part do (also 2013).\textsuperscript{64}

12\% believe that immigration has changed their local community for the better\textsuperscript{65} and it equals to the percentage of non-UK born population (2011),\textsuperscript{66} which facts are suspicious to correlate.

Unfortunately, there are only a few surveys examining separately the Eastern European migrants. Also in the YouGov research it was asked whether immigration from Western Europe had a positive effect on the UK and 39\% thought that it had. By contrast, only 22\% thought that immigration from Eastern Europe was positive (2013).\textsuperscript{67}

Although the measures of different institutes (IPSOS, YouGov, Searchlight, Angus Reid) vary upon the concrete level of rejection of immigrants, even within one sample year, they agree on that the number shall be between 57 and 74\%\textsuperscript{68} with a hard core of approximately 40\% believing that there is no any benefit from immigration.\textsuperscript{69} It is, without doubt, an absolute majority.

\textsuperscript{62} YouGov (March 2013)
\textsuperscript{63} Ipsos MORI (December 2011)
\textsuperscript{64} YouGov (March 2013)
\textsuperscript{65} Searchlight (February 2011)
\textsuperscript{66} Office for National Statistics (2011)
\textsuperscript{67} YouGov (February 2013)
\textsuperscript{68} Ipsos MORI (February 2011)
\textsuperscript{69} Angus Reid (2011)
\textsuperscript{69} YouGov (April 2011)
We should mention also the special case of Asian community of Great Britain, as in 2011, 40% of Asian community believed that immigrants had put their jobs at risk and 47% believed that, because of immigrants, their wages have decreased.\textsuperscript{70} It was not only the result of the economic crisis, because even in 2005, 60% of the Asian community thought there had been too many immigrants in Britain.\textsuperscript{71}

People in the UK are among the most negative in Europe about immigration,\textsuperscript{72} however the general rejection of immigration is not an extraordinary case. We could claim there is a kind of “world consensus” on this:

3. Chart: Public attitudes to immigration among regions of the world

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart.png}
\caption{Would you say that immigration has generally had a positive or negative impact on your country?}
\end{figure}


As one can see Latin America is the only exception where not the rejective statement holds the absolute or relative majority but the neutral one.

\textsuperscript{70} Searchlight (February 2011)
\textsuperscript{71} BBC (April 2005)
\textsuperscript{72} IPSOS (June 2012)
4.1. Causes of Resentment

If one seeks for the causes behind the rejection, there are some possible explanations. For example, according to the Ipsos MORI research:\(^{73}\)

- 69% think immigrants decreased the availability of housing in Britain, 9% think the opposite, remaining are neutral.
- 66% think immigrants decreased the availability of jobs, 10% think the opposite.
- 58% think the crime level increased because of immigrants, 10% think the opposite.
- People are more divided in the question about being the schools negatively affected by immigrants or not (45% vote for negative effect, 28% neutral, 20% positive effect).
- And the contribution/pressure on National Health System by immigrants (45% for negative effect, 18% neutral, 32% positive effect).

Improver fact can be a sense of overpopulation in Britain: 79% believe that population of UK is even nowadays too high\(^ {74}\) and 85% worry on the projected rise in population up to 70 million until 2029.\(^ {75}\)

About the assimilation of immigrants, 59% feel the biggest barrier is ‘not speaking English’ - far ahead of anything else. Not mixing with other groups (25%) is another commonly named barrier, similarly common like the more rigid claim “being born outside the UK” (26%). However, only one in ten people (9%) feel that being from an ethnic minority prevents people being fully British, and a similar proportion (11%) feel that having foreign born parents is a barrier to being British.\(^ {76}\)

Another Ipsos MORI research\(^ {77}\) came to the conclusion, that, in the sample of some European countries, the strongest correlation is between the acceptance of the claim “there is too many immigrants in our country” and the public belief of immigrants had put high pressure on public services.

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\(^{73}\) Ipsos MORI (December 2011)
\(^{74}\) YouGov (May 2011)
\(^{75}\) YouGov (2010)
\(^{76}\) Ipsos MORI (February 2012)
\(^{77}\) IPSOS (June 2012)
4. Chart: Correlations between the opinion of “immigrants overcharge public services” and “there are too many immigrants in the country” within particular European countries

The belief that there are too many immigrants strongly correlates with a concern that immigrants place too much pressure on public services...


The correlation is weaker ($R^2 = 0.45$) between the perception of too many immigrants and the concern that immigrants make it more difficult to find jobs, while a majority of the British agree both claims.  

The next graph shows how the respondents of these countries reflect to both the questions of immigrants make it difficult to find jobs and whether anyone they personally know had lost his job because of economic reasons. We don’t get an R-square value here, but we can see, although Great Britain is among the countries which are less affected by the crisis, British people are who blame immigration the most for lost jobs.

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78 Ibid.
5. Chart: Public opinion in certain European countries about if immigrants are responsible for lack of jobs


As we see, among the causes, man can find the ones which typify “problematic” immigrants, such as crime, negative effect on schools, weight on the social system and NHS, while housing and job shortages can be caused by all kinds of the immigrants. The question is that, can and do policies, which prevent the massive consumption of social services or limit immigration to the educated migrants, calm down worries of the British, or the consequences of resentment against immigrants may terminate Britain for most of the East Europeans in the long term.

To answer it, we can gain some improver fact from the polls. Certainly, it is required by the 93% of Britons that immigrants coming to live permanently in the UK should learn English, 79 but when thinking about issues of identity and what it means to be British, being born in the UK is not regarded as the most important aspect. 59% of people think that the most important aspect of being British is to put being British first, 80 which is not a restrictive standpoint.

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79 YouGov (April 2011)
80 Searchlight (February 2011)
On their most burning issue, in 2013, 86% of Britons would prefer a law that meant EU migrants would only have access to benefits after a certain amount of time and 75% said that they’d support changing the law so that only those who’d been resident in the UK for a fixed period would have access to emergency NHS treatment.\textsuperscript{81}

A big share of Britons supports both protectionism in the labour market for British and restriction of immigration. While the respondents of the YouGov research were not so radical, 45% of them thought that British workers should always be prioritized over foreigners, even if they were less well qualified, but 47% disagreed.\textsuperscript{82} The outcome of the ComRes was more harsh: 74% agreed that employees shouldn’t be recruited from overseas while a million young Britons are unemployed,\textsuperscript{83} and 67% answered that British firms should be able to prioritize British citizens over other EU citizens when hiring new workers, even if this means the UK would have to leave the EU.\textsuperscript{84} On the ideal level of immigration, 79% believe that net migration of 100,000 or less would be best for Britain.\textsuperscript{85} Their radicalism is inversely proportional to their societal status: when it was asked to choose two policies from a list of seven that they would most like to see implemented, 53% of working class voters chose ‘stopping ALL immigration’ over any other policy, while 32% of middle class voters did so.\textsuperscript{86}

Seeing the evidences, it seems like that British people became deeply disappointed of open migration policy and immigration itself. However, if we open the scope with the time aspect, we find that, in 1997, around 5% thought that immigration was the main issue facing Britain, nine years later the figure hit 40%, and by 2013, the figure was 58%, according to the Searchlight.\textsuperscript{87} On the other hand the general opinion of immigration hasn’t changed much, so it seems there are preconceptions toward immigration encoded somehow culturally in the society, and its preconceptions change rarely over time. The thing which is able to change relatively rapidly and affect policy-making is the importance of the question in the eyes of the public. The following charts prove that population of the host countries may vary their opinion of migrants irrespectively of the proportion of immigrants, so the plain formula „more immigrants → more tension between cultures and interests → less acceptance of immigration” is simply and solely false.

\textsuperscript{81} YouGov (March 2013)  
\textsuperscript{82} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{83} ComRes (August 2013)  
\textsuperscript{84} Ibid.  
\textsuperscript{85} YouGov (May 2011)  
\textsuperscript{86} YouGov (October 2012)  
\textsuperscript{87} Searchlight (February 2011)
6. Chart: Correlation between the importance of the importance of 'immigrant issue' and proportion of immigrants within certain European countries

Source: IPSOS (June 2012): Public attitudes to immigration, Findings from Ipsos’s Global @dvisor, 2011. pp. 27.
Anyway, even if the public sense is based on cultural preconceptions, it may reflect the reality. In the next chapter I examine whether the impacts of immigration to the British society are so harmful, that immigration really deserves its bad reputation.
5. Empirical Evidences on The Impacts of Immigration on the UK Resident Population

5.1. Introduction
In the years preceding the 2010 victory of the coalition, the government, business organizations, and think tanks argued that immigration creates significant economic benefits for the UK. For example, in a major speech in 2007, the Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith MP, said “if net migration ceased, our growth rate would be cut by 0.5% over the next two years”.\(^{88}\) Making a similar point, the Immigration Minister, Liam Byrne MP, said that “There is a big positive impact on the economy which is worth about £6 billion”.\(^{89}\)

The most comprehensive analysis on the issue that I have found during my research is the First Report on The Economic Impact of Immigration, made by the House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs in 2008.\(^{90}\) Although not being a very recent paper, it is the most exhaustive one, and it reflects on the different aspects of the question and, what is more important, the policy of the coalition government is underpinned by the evidences presented here, hence my interpretation of the theme should build upon this text.

The first thing to lay down is that the above mentioned political statements are only about the GDP – which, measuring only the total output created by both immigrants and residents, is perfectly irrelevant in the aspect of economic impacts of immigration on the resident population, thus we can claim that referring only to the £6 billion growth is nothing more than pure populism. GDP per capita would be a better measure than GDP because it calculates with the increased population due to immigration, however, it is still an imperfect criterion because it includes the per capita income of immigrants, too, biasing up- or downward the figures compared to real welfare change of native residents.

5.2.1. Impacts on GDP Per Capita
The general conclusion from the empirical evidences is that immigration has a marginal influence on GDP per capita, whether these impacts are positive or negative. This outcome is parallel with the results of studies of the economic impacts of immigration in other countries like US. In details:

\(^{88}\) Smith, J. (2007)  
\(^{89}\) Byrne, L. - Homer, L. (2007)  
\(^{90}\) House of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs (2008)
It is not clear why the government has not ordered one, but there has been no empirical research that has studied the changing per capita income of the resident population due to immigration. Hence we have to content ourselves with some analysis on the impact on GDP and GDP per capita.

As it was mentioned before, a Home Office submission presents data on a £6 billion positive contribution to GDP in 2006 but does not give any estimates of GDP per capita.

The National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) suggests that immigration between 1998 and 2005 supported an increase in real GDP of about 3%, while made up 3.8% of the population: the two impacts together ended up in a light decrease of GDP per capita. However, this estimation was based on the effects of a labour supply expansion only, not calculating with the additional increase that would come from an increase in capital. If capital had been factored in, this could have led to a result presenting a slightly positive impact on GDP per head.

5.2.2. Dynamic Effects and Spill-Overs
The Committee admitted that there can be such effects, but they have found no convincing empirical proof of significant dynamic benefits created by immigration. Most of the examples their experts gave involved highly skilled migrants working in the financial or medical sector or in the university area, but the advantages of high skilled immigration were never questioned.

5.2.3. Impact on Earnings
The Committee suggests that immigration has had a small negative effect on the wages of lowest paid workers, and a small positive effect on the salaries of higher paid ones. Those resident groups whose earnings have been unfavorably affected are likely to made up of former immigrants and workers from disadvantaged ethnic minorities. In details:

There are methodological difficulties in analyzing the labour market impacts of immigration. First, since immigrants usually flow to areas of strong labour demand and growing economy, it is complicated to estimate the counter-effect of immigration on wages. Second, underclass immigration may incite some residents to move off, thus the impact of these changes may dissolve across the country, which makes it harder to measure through local labour market analysis. Third, the available data are often based on small samples and may thus contain significant measurement error. Of course, there
are various econometric techniques to treat these problems, but neither of them is perfect.

Aside from the methodological challenges, a study by Professor Dustmann and others showed that every 1% increase in the ratio of immigrants to natives in the working age population ratio led to a 0.5% decrease in wages at the lowest 10% of wage earners, a 0.6% increase at the median, and a 0.4% increase at the 9th decile.\textsuperscript{91} Explaining these results, the authors told that, recent immigrants appear to be competitors of the old ones. Experts pointed out that separate waves of immigrants usually touch the same sectors, and many of the former immigrants have since become British citizens, so they are kept counted as domestic residents. For example, some of the Pakistani community felt their jobs were lost due to the relatively recently arrived Polish migrants, who were higher skilled and willing to work for lower wages.

Due to a sociological effect, even if immigrants are not competing with residents for the same job opportunities, they may still have an indirect wage depressing effect. It is found that, following A8 accession, the wage growth seceded from the pace of economic prosperity in both the UK and Ireland. Since there is a commonly shared preconception that high immigration causes unemployment, employees may have become too cautious in their demand for wage rise.

The Committee mentioned also that the national minimum wage has probably played a significant role in shielding low-paid workers from more adverse impacts.

5.2.4. Impact on Unemployment

According to the Committee, the negative impact of immigration on the unemployment rate in the UK is statistically not proven. However, they admitted the possibility of young British people were unfavorably affected by more competitive young migrants from the A8 countries, and suggested further research on the issue.

The First Report mentions a debate between the scholars. Both the DWP Working Paper 29 and an earlier study of Professor Dustmann found “if there is an impact of immigration on unemployment then it is statistically poorly determined and probably small in size”.\textsuperscript{92} However a NIESR study based on simulation models claimed that immigration increases unemployment in the short-run and has almost zero effect in the

\textsuperscript{91} Dustmann et al. (2007)
\textsuperscript{92} Dustmann et al. (2003)
long-run. Another scholar, Professor Rowthorn pointed out that both the DWP study and Professor Dustmann had found relatively strong, although statistically insignificant effects of immigration on unemployment. He argued that finding statistically insignificant effects does not mean that they are negligible, just that there is too much noise in the data to weight them accurately.

Also, a more recent report from Migration Advisory Committee, in which the immigrant groups were differentiated by origin, length of stay and whether they came in economic boom or recession, came up with contradictory results.\(^9\) The study suggests that, in times of economic downturn, a one-off increase of 100 in the inflow of working-age non-EU born migrants is associated with a decline in resident employment of 23, furthermore, any reduction in native employment associated with migrant inflows is equal to an increase in native employment associated with equivalent migrant outflows. On the other hand, migration during an economic upturn cannot be bonded with unemployment.

Inflow of working-age EU migrants does not have any statistically significant association, moreover, the results suggest that only recent immigrants (not having been in the country for at least five years) are associated with possible displacement of British workers, but old ones being here for over five years are not.

5.2.5. Inflation Effect

Richard Barwell, senior economist of the Bank of England has highlighted the decisive role of immigrants' length of stay in determining their influence on inflation. “If the majority of immigrants do intend to return home in the near future, it is likely that they will try to save a large fraction of their income. So recent inflows may have had only a muted impact on aggregate demand.” Temporary immigrants likely have a larger impact on aggregate supply than demand, “so migration has probably helped to ease inflationary pressures in the economy, at least temporarily.”\(^9\) This is especially true of EU migration as many of them are guest workers, but far less true of immigration from the Third World.

5.2.6. Labour Shortages

One of the justifications of the Labour government for sustained net immigration was that immigration was required to lower the number of vacancies. But as Figure 5 shows, the increase in immigration between 2001 and 2007 has not contributed to any decline in the overall labour shortages, their number remained around 600,000.

\(^9\) Migration Advisory Committee (January 2012)
\(^9\) Barwell, R. (2007)
If we think over it, the result is simple and clear: large-scale labour immigration augments the overall economy, it cannot be expected to have a strong reducing impact on vacancies. Immigration increases not only the supply of labour, but more or less, depending on the circumstances, the demand for goods and services. Thus, when companies start to recruit new employees to increase production to meet this extra demand, immigration created new vacancies.


5.2.7. Immigrant Workforce in the Public Sector

Public and private industries in which immigrant labour is concentrated are able to keep their labour costs low, which also benefit consumers and taxpayers, who then pay less than they otherwise would for products and services.

It is clear that the low-wage end of the public sector of the UK is heavily dependent on immigrant labour today. Experts argued that raising wages for workers employed in the public sector would go against the cost pressures, and either expectations for cheap government or the scale and standards of services would hurt. According to a doctor who witnessed the Committee: “If there were no immigration, there really would have to be a big re-think about how social care and care of the elderly was organized; really big, back-to-first premises”. In general terms, the employment of migrants is a conscious policy choice to decrease labour costs.

The public health sector has certainly profited from the employment of immigrant doctors, too. They bring their qualifications and expertise from their home country to the UK virtually
for free, while it is a quarter of a million pounds to qualify a doctor within the United Kingdom medical school system.

5.2.8. Work Ethic

In many cases, immigrants, competing for the same low-skilled jobs, are more educated and have lower expectations for earnings and employment conditions offered than the British workers do. Most employers, who were interviewed by the Committee, shared this view, naming work ethic and attitude as one of the main rationale behind the preference of immigrants.95

Sainsbury's, the second largest chain of supermarkets in the UK said: “We have found migrant workers to have a very satisfactory work ethic, in many cases superior to domestic workers”.

The National Farmers Union: migrants “are an attractive source of labour to UK employers because of their work ethos, efficiency and dependency” and that they do jobs “the domestic workforce is unwilling to do”.

Recruitment and Employment Confederation: “sometimes in the UK you almost feel that there is an attitude gap rather than a skills gap”.

The British Hospitality Association: “in many cases, they [migrants] are seen as having more to offer than the domestic workforce”.

Because of the volume and diversity of accessible pool of immigrant labour, a specific request developed for them among certain British employers, sometimes even for special nationalities. There are employers, particularly in low-wage sectors like domestic care and hospitality, who apply stereotyped patterns of “national characteristics” for assessing candidates' appropriateness for specific occupations.

5.2.9. Impacts on Public Services and Public Finance

Although immigration has important economic impacts on public services such as education and health, the current information and data available to estimate the net fiscal effects (the difference between the paid taxes and the costs of consumed public services and benefits) are very limited. Different estimations, built upon the analysis of the period 2003-04, varied from

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£5.3 billion to +£2.6 billion (-0.47% to +0.23% of GDP), which was and is probably still small compared to the size of the total economy.

While the overall impact is small, the differences between particular immigrant groups are considerable, and it is not necessarily the concern of First World – Third World background. An Institute for Public Policy Research study (2007) suggested that immigrant employees from thirteen countries, including either Americans and Zimbabweans, paid more tax and national insurance contributions on average than British citizens, while immigrants eg. from Bangladesh or Turkey paid significantly less. The study also found that almost no Americans and only 1% of Poles and Filipinos asked for income support, related to 39% of Somalis.

It was verified too by a recent report suggesting that between 1995 and 2011 migrants in the UK received £95 billion more in services and benefits than they contributed in taxes (it doesn’t contradict with the previous figures, as the sum divided by the number of years leads to £5.9 billion per year). Breaking this figure down by nationalities, EEA migrants contributed £9 billion more than they consumed while non-EEA migrants, in reverse, consumed £104 billion more than they contributed.

According to the Committee, the reasoning behind the necessity of high immigration to disarm the “pensions time bomb” is rather weak as it is founded on the unreasonable assumption that retirement age won’t be changed as life expectancy increases. It ignores that permanent immigrants, too, will grow old and draw pensions, not mentioning the fact that births are in excess of deaths in the UK even without positive net immigration.

About the methodological questions:

The net fiscal impacts of immigration usually depend on a series of coefficients: immigrants’ age, earnings, their eligibility, and requirement for public services, and benefits; the tax and transfer system, particularly on the degree of income redistribution from high to low-income earners.

There are two possible ways to measure it: the static or “snapshot” approach measures a given period (eg. a year), while the dynamic approach takes a long-term view, for instance covering an immigrant’s entire lifetime. In theory, the long-term approach is more comprehensive but also at the same time more speculative, as it relies heavily on

97 Dustmann, C. - Frattini, T. (2013)
predictions about earnings, employment and state redistribution which are hard to forecast precisely in the long run. The static approach works with historical data, which are at least available and real, but it still requires the above mentioned decisions about what costs and benefits to include, and about how to attribute them to migrants and non-migrants, for example, whether a proportion of defence costs should be attributed to migrants or not.

5.2.10. Rising Population Density: Impacts on Housing

Immigration also influences house prices, partly directly through increasing demand and partly indirectly through boosting the house rental market. In a Goldman Sachs paper it was estimated that a 1% rise in the number of households boosts house prices by 8% in the short term and by 6% in the long term, following the expected increase in stock of housing in respond of house-building market to higher prices.

One of the witnessed experts, Professor Nickell said that between 2000 and 2008 the ratio of average house prices to average annual earnings had risen from 4 to 7, of which 0.5 times increase can be charged on immigrants. His prediction is, if the current rate of house building and a 190,000 net immigration each year persist until 2028, house prices will rise to 10.5 times average income, 13% higher than they would without positive net immigration.

5.3. Conclusion of the Empirical Evidences in Contrast with the Public Opinion

Beyond the general rejection of all immigrants, Britons worry the most about (in order of priorities) housing situation, availability of jobs, crime and usage of public services. These aspects are the focus of the attention of contemporary British society, thereby the all-time government is expected to keep to them, especially before elections – of course, within the framework of EU, until the membership serves its diplomatic and commercial interests.

- Mentioning again the projection of Professor Nickell, if he is right, 13% of the increasing house prices can be written on the account of migration, so the public fear seems to have some foundation.
- The issue of unemployment is less clear, it is under continuous debates. Once, the negative impact of immigration, in general and as a whole, is statistically not proven. Secondly, it has a time dimension, which is underpinned by the theory, too: it probably increases unemployment in the short-run but has almost zero effect in the long-run. According to the Migration Advisory Committee, this temporary period lasts
five years, moreover negative effects emerge under times of recession, otherwise not. Thirdly, the largest part of impact endangers low paid jobs, particularly those ones which are occupied by previous immigrants.

- Earnings, which are connected to the employment topic, are affected negatively at the low end but, from the middle class level, are affected positively. However, the common belief that high immigration causes unemployment influences wage bargain, as employees may become more cautious in their demand for wage rise.

- As my thesis much more focused on economic impacts, and I have never read anywhere that EEA migrants add to crime level, I would not like to state anything in this topic.

- The share of foreign-born population is altogether around 18%, but their net fiscal effects were and is probably nearby -0.5%, so it is small compared to both the size of the total economy and the share of immigrant population. If we divide it, some migrant groups (EEA migrants too) have a slight positive balance while others consumed much more than they contributed. Probably it is a relatively minor advantage, but the low-wage end of the public sector decreases labour costs by the employment of migrants, too.

Putting the evidences together, the impact of EEA migrants can’t be declared to be negative without doubts. Additionally, the lobby of industries employing relatively high share of immigrant labour is satisfied with the work ethic and modesty of their guest workers, so they likely try to counteract the pressure of public opinion. What is more, as it was presented above (pages 47-49.), a vast majority of governments in Earth manage immigration policy always in the mood of general rejection of immigrants independently of the current share of them, which fact means, it is not necessary to convince the people to accept migrants, if a government would like to continue a liberal migration policy. It is enough, if not immigration is the hot potato in the election campaign.

Taking all of these into consideration, I expect British government not to execute an effective intervention in the case of EEA migrants, especially, if economic conditions turn better, because such a confrontation with the European Union simply doesn’t worth.
6. Empirical research on the Hungarian immigrants

6.1. Methodology

I’ve shared a self-made questionnaire at Angliai munkák (Jobs in England) Facebook group and asked my emigrated Hungarian fellow nationals to fill it. The questionnaire itself can be found in the Appendix. After five days, when no more answers came therefore I closed the survey, I had 111 responses and 110 valid ones.

I used a program for statistical analytical, the SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science), to evaluate my survey. During my work, I used most frequently the Crosstab analysis, which is a tool to examine the tie and the strenght of the tie between two nominal or ordinal variable. I used also correlation-analysis to study the bonds (direction and strenght) between numeric variables. If the level of significance between two variables is less than 0.05 there is a statistically verified connection between the variables.

I have examined the following variables:

- Gender; age; rural or urban origin of the respondent;
- Length of stay in Britain; originally planned length of stay; cause of migration; people who gave help to do the first steps (seeking a job and residence);
- Language proficiency;
- Willingness to apply British citizenship;
- Family ties to Hungary or Britain; the nationality of the respondent’s circle of friends; the frequency of keeping contact with relatives in Hungary; degree of interest in Hungarian news;
- Realltionship with other Hungarians in Britain; relationships with other nationals;
- Profession shift between Hungary and Britain; satisfaction with living standard, social life and career in Britain;
- Whether the respondent has savings and if these are for purposes related to Hungary; their opinion about the future of Hungary.

6.2. The Statistical Population

Among the respondents there were 35.5% men and 64.5% women (my ordinary experience is that women answer questionnaires twice as frequently then man, so the proportion doesn’t reflect the real share of genders); 28.2% lived in Budapest, 43.6% lived in cities, and another 28.2% lived in villages or towns before they moved to Britain.
My most substantive experience was that the statistical population was very heterogeneous in most of the aspects I examined it, and I found really few significant associations or correlations that could help me to categorize the population between dimensions.

6.2.1. Age
As we see, more than half of the emigrants are in their twenties. Of course, it can be the result of that the Angliai munkák group is basically a job-seeker page (although only 3 of the respondents have no job presently), and older persons may be less active in Facebook.

10. Chart: Age distribution of the respondents

![Histogram of Age Distribution](chart1.png)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statistics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentile 50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentile 75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6.2.2. English Proficiency
The first column of the 13. Chart represents “under elementary” knowledge (11.8%), latter ones: “elementary” (25.5%), “intermediate” (33.6%), “mastery” (13.6%), “fluent English” (14.5%) and “native” (0.9% - only one respondent). The median is “intermediate”. The language development through the years spent in Britain couldn’t be verified because, while far less long-term
migrants answered than those who spent only one or two years in Britain, most of those who have at least “mastery” knowledge are among the newcomers and the share of people with “elementary” or “under elementary” knowledge remained high (around a third) even after 5 years of residency.

6.2.3. Causes of Migration
The respondents had the possibility to choose more than one cause, so there are overlaps.

- 56% moved because of financial problems.
- 14.5% moved out following a close family member.
- 32% moved out to learn the language.
- 9% to learn in British education.
- 65.5% to work.
- 37% don’t accept Hungarian public life and public mentality.

6.2.4. The Circumstances of Moving out and Presence of Migration Networks
Who the respondents reclined upon during the first times in terms of seeking for job, accommodation or material help:

- Family members living in Hungary: 15.5%
- Friends and relatives in UK: 39%
- Other Hungarians in UK who they met after moving out: 18%
- British persons who they met in Britain: 3.6%
- Organizations and firms taking care of migrants: 8%
- Only themselves: 28%

24.5% reported having at least one relative in Britain. 63% of those who have relatives in Britain had got help from ‘Friend and relatives in the UK’ and it is statistically significant. Of course it doesn’t mean that the other 37% are in a bad relationship with their UK relatives, just maybe they had been the pioneers and were followed by them. 14.5% moved out following a close family member.

Although I admit it to be quite subjective, I tried to make an estimation in how many cases the moving out meant also vocational demotion. I counted shifting from an intellectual profession (or from being university student) to physical one, or from being an entrepreneur to being an employee as a demotion. In this sense 37% were demoted. However, also 16% were
promoted, most frequently shifting from unemployment to having a job. The remaining 46% basically preserved their profession or started to work after general certification.

Only 12% had a concrete job offer before moved, the others started looking for employment there.

6.2.5. Years of Living in Britain and Planning to Move back to Hungary
In spite of the fact that three quarters of the respondents lived in Britain for only 2 years, 53% claimed that they planned originally to stay more than 2 years and only 14% planned exactly less than 2 years. 76.5% don’t plan to come home in the foreseeable future (35.5% answered ’no’, 41% ’maybe, someday’)! Although it is statistically not significant, none of the 10 persons moved out to achieve a British graduation plan to come home!

12. Chart: Number of years spent in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of years spent in Britain</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Valid Percent</th>
<th>Cumulative Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>45.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>30.0</td>
<td>75.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>84.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>89.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>92.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>95.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>97.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>98.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>99.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>.9</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Only 29% of those intending to return plan to stay more than 5 years.

Unsurprisingly, the longer the time a respondent lived in Britain, the higher the chance of having children there: 2% within 0-1 year group, 12% within 1-2 years group, 31.5% within 2-5 years group and 37.5% within the group living for more than 5 years.

The effect of having a love relationship is significant: 90% of those having romances in Britain don’t want to come back in foreseeable time in contrast with 73% of those not having. On the other hand only 4 people have a relationship in Hungary – maybe enamoured people don’t want to move out from the outset.
95% of those (37% of respondents) claiming that Hungarian public mentality is one of their reasons why they emigrated don’t plan to come home in the foreseeable future!

54% think the future of Hungary 8 years ahead will be worse than the present, 88% of them don’t want to return!

3. Tabulation: Hungarian mentality as cause of immigration within the group of respondents planning to stay in Britain

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian mentality as cause of emigration</th>
<th>Planning to return</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Planning to return</em></td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>53,1</td>
<td>13,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 'Hungarian mentality'</td>
<td>70,1%</td>
<td>29,9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>30,9</td>
<td>8,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 'Hungarian mentality'</td>
<td>94,9%</td>
<td>5,1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>84,0</td>
<td>22,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within 'Hungarian mentality'</td>
<td>79,2%</td>
<td>20,8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**6.2.6. Satisfaction with Life in Britain and Social Relationships**

80% are unambiguously more satisfied with their living standard and career opportunities than they were in Hungary, and it doesn’t depend on their English proficiency, the length of stay or even whether they have to work less prestigious occupation than in Hungary.

British citizenship is a highly valued status as not only three quarters of those not intending to return desire it, but one quarter of those planning to move back do so.

41% suffered the loss of their social relationships, while 28% sense neither improvement nor decline, another 31% feel their social life to be better. However, it doesn’t really impact willingness to stay or return.

44.5% have Hungarian good acquaintances, 42% have Hungarian friends, 23% have Hungarian romances. The share of having either acquaintanceships or friendships is independent from previous relationships known from Hungary, so Hungarians are seeking for the companion of one another, however, there are 14.5% reported avoiding fellow Hungarians, because they had disillusioning experiences (“here, Hungarian is the enemy of Hungarian”, “many of them swindle and exploit fellow-countrymen”).

63
51% have other immigrant good acquaintances, 19% have friends among them. Proportion of having non-Hungarian love relationships is negligible.

Still, 42% have British good acquaintances, but only 9% have friendships and it doesn’t depend on their English proficiency nor the length of stay.

The 12% of respondents on his own admission has not any relatives in Hungary. In spite of this it doesn’t affect statistically their will whether coming back Hungary or not, although their exact number in the sample (12/110) is far less to reach significance.

24.5% reported having at least one relative in Britain.

A recent PhD study\textsuperscript{98} suggests that migrants in the UK are likely to cluster around their own diasporas, keeping friendships and relationships with their fellow nationals, living out their lives in ‘a cultural bubble’. In my data only 18% seems to be closed into the ethnic enclave as they have friendships or good acquaintanceships neither with British or other nationals. They do not differ in any studied aspects from other fellow Hungarians, nor even in length of stay or English proficiency.

\textit{80\% use to keep contact with Hungarian relatives at least once per week and it doesn’t really change with time} (among the 8 persons living in Britain for more than 5 years, 3 keep contact weekly, 4 monthly, 1 rarely).

91% of respondents planning to return Hungary are sure in that their children will speak Hungarian as their native language, compared to the 68% of those not planning to return in the foreseeable future.

\textbf{6.2.7. Comparison of My Empirical Study with a Professional One}

Unsurprisingly, a study on A8 migrants\textsuperscript{99} suggested language knowledge is a positive factor in whether the immigrants had received the information they needed, in their likelihood of having British friends and in how well they felt treated by the British people they met.

“...as of April 2004, 79 per cent of those with fluent English said that they spent some or most of their time with British people, falling to 61 per cent for those whose English was adequate and 29 per cent of those with no English. Nevertheless, one in five of those who were fluent

\textsuperscript{98} Toalster, R. (2012)
\textsuperscript{99} Spencer, S. et al. (May 2007)
still said that they spent no time with British people, as did 39 per cent of those who described their English as adequate.”

4. Tabulation: Leisure time spent with Britons by proficiency in English

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No time</th>
<th>Some time</th>
<th>Most time</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fluently</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adequately</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic only</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: survey interviews with migrants, April 2004.


Inspired by this I examined whether there is a tie in my sample between English proficiency and satisfaction with social life or proportion of having British friends. I was more curious about the deepness of social relationships, this is why I haven’t examined the leisure time spent with British people. According to the Bivariate Correlation analysis, examining Spearman’s rho of the two factors, produced no significant tie.

The aforementioned study of Eastern and Central European immigrants suggested a positive correlation between the years spent in Britain and the leisure time spent in British companion:

“During their first six months in the UK, half of the migrants say they spent no leisure time with British people, with 42 per cent saying that they had some leisure contact and just 6 percent that most of their leisure time was already spent with British people. (...) Nevertheless, after two years, one in four still say that they spent no leisure time at all with British people and less than one in five that most of their time was spent with them.”

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100 Ibid. pp. 58.
101 Ibid. pp. 58.
I got similar results as above with English proficiency: the number of years spent in Britain as an independent factor hasn’t resulted significant correlation. I think the cause of these differences can be found in the low rate of respondents living more than 2 years in Britain.

6.2.8. Savings for Purposes Related to Hungary

18% save for a house or flat in Hungary, 14.5% for entrepreneurship, altogether 26% save for at least one of these things.

Respondents saving for at least one would like to return in significantly higher proportions: 53% compared to 9%, so, at least, not having savings for purposes related to Hungary seems to be a good indicator to predict whether an emigrant plans to return or not.

6.2.9. Opinions about the Immigration Issue in UK

Only 5 of the respondents declared a fear that the immigration issue would negatively impact their life in the long term. One of them resented that his Egyptian spouse is not eligible even to come over to the UK.

I would like to cite some expressed opinions:

“To be honest, I heard of it from the Hungarian news... at local level, there is no much word of it!”\(^{102}\)

“In the aspect of employment, it has no influence. Requesting benefit, however, has really became harder.”\(^{103}\)

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\(^{102}\) Erről inkább a magyar sajtóból értesülök... helyi szinten nem sokat hallani erről!

\(^{103}\) Munkavállalás szempontjából nincs befolyással. Támogatásigénylést viszont valóban megnehezítették
“Here, no one can perceive anything of it. They just show it outside to stop immigrants, because the population of London is made up more than half of foreigners.”

“If somebody has a good profession, accepted qualification or graduation, has a good command of English, and doesn’t come for social benefits, but works hard – he will be more appreciated than at home.”

“Against Hungarians this mood cannot be perceived, and anyone speaking English well cannot sense its disadvantages. (Particularly against Polish, Romanian and Bulgarian people there is some dislike.)”

“It will be harder to arrange the initial administration, eg. registration at the Agency, opening a bank account, etc.”

6.3. Summery of the Survey

In the sphere of English proficiency, my results were by and large similar to the above mentioned 2007 research (page 33). A bit more than a quarter of respondents have at least mastery level, a third have adequate/intermediate level, and somewhat more than a third have basic or below basic level. It would be interesting to find out what is behind the fact that a third of the respondents live in Britain for years without improving their rather weak English knowledge.

The 2006 Labour Force Survey (page 38) detected 80% employment rate among A8 migrants – my results were even better: although ’Angliai munkák’ is a job seeker group, I found only 3 unemployed people.

The respondents were usually delighted with their life: in spite of the relative majority (41%) suffered the shift in their social life, 80% reported obvious development in their financial situation and career chances.

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104 Itt kint nem érezni belőle semmit. Ezt csak kifelé mutattják, hogy ne jöjjön még több bevándorló, mivel London lakosságának már több mint 50%-a külföldi.
105 Ha valakinek jó szakmája van, végzettségét, diplomáját elfogadják, jö nyelvtudása van és nem a szociális juttatásokéért jön, hanem jól dolgozik, jobban meg fogják becsülni, mint otthon.
106 Magyarokkal szemben ezt a hangulatot nem érezni, aki pedig egyébként is jól beszél angolul, nem igazán érzi ennek hátrányát. (Főleg a lengyelekkel, románokkal és bolgárokkal szemben van néha ellenszenv.)
107 Egyre nehezebb a kezdeti ügyintézéseket lebonyolítani, pl. Agencyben regisztrálni, bankszamlát nyítni stb.
Answering the question if they will stay in Britain or return to Hungary, I found a strange contradiction: although three quarters declared to stay for an unspecified time, the number of respondents steeply decreased with their number of years spent in Britain. I can’t really explain this phenomenon, maybe a professional survey would be able to reveal whether a high rate of return is behind it or it is just a mistake of data collection. Anyway, this proportion is higher than even the most extreme results British think tanks published (MigrationWatch UK, page 37).

Watching only the intention of staying, I found four variables which appear to be good predictors, among which the first one is the weakest: having a love relationship in Britain; thinking that Hungary’s future perspective is sad; the emigrant is disgusted with “the Hungarian mentality”; and, not surprisingly, not having savings for purposes in Hungary.

Assuming that respondents who decided to stay really remain in Britain, one can expect a stepwise erosion of Hungarian culture. Only four in ten respondents have Hungarian friends, however, nearly 15% avoid Hungarian companion. 32% of those not planning to return are not sure in that their children will speak Hungarian as their native language. Probably the Hungarian identity of the second generation will be even weaker, so the process speeds up.

Conclusions of the Thesis

Following the alignment of evidences, probably we are able to settle the second of the two research questions, while we have just circumstantial evidences to answer the first one.

1. **Do the emigrant Hungarians in the United Kingdom probably return to Hungary or not?** Having a sight of their satisfaction with their welfare, and assuming that it depends solely on their free will, we could say that they may return if their personal possibilities in Hungary become attracting enough – due to either their accumulated economic and human capital to invest/utilize in Hungary, or their homesickness if a vacation is less than enough to compensate them. Otherwise, if the unemployment rates and economic prospects of the UK decay, it may incite a backward migration as we have seen in the Polish example (page 39). However, it is something that one can say about any permanent migrant on Earth. On the other hand, we can search for predictor variables such as my “got disgusted with Hungarian mentality” was, because, despite being hard to define, it is something pointing at the eroding social cohesion of Hungary, which phenomenon incites strong-minded and ambitious Hungarians to leave the country not only because of material reasons but to look for
another community to belong to. Another aspect of this “mentality” is the mistrust toward fellow-countrymen that some respondents stressed.

2. Is the British government really intending to and does it have effective policy assets to limit Central Eastern European migration? Until it would like to maintain the UK’s free access to the European common market, the answer is definitely not, it has at best administrative tricks to render the newcomer immigrants’ introductory period more difficult or propaganda assets to discourage them. Beyond the government, however, the society itself is able to put a pressure of hidden or open negative discrimination to immigrants, if it will. For our fortune or deuce, according to the surveyed Hungarians, most of Britons seem to be open and behave fairly with anybody who has a good command of English and accepts their customs, which claim is not in contradiction with the results of various studies, presenting the thousands of strings which bonds British industry and public service sector to immigrants.

3. Despite of not being a preliminary research question, one of the most interesting results of this work is that the rejection or acceptance of immigrants by a majority of the society is suspicious to be culturally encoded (pages 47-50), like attitudes toward “big” or “small” state, trust in well-performing free markets, and permission of homosexual marriage. An average citizen does not have an adequate knowledge about these topics to formulate a well-established opinion, hence it seems to be logical that public rejection or even acceptance of immigration is based on a similar prejudice – although may origins from past societal experiences – like the above mentioned examples. It is far beyond the framework of this work, but a further research may worth to reveal the origins of this attitude of the British public thought.
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Appendix

„Magyarok Nagy-Britanniában - hazajönnek-e még?” Kérdőíves kutatás

Mi az Ön neme?

Nő 71 64%
Férfi 40 36%
Egyéb 0 0%

Milyen idős?

35 36 33 34 39 37 38 42 41 40 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 30 31 17 18 21 20 59 55 48 45 44 47 46 52 53 50

Milyen nagy településen élt, mielőtt Nagy-Britanniába költözött?

Falu, kisváros 31 28%
Város 49 44%
Budapest 31 28%

Mennyire beszéli jól az angolt?

Alapfok alatt 13 12%
Alapfok 29 26%
Középfok 37 33%
Felsőfok 15 14%
Fluent English 16 14%
Anyanyelvi szinten 1 1%

Beszél-e más idegen nyelvet?

Nem 82 74%
Még egyet legalább középfokon 21 19%
Még egyet legalább felsőfokon 5 5%
Még kettőt legalább középfokon 0 0%
Több nyelvet és/vagy jobban tudok 3 3%
Van-e olyan közeli hozzátartozója, aki Magyarországhoz köti?

Nincs 13 11%
Szerelmi kapcsolat 4 3%
Gyermek 12 10%
Egyéb (pl. testvér) 87 75%

Van-e olyan közeli hozzátartozója, aki Nagy-Britanniához köti?

Nincs 44 35%
Szerelmi kapcsolat 41 32%
Gyermek 15 12%
Egyéb (pl. testvér) 27 21%

Ha van párja, milyen nemzetiségű?

Nincs párom 20 18%
Magyar 76 68%
Brit 5 4%
Másmilyen 11 10%

Hány éve van Nagy-Britanniában?

<1 0.5 1.5 0 6 1, 5 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4 9 8 11 0,2 0,1 0,6 0,5 0,24 Másfél 2,5 6 0,5 1,5 5 hónap

Milyen időtartamra tervezett eredetileg kimenni?

Kevesebb, mint 1 év 7 6%
2 évnel kevesebb 8 7%
2-5 év 16 14%
5 évnél hosszabb időre 38 34%
Nem volt terv 42 38%

Miért ment ki Nagy-Britanniába?

Anyagi nehézségek miatt, kényszerből 63 26%
Dolgozni (konkrét állásajánlattal) 20 8%
Dolgozni (de állást csak itt kerestem) 33 14%
Kiváncsiságból 14 6%
Családtag után mentem, hogy együtt lehessünk 16 7%
Nyomaszt a magyar közélet, gondolkodásmód 42 17%
Nyelvet tanulni 35 14%
Brit diplomát szerezni 10 4%
Egyéb 10 4%
Számíthatott-e valakire a kiköltözéssel járó kezdeti nehézségek leküzdésében, beilleszkedésben, álláskeresésben vagy akár anyagi problémákban?

Nem, egyedül boldogultam 34 23%
Rokonok, barátok, akiket még otthonról ismert 43 29%
Hazai rokonok, barátok 18 12%
Más magyarok, akiket Nagy-Britanniában ismert meg 22 15%
Britek, akiket Nagy-Britanniában ismert meg 5 3%
Nagy-Britanniában élő más nemzetiségű bevándorlók 10 7%
Kiköltözéssel, letelepedéssel foglalkozó cég, vagy szervezet 11 7%
Egyéb 7 5%

Mivel foglalkozott Magyarországon?

valalkozo vallalkozo Auto mosot vezettem. munkenélküli értékesítő, cégvezető hr munkatars Biztonsági őr diak Tanuló egyetemi hallgato, adatrogzito könyvelő gimnáziumi diák szocialis gondozo posta vezeto főiskolai hallgató tanulo Vállalkozó fordító, tanár Hallgato Programozó Közös képviselő munkanélküli gyari munkas Gyógyszártári szakasszisztens Szerződéses katona alkalmazott irodavezető szakacs Térinformatikus Ápolónő munkanélküli mutosno Villanyszerelő diáj nagybritanniában ismert meg 22 15%
Britek, akiket Nagy-Britanniában ismert meg 5 3%
Nagy-Britanniában élő más nemzetiségű bevándorlók 10 7%
Kiköltözéssel, letelepedéssel foglalkozó cég, vagy szervezet 11 7%
Egyéb 7 5%

Mivel foglalkozott Nagy-Britanniában?

takarító vallalkozo Biztonsági őr tanulo Ua gondozo egy szociális otthonban Gyári operátor diak uzletbezo chef kisfiammal vagyok itthol Gyári munka Nanny Gyárban dolgozom Hotel Porter Programozó munkanélküli Alkalmazott Szakács Ápoló housekeeping szakács Házi ápoló vállalkozó pincer personal assistant nyomdai munkaval vendéglátás raktáros Vendéglátás Auto mosot vezetek pincér Double glaze unit maker hotel szobaserviz floor supervisor raktár termék csomagolás adminisztráció carer Gyermeket nevelek pizza futár F&B assistant takaritas gyereket nevelek costumer service vállalkozó takarito carer,student at college autot mosok idősmeditózás Takarító filmipar felszolgalo bárpultos Idegenforgalom epítőipar shéf Vendéglátás Auto mosot vezetek pincér Double glaze unit maker hotel szobaserviz floor supervisor raktár termék csomagolás adminisztráció carer Gyermeket nevelek pizza futár F&B assistant takaritas gyereket nevelek costumer service vállalkozó takarito carer,student at college autot mosok idősmeditózás Takarító filmipar felszolgalo bárpultos Idegenforgalom epítőipar shéf Mindenes / Most Sofor Raktári munka (part time); Pénztáros (part time) gépbeállító autómentes takarítás vendéglátóipar várónő jelenleg semmivel felszolgoló housekeeping aktiv munka kereső Gyári Munkavállalat recepcióval szobalany tanuló hentes pincerno Takaríras, felszolgalas Accountant gyári dolgozó takarítok subway manager Fostering Shef Szakmunkás(KERTÉSZ) eladó hotelben dolgozom köműves trainer au pair Takarítás Manager fordító, médiaelemző Vendéglátás PhD internetes kutat Sofor student in college head housekeeper Eladó Team leader vagyok munka(raktári) Au pair maid takarítok
Milyen az életszínvonala? [Kérem, hasonlítsa össze mostani életét a korábbi magyarországi életével!]

1 3  3%  
2 3  3%  
3 16 14%  
4 33 30%  
5 56 50%

Milyen a társasági élete? [Kérem, hasonlítsa össze mostani életét a korábbi magyarországi életével!]

1 12 11%  
2 33 30%  
3 32 29%  
4 21 19%  
5 13 12%

Milyennek látja a karrierlehetőségeit? [Kérem, hasonlítsa össze mostani életét a korábbi magyarországi életével!]

1 2  2%  
2 6  5%  
3 15 14%  
4 39 35%  
5 49 44%

Van megtakarítása?

Van  80 72%  
Nincs 31 28%

Ha van megtakarítása, gyűjt-e valamilyen Magyarországi célra?

Saját lakás/ház  21 17%  
Vállalkozás  16 13%  
Fogyasztás otthon  9  7%  
Tanulmányok (tandíj kifizetése)  9  7%  
Egyik sem  72 57%
Milyen mély kapcsolata van kinti magyarokkal?

Nincs külön kapcsolatom ittani magyarokkal 16 12%
Vannak jó ismerőseim, haverjaim (de nem barátok) 51 37%
Vannak barátaim (akik a haveroknál többet jelentenek) 45 33%
A párom ittani magyar 25 18%

Ha azt válaszolta, hogy nincs kapcsolata kinti magyarokkal, mi ennek az oka?

A magyar mentalitást a legtöbbüknek nem sikerült otthon hagynia. Veszélyesek, mert legjobban a magyar használja ki a magyart. Az angolokban ritkán fordul meg hasonló. A könnyebb felé történő elmozdulás elvére alapján, sokkal több értelme van angolokkal üzletelni és kapcsolatot tartani. - nem kell közben folyton a háttám mögé is nézni. Afeléseget meg otthonrol ismerem. az ittani magyarak legtobbszor ki akarnak használni. nem ismertem itt senkit amikor kijött - Nagyon sok magyar inkább aláás a másik magyarknak, nemhogy segítse. A legtöbb lenézi a másikat, képmutató. Nem lehet megbízni bennük, pletykásak. heti 6-7 nap munka az egyszem szabadnapomon örölkők hogy luk van a seggemen ráadásul az utazás méregdrága. Nincs rather ido. Pussz inkább baratkozom pozitív szemleletű emberekkel. Van kapcsolatom, de nagyon kevéssel. Oka egyszerű: rossz tapasztalatok. Engem is egy magyar "hívott" ki fix munkalehetőségre, aztán ott álltam a reptéren két bőrönddel és egy azóta is elérhetetlen telefonzámmal. Szóval nem is nulláról, inkább minusz blot indultam, egyedül. Tül sokat csalódottam, megloptak,atverték sajnos. Nem szabad velük foglalkozni itt is olyanok a magyarak mint otthon , nincs összetartás, segítség...: irigység A magyarak itt is képtelen levetkőzni magyar mívoltukat: irigý, alattomos, stb. Azért jött ebbe az országra ,hogy ezekkel a viselkedésformákkal se én se gyermekeim ne találkozson. Az eletemben nincs szükseggem az általános negativoskodasukra. Van magyar baratom, szoval nem zarami ki az eletemből oket. Apro megjegyzes: itt Londonban nem jellemző az összetartás a magyarakra. Rengetegen becsapják, kihasználják honfitarsaikat.előbb utobb osztonosn tavolsagtartova válsz, es sajna mivel a sajat eledet, gondod- bájod, munkad utan rohansz kevesbe tudsz-akarsz segíteni semmire.....es maris bunko vagy azok szerint, akik AZT velik, h ITT kolbaszbol van a kerítés, es a penz az egbol potyog.. Nem fűjt össze velük a szél, öszintén szólváva nem is hiányoznak. Aittalaban a magyarak csak atverik egymást Idekinn a magyarral a magyarnak(sajnos!) Saját tapasztalat! Ha az ember kicsit többet tud angolul a másik magyarnál(akivel dolgozik vagy lakik) az megpróbál keresztre tenni. Nem fogok másnak segíteni semmiben, nekem sem segített senki. ha barátkozom, nem veszem figyelembe a nemzetiségi viszonyokat, tehát akivel kijövők és véletlennel magyar, azzal tartom a kapcsolatot, de nem keresem a magyarak társaságát. van elég magyar barátok otthon és itt is. egy régi barátom dolgozik egy másik városban és itt ismertem meg barátkong keresztül egy párt. akiket ismerek, azokkal mind régi ismerős hozott össze. Messze élnek tőlem, illetve borzasztóan alpáriak és kihasználják a saját népük tagjait idekint. Nem vagyok a magyarakra kíváncsi...

Milyen gyakran érintkezik hazai magyarokkal, családdal, barátokkal, ismerősökkel?

Napi kapcsolat 40 36%
Hetente legalább egyszer 49 44%
Havonta legalább egyszer 15 14%
Rítkábban 7 6%
Milyen gyakran jár haza?

Havonta vagy gyakrabban 2 2%
Évente néhányszor 54 49%
Évente egyszer 44 40%
Ritkábban 11 10%

Ha van/lesz gyereke, fontosnak érzi-e, hogy megtanuljon anyanyelvi szinten magyarul?

Mindenképp 80 72%
Igen, de nem biztos, hogy így is lesz 21 19%
Nem 10 9%

Magyarországi politikai, gazdasági hírek, események [Kérem egy 0-tól 4-ig terjedő skálán értékelje, hogy mennyire érdeklődik Önt az alábbiak!]

0 22 20%
1 26 23%
2 20 18%
3 25 23%
4 18 16%

Magyarországi kulturális események [Kérem egy 0-tól 4-ig terjedő skálán értékelje, hogy mennyire érdeklődik Önt az alábbiak!]

0 37 33%
1 13 12%
2 32 29%
3 20 18%
4 9 8%

Magyarországi bulvárhírek [Kérem egy 0-tól 4-ig terjedő skálán értékelje, hogy mennyire érdeklődik Önt az alábbiak!]

0 74 67%
1 16 14%
2 15 14%
3 4 4%
4 2 2%
Mit gondol Magyarország jövőjéről 8 év múlva?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Válasz</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jobb lesz</td>
<td>11 10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nem lesz se jobb, se rosszabb</td>
<td>18 16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosszabb lesz</td>
<td>60 54%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nem tudom</td>
<td>22 20%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Milyen mély a kapcsolata britekkel?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Válasz</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A mindennapi ügyeken kívül nem foglalkozom velük</td>
<td>47 40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vannak jó ismerőseim, havérjaim (de nem barátok)</td>
<td>51 43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vannak barátaim (akik a havérknál többet jelentenek)</td>
<td>15 13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A párom brit</td>
<td>5  4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Mondjon 3-5 olyan dolgot, ami a leginkább színpattikus a brit életmódban/ kultúrában/emberekben!

- Anyagi biztonság, ha dolgozik az ember - Vidámság, nyitottság, érdeklődés Nyugodtak, illedelmesek, felszabadultak. Tabu a maganeletük,a hetvege a csalade,szeretik a magyarak nem itélkeznek külső alapján, bőr szín.stb, bitonyítani kell a hozzáértésed és ez alapján itélnek Nyugalom, pozitívvabb szemlelet, nagyrobb anyagi biztonság közvetlenség segítőkészség nyugodtság kulturált sorbaállás, rend,tisztság szinte mindenhol,a nyugodtságuk,a futballkultúra, London Kiegyensúlyozottak Kedvesek Nyugodtak Előzékenek Közúti közlekedésben nem agresszívak segítőkészség rengeteg lehetőség nem itélkeznek előre az emberek Anyagi biztonság, stresszmentesebb élet Udvariassag, elheto mindennapok, szeles kulturalis lehetőségek stresszmentes,könnyebb megélhetés Nyugalom, sokszínűség, kedvesség -Vidámabb az élet idekinn... alapvetően az életszínvonal miatt is gondolom ezt. Segítőkészség, udvariasság!!!!, elbővülő kertkultúra, pozitív egymáshoz való hozzáállás. Nincs eleteles, ha mashogy is nezek ki nem ciki.Ha tul extremre sikerült a hajam nem leneznak hanem megdíszernek. Sokkal jobb az életszínvonal Aranyosak, barátságosak, segítőkészek Sok program várja az embereket városszerte Segítőkészség, nyugalom, baratsagosság, elfogadás senkit nem érdekel ki hogy néz ki, csak az milyen ember. nekem csak jó élményem van, befogadóak voltak velem mindig. szeretem a száraz, bozasszántos humorukat és a dél-angol laszását. egy kívándorlással megtanulja az ember, hogy nem számít ki honnan jött, mert az emberek úgyis mindenhol egyformák, a szó jó és rossz értelmében. nem britek között élek és dolgozom, amit gondolok róluk az sem pozitív Nyitottság, Elfogadás, Segítőkészség, Lazaság stresszmentes ovezet tisztelet biztonság laza Mas eletelfogas. Boldogabbak az emberek. Baratságosabbak. nyugodtabban élnek az anyagi biztonság tudatában, kedvesek,segítőkészek, hagyománytiszteletűk nyugodtak türelmesek pozitív gondolkodás (nincs is nagy ok idegeskedni) Nem tudok Béke van. Ha nem ad rá okot az ember, akkor senki sem piszkálja, sőt, ha valakinek segítségre van szüksége megkapja. Akár a helyi adóhatóságtól vagy a banktól is. Sokkal lazábban veszik a dolgokat. Nagyon kedvesek és segítőkészek. Boldogok és optimistán tekintenek a jövőre. életszínvonal, kulturalis elet sokszínű, elfogadás magasabb szintu, udvariassag, segítőkészség, parkok Többet mosolyognak, segítőkészek, kevésbé stresszes munkahelyek Barátságisabbak.segítőkészebebb.kedvesebb.ukyan annyiba kerül minden de a fizetés az otthoni többszöröse. Elismernek, könnyebb barátkozni, segítőkészek / Segítőkészek, kedvesek, udvariassak. semmi udvariassababbak mosolyognak olsó az élelmiszer Nem igen ismertem meg az 5 hónap alatt a brit életmódot és kultúrát. Ahol lakom ott kifejezetten brit
egy sem lakik. Csak arabok, feketsék. Nyugodtabb, segítőkészek! A magyarok, nyugalmal van, sokkal kiszámíthatóbb az élet jobb a támogatási rendszer elfogadóbbok több a lehetőség bacon halloween mindig kedvesek.

Szozialis segélyezés, orvosi ellátás, színvonalú közlekedés, Stresszmentes gondolkodás. Nem stresszelnél értekelik az embert Szeretnek szorakozni Tavolsag tartó. Vannak lehetőségek, mert a távoli országban, az élelmiszer és ruha sokkal jobb minőséggel, a szolgáltatások is olcsóbbak. Emellett kevésbé ragaszkodnak a személyes társkeresőkhoz, amikor a kommunikáció segítőkészetesség mellett, az emberek nyugodtabbak, vidámabbak, az élelmiszer és ruha okosabb, a gyógyszeres kezelés is könnyebb.

Számos megvalósulásban, politikai vagy más, sokkal jobb a biztonság, a nyugalmi élet évszázadokig. Az emberek kedvesek, segítőkészek, nagyon barátságosak az emberek. Tudják, hogy a zövön a gyalogosoknak van eloszlása! Nem stresszelnek Ertekelik az embert Szeretőkészek. Tavolsag tartóként van lehetőség a Halloween mindig kedvesek.

Nyugalmi élet, jobb a társadalom elfogadóbbak több a lehetőség az emberek kedvesek, segítőkészek. Nagyon barátságosak az emberek. Tudják, hogy a zövön a gyalogosoknak van eloszlása! Nem stresszelnek Ertekelik az embert Szeretőkészek. Tavolsag tartóként van lehetőség a Halloween mindig kedvesek.

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nyílvanas helyen, irodaban vagy barhol. A hazak nagyon egyformak, nehany helyen zsufoltak és egymásra epultek...nincs meg a hazaknak az egyenisege. Brit konyha (hiányzik sok magyar étel) vékony házfal (3 helyen laktam, mindenhol tapasztaltam. Nyilván a jobbat meg kell fizetni) x Ráérősek, lusták, buták tea Sokan felszínesek, nem őszinték. Sokaknak vannak előítéleteik a bevándorlókkal szemben - sajnos nem ok nélkül. Ételek, lustaság, időjárás A munkaszervezés nem erős. A tömegközlekedés nem olcsó, bar megkeresik a ravalot. A nedves levego miatt gyakran kell peneszt takaritani. Mindennapi teazas - az angolok alapvetően kétszínűek (tisztelet a kivételnek) de sokszor kiütközik a rasszizmus, lenézés - keverő csaptelep ritka, külön csapból jön a hideg és a meleg víz - nehéz magyar izmekhez jutni a boltokban, legalábbis itt, vidéken - a munkáltatók sokszor húlyének nézik a külföldi munkavállalót a gyerek neveles az borzalmas nem csalad centrikusak, nincs, talan a husos pitek Nem ismerem oket annyira, nekem kollegaim feher angolok, ok olyanok mint fent említettem. Laktatas. A hazak. mindent meg lehet szokni beépíteni az életmódba ki mire mennyire nyitott nem tudnak gyereket nevelni (pórázon tartják őket) figyelmetlenek egymással szemben nem foglalkoznak a környezetvédelemmel (a WC 20 literrel öblít, a füttés megy ezrel, de az ablakok szigetelése egy vicc, mindent beszamosnak ahányszor csak tudnak) a közlekedés furcsa - nincs konnektor a fürdőszobában 2-jellemző a külön forro ill. hidegvizes csap 3-izetlen receptek Igénytelenebbek, miret ételek túlnyomó többsége, gáttal magasabbak Semmit nem tudok erre írni. Alkalmazkodni kell. Gasztronómiai hianyosságok, nehany nemzetiség bevándorlása, ejel nincs metro koszos undornány bevándorlók lakják az utca tiszta szemét mindenhol a házak papírból vannak szarik mindenki a környezetvédelemre a kaja undornánynak "hal és hasábburgonya" a nemzeti étele elhez ezt hiszem nem is kell hozzáfűzni semmit előitelet megkülönböztetés kirekeszes lassu ugyintéztes, sokuknak, nincs wc a legtöbb helyen nincs ilyen A legnehezebben felfoghatatő hogy miért egy másik országban kell élni ahhoz hogy "élhessek" és miért nem tehetem a hazámban! Miért nem kap egy magyar ember Magyarországon ugyanakkora szeletet az ételt tartják? Túl sok a törvény melyel az embereket nagy nyomás és feszültség alá vetik! Sok fele kultúra keveredése és ember csoportok keveredése! - Kifacsart, nem logikus angolszász "logika" - Kissé csőlátók, nehezen veszik az újdonságokat, új megoldásokat, abszolút nem szeretne eltérni a már kijárt, "elvárt" úttől - Sokszor túl harsány, néha már kifejezetten kellemetlen vérmérséklet egészségtelen ételek, rossz humor, más felfogás Nyelv - területi akcentusok A szánkkra más/új gondolkodásmódjuk a mindennapokról. Közlekedés/tömegközlekedés (nem a baloldali közlekedés miatt) Egyes, más bevándorlók írígysége. Nincs ilyen. Én választottam az otszágot, elfogadom olyannak az emereket, amilyenek Időjárás, neveletlen gyerekek. Sokféle brit akcentust nehéz megérténi. Itt Skóciában a Whisky szósz az ételhez nem túl igazán szólnak rá, ha rosszalkodnak. Rájuk hagynak mindent... higiénia hiánya Rendetlenek, felszínes udvariaskodas, Nem szeretnek füteni, szegényes gasztronómia, külön csap a meleg és hideg víznek

Szeretne brit állampolgárságot?

| Nem     | 39 35% |
| Igen    | 71 64% |
| Már az vagyok | 1% |
Tervez-e hazaköltözni?

Igen, egy éven belül 6 5%
Igen, néhány éven belül 16 14%
Talán egyszer 45 41%
Nem 40 36%
Ingázó életmódot szeretnél folytatni 4 4%

Biztosan értesült róla, hogy erősödött a bevándorlás-ellenes közhangulat az utóbbi években Nagy-Britanniában, ami hat a kormány politikájára is. Befolyással van ez az Ön életére? Ha igen, hogyan?

igénylésén, hogy bebiztosítsam magam. Nem erzem. Nincs befolyással egyelőre nincs
Személyesen nem igazan befolyásol. A britek jo resze udvarias, es (elottem) nem mond
velemenyt, ha a letelepedesi szandekomról kerdez. Latszolag nem a nyelvet beszelo es
dolgozni akaro emberek okozzak a legnagyobb gondot, hanem azok, akik szocialis
juttatásokból akarnak elni. nincs befojassal az etetemre. felsovezetokent dolgozom velem nem
ereztetik Nem befolyásolja az etetem. nem rosszabb lesz a megélhetés és a pénz
kereseti lehetőség Erről inkább a magyar sajtóból értesülök... helyi szinten nem sokat hallani erről! Én
semmit sem éreztem ebből. Igazából nagyon nem, mert már majdnem 3 éve vagyok itt.
választások lesznek, természetes hogy a kormány próbál a választói kedvére tenni látszat vagy
látszólag drasztikus intézkedésekkkel. A múltkor bementünk egy barátommal (magyar) egy
pub-ba és amikor magyarul kezdtünk beszélni, hát épphogy ki nem néztek minket, szóval van
azért ilyen is. London más például, ott jobban elfogadják a külföldit, hiszen lassan mindenki
az, tekintve hogy a lakosság 35%-a brit csak. :-) Nem érezhető! eddig még nem erzékeltem
Nincs, mert nem azért jötem ki hogy kihasználjam a rendszert (ahogy sok más külföldi),
hanem hogy dolgozzak és tanuljak, amivel a britteknk semmi gondjuk. Csak 7 honapja
vagyok itt, de nem tapasztaltam ilyen fajta negativumot.

Milyen mély a kapcsolata nem magyar bevándorlókkal?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nincs külön kapcsolatom velük</th>
<th>36 31%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Vannak jó ismerőseim, haverjaim (de nem barátok)</td>
<td>57 49%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vannak barátaim (akik a haveroknál többet jelentenek)</td>
<td>21 18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A párom nem magyar bevándorló</td>
<td>3 3%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>